Donald Gregory Mitchell

MPAC requested a review of an Assessment Review Board decision that reduced the assessed value of the subject property based on the average assessed value of comparable properties.

MPAC argued the Board erred in its interpretation of section 44(3)(b) of the Assessment Act by comparing assessments rather than the relationship between assessments and values.

The Associate Chair denied the request for review, finding that the determination of equity is within the presiding Member's purview and that the original decision was reasonable given MPAC's agreement with the comparable properties at the hearing.

The applicant railway company sought a declaration that its railway right‑of‑way lands were exempt from municipal taxation under s. 315(1) of the Municipal Act, 2001, on the basis that the lands were leased to another entity for valuable consideration.

The court examined the contractual arrangements between the railway owner, a rail users’ consortium, and a licensed rail operator governing the operation and maintenance of the railway line.

Applying principles distinguishing leases from licences, the court held the agreements did not grant exclusive possession or create a landlord‑tenant relationship but instead resembled a joint venture or operational arrangement.

The court further found that the consortium did not pay rent or other valuable consideration within the meaning of the statute.

As a result, the railway lands were not exempt from municipal taxation.

The appellant appealed the property assessments for an auto dealership in Whitby for the 2013, 2014, and deemed 2015 taxation years.

The appellant argued the assessment was too high due to functional obsolescence, narrow frontage, an unprofitable café, and excessive building height.

MPAC relied on the Cost Approach to determine a value of $9,933,000.

The Assessment Review Board accepted MPAC's valuation, finding no evidence to support the appellant's claims of functional obsolescence or negative impact from the building's height and layout.

The Board confirmed the assessment at $9,933,000 and found no equity adjustment was required.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application for a property tax exemption for premises it leases in four buildings.

The appellant argued that section 10 of the YMCA Act, which exempts 'buildings, lands... of the said association', should be interpreted broadly to include leased premises.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that a leasehold interest is not 'land' or 'property of' the association within the meaning of the Assessment Act and the YMCA Act.

The exemption requires an ownership interest, and the plain meaning of the statute does not extend to leased properties.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff’s action, the court addressed costs submissions from the defendants.

The Township of Puslinch sought costs previously fixed at $23,400, which the plaintiff challenged as excessive and duplicative.

The court accepted that a portion of the Township’s costs duplicated a prior motion award and reduced the amount accordingly.

The court rejected the plaintiff’s argument that the award should be limited due to the plaintiff’s financial circumstances.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation also sought costs for the action and motion, which the court found reasonable in light of the extensive materials and history of the proceeding.

The appellant, Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, appealed a decision exempting certain machinery and equipment at hydro-electric generating stations from real property taxation under the Assessment Act.

The appellant argued the application judge erred by applying the rejected 'integration test' to characterize penstocks and surge tanks as equipment rather than structures, and by finding that maintenance and safety items were used for producing electric power.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge correctly applied the holistic approach from Metals Alloys and Nabisco, and correctly concluded that items need not be directly involved in the transformation of water to electricity to qualify for the exemption.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Assessment Review Board decision directing a rehearing of a property tax assessment appeal.

The Divisional Court held that the matter should proceed as an appeal under s. 43.1 of the Assessment Act rather than a judicial review, to preserve the court's gate-keeping function.

Converting the application to an appeal, the court granted leave and allowed the appeal, finding the Board erred in law by concluding there was a procedural fairness violation.

The Board had admitted the landowner's evidence but gave it no weight, which is a matter of evidentiary weight, not procedural fairness.

The appellants appealed a decision finding that premises occupied by the Hospital for Sick Children Foundation were not exempt from municipal taxation.

The Divisional Court upheld the application judge's findings that the Foundation was a tenant under the Assessment Act and that there was no shared patrimony between the Hospital and the Foundation that would extend the hospital's tax exemption to the Foundation.

The appeal was dismissed.

In an application concerning hydro-electric property tax exemptions under section 3(1), paragraph 18 of the Assessment Act, the court determined that most disputed station components qualified as machinery and equipment used for producing electricity for sale to the general public.

The court rejected a narrow interpretation requiring direct transformation use and held all power produced at the stations met the sale-to-general-public requirement.

The court also held the applicant could not rely on paragraph 17 as an alternative exemption route.

Due conflicting expert evidence, the scope of exempt foundations required further expert process and a trial on that issue.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Assessment Review Board dismissing her property assessment appeals.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, noting that judicial review is discretionary and the applicant failed to pursue the statutory right of appeal in a timely manner without explanation.

