Deschamps

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario that set aside his acquittal on three counts of sexual assault and entered convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge misdirected himself on the objective test for sexual assault.

The Court held that the Court of Appeal properly exercised its power under section 686(4)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Code to substitute a conviction, as the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the touching occurred in circumstances of a sexual nature and the appellant would necessarily have been convicted but for the trial judge's error of law.

The appellant union applied to the Canada Industrial Relations Board for certification as the bargaining agent for the employees of a children's aid society providing services to Aboriginal families in Toronto.

The agency challenged the application, arguing its labour relations fell under exclusive provincial authority.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the essential function of the agency is to deliver child welfare services, which is a provincial function.

The presumption of provincial jurisdiction over labour relations was not displaced by the Aboriginal aspects of the agency's operations.

The appellant, an Aboriginal child welfare agency, provides services to Aboriginal children and families in British Columbia.

The respondent union applied to the provincial Labour Relations Board for certification as the bargaining agent for the appellant's employees.

The appellant objected, arguing its labour relations fell within federal jurisdiction under s. 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the essential nature of the appellant's operation is the provision of child welfare services, a provincial matter.

Applying the functional test, the Court concluded that the appellant is a provincial undertaking and its labour relations are subject to provincial jurisdiction.

The appellant filed a civil liability action for sexual assault more than 25 years after the alleged assault occurred.

The respondents successfully moved to dismiss the action on the ground that it was prescribed, and the Quebec Court of Appeal affirmed the dismissal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, agreeing with the dissenting judge at the Court of Appeal that the issue of when prescription started to run raised questions of fact that could not be resolved on the face of the record.

The case was remanded to the Quebec Superior Court to assess the evidence.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder by a judge and jury.

He appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that they could consider his post-offence conduct as consistent with a pre-existing plan and intention to kill.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal as of right, finding that the jury instructions, read as a whole, were fair, balanced, and accurate regarding post-offence conduct.

The appellant newspaper appealed orders compelling its journalist to answer questions that could reveal a confidential source, and a publication ban on reporting settlement negotiations in the Sponsorship Scandal litigation.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while no class-based constitutional privilege exists for journalists, the common law Wigmore framework applies in Quebec civil proceedings to determine journalist-source privilege on a case-by-case basis.

The Court also quashed the publication ban, finding it was improperly issued without notice and failed the Dagenais/Mentuck test, as the media was not bound by the parties' confidentiality undertakings.

The appellant sought recognition in Quebec of an English judgment ordering the Republic of Iraq to pay costs arising from litigation over aircraft seized during the invasion of Kuwait.

Iraq claimed state immunity under the State Immunity Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the Act applies to applications for recognition of foreign judgments, Iraq's conduct in controlling the defence of its state-owned airline in the English commercial litigation fell within the commercial activity exception.

The Court allowed the appeal and permitted the application for recognition to proceed.

The respondents operated a commercial float plane business on a lake in a municipality.

The municipality amended its zoning by-law to prohibit aerodromes on that lake, while permitting them on another lake.

The municipality sought an injunction to stop the respondents' aviation activities.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the by-law amendment was ultra vires the province because its pith and substance was the regulation of aeronautics, an exclusive federal jurisdiction.

The Court further held that the amendment was not saved by the ancillary powers doctrine because it was not rationally and functionally connected to the broader, valid municipal zoning scheme.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was arrested for murder, advised of his right to counsel, and spoke with his lawyer twice before being interviewed by police.

During the five-hour interview, the appellant repeatedly stated he had nothing to say and wished to speak to his lawyer again.

The police refused further consultation and continued questioning, eventually obtaining a confession.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that section 10(b) of the Charter does not mandate the presence of counsel throughout an interrogation, nor does it require police to provide multiple opportunities to consult counsel unless there are changed circumstances, such as new procedures, a change in jeopardy, or reason to believe the detainee did not understand their rights.

As no such circumstances existed, the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was arrested for murder and informed of his right to counsel.

After an unsuccessful attempt to contact his preferred lawyer, he spoke with duty counsel and expressed satisfaction with the advice.

He subsequently provided an incriminating statement to the police.

The trial judge excluded the statement, finding a breach of the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel of choice.

The Court of Appeal reversed the acquittal.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the police did not breach the appellant's right to counsel, as he was afforded a reasonable opportunity to contact counsel and voluntarily chose to speak with duty counsel.

The employer sold a division of its business, resulting in the transfer of employees to a new company.

The transferred employees were removed from the employer's defined benefit pension plan and incorporated into a new successor plan.

At the time of the transfer, the employer's pension plan had a significant projected actuarial surplus.

The employer transferred enough funds to cover the transferred employees' defined benefits but did not transfer any surplus funds.

