Donald J. Gordon

The moving party sought an order staying the respondent's action until a costs award in favour of a former co-defendant was paid in full.

The respondent claimed impecuniosity but provided no financial disclosure to support the claim.

The court found that court orders must be enforced and that the respondent had made no voluntary effort to pay the costs award.

The court granted the motion, staying the action until the costs are paid and setting a deadline for payment, failing which the moving party may move to dismiss the claim.

This supplementary endorsement addresses the costs of an unsuccessful motion for leave to appeal brought by the plaintiff.

The defendants, having been entirely successful, were presumptively entitled to costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The court found the amounts claimed by the defendants' counsel to be excessive for a straightforward leave to appeal motion heard in writing, particularly the time allocated for legal research and drafting.

The court significantly reduced the claimed costs, setting a cap for fees on such motions, and awarded specific amounts to each defendant group.

The plaintiff brought a Rule 21 motion seeking a determination on the applicable prejudgment interest rate in a solicitor's negligence action, specifically whether the rate should be from the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS) or the Courts of Justice Act.

The court declined to determine the issue on a motion, finding that a trial judge with a full evidentiary record would be in a better position to assess the relevant factors and avoid a potentially punitive outcome, leaving the interest rate dispute for trial.

The applicant, Georgios Lekkas, and the respondent, Helen Lekkas, each brought a motion to change a 2007 final consent order.

Mr. Lekkas sought to terminate child support obligations, arguing the children were adults and employed.

Ms. Lekkas sought child support, spousal support, payment of arrears for child support and s. 7 expenses, and a $2 million property settlement.

The court found that Ms. Lekkas failed to establish higher income or fraud by Mr. Lekkas.

Child support was terminated as of the children's college graduation dates.

Claims for support arrears and retroactive s. 7 expenses by Ms. Lekkas were dismissed, as arrears were paid and s. 7 claims were unsubstantiated and delayed.

The spousal support claim was dismissed due to no material change in circumstances and a prior Criminal Injuries Compensation Board decision rejecting Ms. Lekkas's claims of abuse-related disability.

The property claim was dismissed as it was statute-barred.

Mr. Lekkas's motion was granted, and Ms. Lekkas's motion was dismissed, with costs awarded to Mr. Lekkas.

The moving parties, who were the attorneys for property and personal care for their elderly father, brought a motion for an interim order restricting the father from leaving his long-term care facility except for medical appointments.

The responding parties, the other sons, opposed the motion, wishing to take the father on outings.

The court reviewed medical evidence indicating the father had advanced dementia, mobility limitations, and required assistance with daily living.

Finding that the responding parties provided no medical evidence to contradict the treating physician's recommendation, the court granted the order restricting the father's removal from the facility and awarded costs to the moving parties.

The parties executed minutes of settlement following a pretrial conference, which required the exchange of a mutual release.

The moving party sought a general release barring all claims, including a private criminal information, while the responding parties sought a release limited to the civil action.

The court found there was no meeting of the minds regarding the scope of the release, as the responding party secretly intended to pursue criminal charges.

The motion to approve either draft release was dismissed, and the action was ordered restored to the trial list if no agreement could be reached.

The defendant movie theatre brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prohibit the plaintiff and his litigation guardian from picketing outside the theatre and publishing allegedly defamatory statements on social media.

The underlying action involved a personal injury claim where the plaintiff allegedly suffered catastrophic injuries after choking on popcorn.

The court dismissed the motion on procedural grounds, finding it lacked jurisdiction to grant an interlocutory injunction because the defendant had not claimed a permanent injunction in the existing or any intended proceeding.

The court also noted that the defendant's evidentiary record was insufficient to meet the substantive requirements of the RJR-MacDonald test.

The individual defendants brought an urgent motion to stay the execution of a summary judgment granting the plaintiff possession of their personal residences following a corporate loan default.

The defendants argued the plaintiff should first realize on the bankrupt corporation's assets.

The court found it had inherent jurisdiction to grant a stay but declined to do so, ruling the motion was an impermissible collateral attack because the defendants failed to seek this relief during the original summary judgment motion.

The court also found the defendants failed to prove the corporate assets had sufficient value to satisfy the debt.

The motion was dismissed.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order compelling the production of historical medical records dating back to 2000 in a personal injury action.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal primarily because it was served out of time and the plaintiff did not seek an extension.

The court also noted that the motion would fail on the merits, as the requested records were relevant to the plaintiff's pre-existing complaints and proportional to the $2 million damages claim.

Following a successful application regarding a dispute between a first and second mortgagee, the applicant sought costs of $43,885.29.

The respondent did not deliver costs submissions.

