Dean Fraser Embry

The accused, charged with invitation to sexual touching, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the swearing of the Information to the anticipated trial date was 34.7 months.

The court found that a significant portion of the delay was attributable to the Crown's failure to disclose relevant computer forensic evidence until shortly before the original trial date, necessitating an adjournment.

Finding that the delay exceeded the guidelines and caused actual prejudice to the accused, the court granted the application and stayed the proceedings.

The appellant challenged the dismissal of his certiorari application seeking to quash a preliminary inquiry committal for second degree murder.

He argued the evidence could support committal only for manslaughter and that the inferences drawn by the preliminary inquiry judge amounted to speculation.

The Court of Appeal held that, at the preliminary inquiry stage, the inference most favourable to the Crown must be drawn and that difficult inferences may still be reasonable.

It found the inferences supporting committal under ss. 21(1) and 21(2) of the Criminal Code were reasonably available given the appellant's conduct, the conduct of his accomplices, and the planning and execution of the robbery.

The defendant applied for a stay of proceedings pursuant to section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms on grounds of unreasonable trial delay.

The defendant was charged with conspiracy to commit fraud over $5,000, fraud over $5,000, and obstructing a peace officer in connection with an alleged staged motor vehicle accident and fraudulent insurance claim.

The charges arose from Project Whiplash, a large-scale investigation involving 38 separately charged individuals.

The court conducted an attribution analysis of the delay periods and found that approximately 8 months of the 16-month total delay constituted neutral intake procedures inherent to the case, while 7 months represented systemic institutional delay.

The court determined that the defendant suffered only modest actual and inferred prejudice and that society's interest in a trial on the merits outweighed the defendant's interest in prompt adjudication.

The application was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to three charges: mischief under $5,000 by interference with an ATM, possession of a forgery device (skimmer device), and possession of a credit card obtained by crime.

The accused was observed manipulating an ATM where a skimmer device and pinhole camera had been installed to steal debit card data and record PINs.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with 12 months probation, while the defence sought a conditional discharge.

The court rejected both positions, finding that incarceration was necessary but that a conditional sentence was appropriate given the accused's youth, first-offender status, and the need to balance general deterrence with rehabilitation principles.

The respondent, a first offender, pleaded guilty to importing 9.56 kilograms of high-grade heroin into Canada as a courier.

The sentencing judge imposed a sentence of seven years and nine months, treating heroin as only marginally more dangerous than cocaine and considering the respondent's wilful blindness as a mitigating factor.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that heroin is significantly more dangerous than cocaine and that wilful blindness is not a mitigating factor.

The Court established a sentencing range of 12 to 17 years for first offender couriers importing large amounts of high-grade heroin for personal gain, and increased the respondent's sentence to 14 years and nine months.

The appellant appealed her sentence for dangerous driving causing bodily injury and failing to remain.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge's six-year sentence for dangerous driving exceeded the Crown's requested maximum of five years and fell outside the acceptable range.

The appeal was allowed, reducing the dangerous driving sentence to four years (for a global sentence of five years) and the driving prohibition from sixteen years to eleven years.