The transferred employees argued the employer breached its fiduciary duty of even-handedness by not transferring a portion of the surplus and by improperly charging plan administration expenses to the fund.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the pension plan documentation allowed the employer to charge administration expenses to the fund and that the transferred employees had no equitable interest in the actuarial surplus, meaning the employer's obligations were satisfied by assuring their defined benefits.

The insured, a general contractor, was sued for negligence and breach of contract after water damage caused rot and deterioration in several housing complexes it built.

The insured sought a declaration that its insurer owed a duty to defend under its commercial general liability policies.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the insurer owed a duty to defend, finding that the pleadings revealed a possibility of coverage.

The Court clarified that 'property damage' is not limited to third-party property and that defective workmanship can constitute an 'accident' if the resulting damage was neither expected nor intended by the insured.

Furthermore, the 'work performed' exclusions did not clearly and unambiguously exclude the claims, particularly given the involvement of subcontractors.

The union filed a grievance against a decision not to renew the contract of a university professor, arguing it amounted to a dismissal without good and sufficient cause under the collective agreement and s. 124 of the Act respecting labour standards.

The arbitrator found the collective agreement established an equivalent remedial procedure and ordered the parties to proceed under it.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the collective agreement's provisions regarding dismissal were sufficiently clear and provided an equivalent procedure to s. 124, giving the arbitrator jurisdiction to hear the grievance without incorporating the statutory provision.

The union filed a grievance against the Cégep's decision to withdraw employment priority from a teacher, alleging it constituted dismissal without good and sufficient cause under s. 124 of the Act respecting labour standards.

The arbitrator found she lacked jurisdiction to apply s. 124 as the collective agreement did not provide an equivalent remedial procedure.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 124 is not implicitly incorporated into the collective agreement, and where an agreement lacks adequate protection, the Commission des relations du travail has exclusive jurisdiction.

The appellant union filed grievances on behalf of two employees (one casual, one probationary) who were dismissed.

The collective agreement denied them access to the grievance procedure for dismissals.

The union argued that the public order standard in s. 124 of the Act respecting labour standards, which prohibits dismissal without good and sufficient cause after two years of service, was implicitly incorporated into the collective agreement, giving the arbitrator jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that while the standard is not implicitly incorporated, the public order nature of the Act renders the collective agreement clauses denying arbitration absolutely null.

Consequently, the grievance arbitrator has jurisdiction to hear the complaints and provide a recourse equivalent to that of the Commission des relations du travail.

The respondent was mistakenly identified as a suspect, arrested, strip-searched, and his vehicle was seized.

The trial judge found breaches of his s. 8 Charter rights and awarded damages under s. 24(1).

The Supreme Court of Canada established a four-step framework for awarding Charter damages: (1) proof of breach, (2) functional justification (compensation, vindication, deterrence), (3) absence of countervailing factors, and (4) quantum assessment.

The Court upheld the $5,000 damage award for the strip search but set aside the $100 award for the vehicle seizure, finding a declaration sufficient for the latter.

The accused was convicted of sexual offences and sought an extension of time to appeal his conviction several years later.

A single judge of the Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, but a three-judge panel subsequently granted it.

The Crown applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, challenging the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction to overturn a single judge's decision.

The Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to entertain the leave application under section 40(1) of the Supreme Court Act, overruling previous jurisprudence to the contrary.

However, the Court dismissed the application, finding that it raised no question of sufficient importance to warrant granting leave.

The appellants were stopped in a commercial truck during a random roadside check.

The police officer discovered regulatory violations and, during a search of the cab for documents, found $115,000 in a duffle bag.

The appellants were arrested for possession of proceeds of crime.

A subsequent search of the trailer revealed 392 pounds of marijuana in a hidden compartment.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the initial stop and regulatory search were lawful and did not violate the Charter.

The arrest was based on reasonable and probable grounds, and the search of the trailer was a valid search incidental to arrest.

Although a later inventory search violated section 8, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2).

The appeal was dismissed.

Media organizations challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory publication ban on bail hearing information under s. 517 of the Criminal Code, arguing it unjustifiably infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the provision.

The Court found that while the mandatory ban limits freedom of expression, it is justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The ban's objectives of safeguarding the right to a fair trial and ensuring expeditious bail hearings are pressing and substantial.

The mandatory nature of the ban is rationally connected to these objectives, minimally impairs freedom of expression given its temporary nature and limited scope, and its salutary effects outweigh its deleterious effects.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting his stepdaughter.

A confession made to police was ruled inadmissible at trial due to an improper inducement.

However, an e-mail sent by the accused to his former wife containing a second apology was admitted without a voir dire and without objection from defence counsel.

The accused was convicted.

The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, finding the trial judge should have held a voir dire on his own motion to determine if the e-mail was a derived confession or made to a person in authority.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge did not err in failing to hold a voir dire on his own motion, as the former wife was not a person in authority and there was no obvious connection between the police inducement and the subsequent e-mail to trigger the derived confessions rule, especially given defence counsel's consent to its admission.