David L. Corbett

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his claim against a lawyer and the Law Society of Ontario.

The Divisional Court issued a Rule 2.1.01 notice indicating the appeal appeared frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The appellant failed to provide a substantive response, instead accusing the judge of incompetence and bias.

The court dismissed the appeal under Rule 2.1.01 and ordered that the appellant must obtain leave before commencing any future proceedings in the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing its request to dismiss the action under Rule 2.1.01.

Due to an administrative error, the motions judge did not receive or consider the appellant's responding submissions before releasing her decision.

When notified of the error, the motions judge declined to reconsider the matter and directed the parties to pursue their remedies under the Rules.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge should have set aside her decision and either reconsidered it or directed it to another judge, rather than requiring an appeal.

The decision was set aside and remitted for a new hearing.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Grey Sauble Conservation Authority granting a permit to the Town of South Bruce Peninsula to build a retaining wall on Sauble Beach.

The applicant also challenged the Town's decision to proceed without obtaining a permit under the Endangered Species Act or conducting an environmental assessment.

The Divisional Court found the Authority's decision to issue the permit was unreasonable because it failed to properly apply the test under O. Reg. 151/06 and failed to consider the 2020 Provincial Policy Statement regarding dynamic beach hazards.

The permit was quashed and remitted to the Authority.

The challenges to the Town's decisions regarding the Endangered Species Act and Environmental Assessment Act were dismissed as premature and lacking the proper respondents.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision denying claims for physiotherapy and an in-home assessment under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The insurer had failed to respond to the treatment plans within the required 10-day period under s. 38(8).

The Divisional Court held that the adjudicator erred by requiring the expenses to be reasonable and necessary, as s. 38(11) mandates payment for expenses incurred during the default period and acts as consumer protection legislation.

The appeal was allowed, the insurer was ordered to pay the in-home assessment and applicable physiotherapy expenses, and the issue of a special award was remitted to a new adjudicator.

The tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision ordering his eviction on the basis that the landlord sold the rental unit to her brother, who required it for personal use.

The tenant argued the Board denied him procedural fairness by curtailing his cross-examination and refusing to compel the unredacted agreement of purchase and sale.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that while the Board had discretion to control its process, it erred in law by precluding the tenant from testing critical evidence regarding the bona fides of the sale transaction, specifically the purchase price and payment terms.

The matter was remitted to the Board for a fresh hearing.

The Russian Federation appealed an interlocutory decision that denied its request to adduce fresh evidence on an application to set aside an arbitral tribunal's interim award on jurisdiction.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that an application to challenge a tribunal's jurisdiction under Article 16 of the UNCITRAL Model Law is a hearing de novo, not a deferential review.

Consequently, the parties are entitled as of right to adduce evidence that was not before the arbitral tribunal.

The appellant was catastrophically injured in a motor vehicle accident and sought attendant care benefits and a special award from his insurer.

At first instance, the Licence Appeal Tribunal awarded attendant care benefits up to $6,000 per month and a special award.

On reconsideration, the LAT varied the decision, finding the initial adjudicator erred by not applying the mandatory maximum hourly rates for attendant care and by misapplying the test for a special award.

The appellant appealed to the Divisional Court.

The court dismissed the appeal, holding that the reconsideration adjudicator made no errors of law in applying the statutory hourly rate caps or in setting aside the special award based on the established legal test.

The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal a costs order and an interest award.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal the costs order, awarding costs of $5,000 to the plaintiff.

The court noted that leave is not required to appeal the interest award, which may be addressed at the hearing of the appeal from the trial judgment.

The tenant appealed an eviction order from the Landlord and Tenant Board and obtained a statutory stay.

Despite the stay, the landlord illegally evicted the tenant and re-let the premises to new occupants.

The court issued case management directions, declining to immediately restore the tenant to the premises due to jurisdictional issues raised by the LTB regarding displacing new tenants, but scheduled a contempt hearing for the landlord's breach of the stay order.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an unreported order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the amount of $2,500.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an order dated January 11, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in writing and awarded costs of $2,500 on a partial indemnity scale to the respondents.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision awarding the respondent $25,000 for a concealed mould defect in a house she purchased from them.

The appellants argued the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay evidence from a contractor, imputing knowledge of the defect, and acting unfairly during the trial.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly exercised discretion to admit the hearsay evidence under the Courts of Justice Act and that overwhelming circumstantial evidence supported the finding that the appellants knew about and concealed the mould.

Following the release of its decision allowing the Crown's appeal and setting aside a class action certification order, the Divisional Court entertained post-decision submissions from the respondent based on two new Court of Appeal decisions regarding state liability in negligence.

The court concluded that the new decisions applied settled law and did not alter its previous reasoning.

The court amended its previous disposition to clarify that while the appeal is allowed and the certification order is set aside, the underlying action is not dismissed, leaving that issue for the parties to address below.

The applicant sought leave to appeal an order of the motion judge dated January 11, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $2,500 on a partial indemnity scale to the respondents.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Healey J. dated May 21, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding parties.

The moving party brought a second motion under Rule 59.06 to reopen a 2016 decision of the Divisional Court that dismissed her appeal from a professional discipline decision.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1, noting the motion appeared contrary to the finality principle and res judicata.

Finding the moving party's response asserting undisclosed 'new evidence' to be frivolous, the court dismissed the motion as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and ordered that she be prohibited from bringing further steps without prior judicial permission.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Ferguson J. dated February 2, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties fixed at $5,000.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director, which upheld a police chief's finding that officers did not engage in discreditable conduct.

The officers had required the applicant to leave her parents' home at the homeowner's request, despite the applicant having registered a Certificate of Pending Litigation on the property.

The Divisional Court held that the police acted reasonably and within their discretion to prevent a breach of the peace and enforce the homeowner's rights.

The application for judicial review was dismissed without costs.

The appellant purchased commercial property subject to an easement, with a vendor take-back mortgage that would be reduced by $442,000 if the vendor failed to register a valid release of the easement within one year.

The vendor obtained a court order discharging the easement and registered it two days before the deadline, but the order was subsequently appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the purchaser's appeal, holding that while a court order can satisfy the requirement for a release, an order subject to subsisting appeal rights does not provide the bargained-for certainty of good title.

The purchaser was therefore entitled to the $442,000 reduction in the mortgage principal.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering him to pay the balance owing on a restoration contract.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding a fixed-price contract, assessing deficiencies, and adding the respondent's corporation as a plaintiff at the start of trial.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings regarding the contract and deficiencies.

The court also held that adding the corporate plaintiff was either done on consent or was a permissible correction of a misnomer, as the appellant knew he was dealing with the individual respondent's company and suffered no prejudice.