The court found the requested amount, calculated on a partial indemnity basis up to the date of an offer to settle and substantial indemnity thereafter, to be reasonable and awarded the full amount.

The applicant mother sought leave to appeal a temporary order that granted the respondent father overnight parenting time on Tuesdays.

The applicant argued the motions judge erred in her use of a custody and access assessment report.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the motions judge properly considered the assessment report under the Children's Law Reform Act and that the applicant failed to meet the test for leave to appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on a substantial indemnity basis.

Following a trial regarding child support, the court considered written submissions on costs.

The applicant sought up to $58,050 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court noted that success was divided, both parties were responsible for an unacceptable 14-year delay, and the respondent failed to provide full financial disclosure.

Considering proportionality and the parties' unreasonable positions, the court awarded the applicant $12,000 in costs on a partial indemnity basis.

This supplementary endorsement addresses the issue of costs following the defendant's successful summary judgment motion.

The defendant sought a partial indemnity cost award of $21,500.

The plaintiff opposed, citing impecuniosity, an excessive claim, and the defendant's professional malpractice insurance.

The court dismissed the insurance argument and, while acknowledging the plaintiff's financial hardship, found the defendant's discounted cost claim reasonable.

A cost award of $18,000 was ordered, emphasizing the plaintiff's responsibility for failing to present evidence despite adjournments.

The applicant mother sought retrospective and prospective child support and section 7 expenses from the respondent father.

The court imputed income to the father due to problematic rental business accounting and delayed application for disability benefits.

The court ordered prospective guideline child support, a percentage of future section 7 expenses, and a lump sum for retrospective support and expenses, while deferring the determination of post-secondary expenses as premature.

The applicant, a second mortgagee, sought a determination of the date the respondent, the first mortgagee, became a mortgagee in possession.

The court examined the terms of a forbearance agreement between the first mortgagee and the mortgagor, along with the parties' conduct.

The court concluded that the first mortgagee took complete control of the property and the mortgagor's business operations through the forbearance agreement, thereby becoming a mortgagee in possession on the date the agreement was signed, rather than the later date of the mortgagor's bankruptcy.

This determination impacts the calculation of the mortgagor's indebtedness to the first mortgagee and the second mortgagee's interest in the property's sale proceeds.

The Ontario Provincial Police (O.P.P.) brought a motion to amend a temporary parenting order, seeking to be relieved of their responsibility to apprehend and deliver a child under section 36 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

This responsibility was initially assigned due to a demonstrated conflict of interest within the Waterloo Regional Police Service (W.R.P.S.), where the respondent father was employed.

The court found that W.R.P.S. had failed to provide effective and independent police services for the family, particularly the child, due to the inherent conflict.

Emphasizing the best interests of the child and exercising its parens patriae jurisdiction, the court dismissed the O.P.P.'s motion, maintaining their role in enforcement to ensure independent policing.

The court issued a supplementary endorsement on costs following a decision where it dismissed the applicant's motion and application, finding that an Indian court had sole jurisdiction over the custody case.

The respondent, Hiral Gandhi, sought a cost award of $15,000, while the applicant, Vaibhav Mehta, argued for each party to bear their own costs.

The court found that the respondent was presumptively entitled to costs as the successful party and that her conduct was not unreasonable, distinguishing the case from precedents where costs were denied due to a party's unreasonable actions.

A cost award of $15,000 in favour of the respondent was deemed fair and reasonable.

The applicant sought temporary orders for child and spousal support, sale of a cottage property, and interim disbursements.

The respondent failed to provide full financial disclosure despite previous agreements and court orders.

The court imputed income to the respondent based on adverse inferences drawn from his non-disclosure and the applicant's expert's preliminary report.

The court granted temporary orders for child and spousal support, ordered the sale of the cottage, and awarded interim disbursements to the applicant to level the playing field.

The applicant father sought custody of his son and an order for the respondent mother to return the child to Ontario.

The threshold issue was jurisdiction, specifically whether Ontario or India had habitual residence over the child.

The court found that the mother's decision to remain in India with the child, coupled with the father's acquiescence or undue delay in challenging this decision, established India as the child's habitual residence.

Consequently, the Ontario court declined jurisdiction, dismissing the father's motion and application.

In a child protection proceeding, the maternal grandmother and step-grandfather brought a motion for access to their five-year-old grandchild.

The mother had terminated their access after the child's father was arrested for alleged sexual offences against the child, believing the grandmother had coached the child's disclosure.

The Society took no position on the motion.

Applying the Chapman principles, the court found that a positive grandparent-grandchild relationship existed and that the mother's decision to terminate access was arbitrary and contrary to the child's best interests.

The court granted temporary access, initially supervised.