Furthermore, the application lacked merit as the Board reasonably dismissed the appeals after the applicant repeatedly failed to comply with rules regarding the Statement of Issues despite receiving proper notice.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (MPAC) appealed a decision invalidating assessments made under s. 33(1) of the Assessment Act.

MPAC had assessed a fully-occupied residential property as 'vacant land' and later re-assessed it to add the 'omitted' building.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that no land liable to assessment had been omitted.

MPAC had identified 293 individual apartment units and assigned each a unique roll number, meaning the building was not omitted simply because MPAC failed to put a current value on it.

The appellants challenged the municipal tax assessments of several bank tower properties in downtown Toronto.

The Assessment Review Board initially ruled that the phrase 'fee simple, if unencumbered' in the Assessment Act required the properties to be valued as if they were vacant.

The Divisional Court overturned this, holding that the standard of review was correctness and that the Board erred in law.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's interpretation, confirming that income-producing properties should be assessed using market rents and a normal vacancy rate, rather than assuming they are entirely vacant.

The appeal was allowed only to the limited extent of returning the matter to the same panel of the Board rather than a new one.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation appealed a decision declaring that properties leased by the Crown to non-profit Harbour Authorities for nominal rent were exempt from property taxation.

MPAC argued the Harbour Authorities paid valuable consideration through services and maintenance obligations.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's conclusion that the services did not constitute a profit to the Crown.

Furthermore, the Court held that the Harbour Authorities shared an identity of patrimony with the Crown, entitling them to the same tax exemption.

Following a successful appeal regarding the interpretation of 'fee simple, if unencumbered' for property assessment purposes, the appellants (Municipal Property Assessment Corporation and the City of Toronto) sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The respondents argued the claimed fees were excessive and that the appellants should have coordinated their submissions.

The court found the issues complex, the amounts at stake substantial, and no unnecessary overlap in arguments.

Applying Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court fixed costs at $70,500 for fees and counsel fees for each appellant, plus their respective disbursements.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation and the City of Toronto appealed an interim decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the property tax assessments of several large office complexes.

The Board had accepted the property owners' argument that the properties should be valued as if vacant, treating all leases as encumbrances under the definition of 'current value' and 'fee simple, if unencumbered' in the Assessment Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Board's interpretation was incorrect in law.

The Court found that a leasehold interest is an interest in land for assessment purposes, and the whole of the land must be assessed by valuing the totality of interests, including the value of leases in place, rather than just the owner's interest.

The Municipal Property Assessment Corporation and the City of Toronto appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the property tax assessments of six large office complexes in Toronto.

The Board had accepted the property owners' argument that the statutory phrase 'fee simple, if unencumbered' required the properties to be valued as if they were vacant, ignoring existing leases.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Board's interpretation was wrong in law.

The Court held that the whole of the land must be assessed, and in the context of income-producing properties, 'fee simple, if unencumbered' means value calculated using market rents rather than actual rents, ensuring all interests in the land are valued.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding the property tax assessments of six large office complexes.

The Board had accepted the respondents' argument that the statutory definition of 'current value' as 'fee simple, if unencumbered' required the properties to be valued as if vacant, ignoring existing leases.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Board's interpretation was wrong in law.

The Court found that the entire ownership interest, including both the landlord's and tenants' interests, must be valued, and that the 1997 amendment to the Assessment Act was intended to ensure consistency in valuation by requiring the use of market rents rather than actual rents.

The self-represented applicant requested a third adjournment of her judicial review application and motion for leave to appeal due to health issues.

The court granted the adjournment, setting a peremptory hearing date, but ordered the applicant to pay $500 in costs thrown away to the respondent within 30 days, failing which the application would be dismissed.

The property owners sought leave to appeal an amended decision of the Assessment Review Board regarding omitted property assessments for the 2004, 2005, and 2006 taxation years following home renovations.

The owners argued the Board erred in law by allowing the omitted assessments, claiming the issues were barred by issue estoppel and res judicata.

The Divisional Court denied leave to appeal, finding that the Board's conclusion that the omitted assessments were properly returned for the additional square footage was a determination of fact, not a question of law as required by section 43.1(1) of the Assessment Act.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its application for a declaration that its commercial property was an 'eligible property' under s. 447.34.1 of the Municipal Act.

The property had been subject to a frozen assessment listing, and a notice of supplementary assessment triggered s. 447.10.

The Court of Appeal held that the property met the definition of 'eligible property' because s. 447.10(2) applied to determine the final assessment after improvements were made.

The appeal was allowed, and the municipality was ordered to determine the total assessment for the property as an eligible property.