David B. Butt

The accused pleaded guilty to attempting to obstruct justice by lying to police about the identity of the person who killed her ex-boyfriend.

The accused was assaulted by her ex-boyfriend with a knife, and her current boyfriend shot and killed him in defence.

When police arrived, the accused gave false statements claiming she did not know who the shooter was, and she attempted to persuade a witness not to mention her boyfriend to police.

The accused maintained this lie for seven and a half months before finally admitting the truth.

The court imposed a nine-month conditional sentence followed by one year of probation, balancing her youth, guilty plea, and lack of criminal record against the serious nature of obstructing justice in a homicide investigation.

The appellant, Patrick Lemieux, appealed his conviction for assault causing bodily harm, arguing the trial judge failed to properly consider his state of mind regarding self-defence, reversed the burden of proof, and provided inadequate reasons.

The Superior Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge correctly applied self-defence principles, including the air of reality test, and did not misapply the burden of proof or W.(D.) principles.

The court affirmed that the trial judge's reasons, when read in context, sufficiently demonstrated that the self-defence claim lacked a reasonable basis and that the appellant's response was disproportionate.

The plaintiff sued his former employer for wrongful dismissal after being terminated for cause following an incident involving a female co-worker.

The co-worker moved for leave to intervene in the action under Rule 13.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to protect her moral and physical integrity, arguing that the plaintiff's version of events and cross-examination tactics threatened her reputation in the workplace.

The court granted the motion, finding that the co-worker had a legitimate interest in protecting her integrity and that her limited participation through counsel would not unduly delay or prejudice the proceedings.

The appellant, a police officer, appealed his conviction for dangerous driving causing bodily harm.

While responding to an emergency at high speed, he drove through a small town at 178 kmph in a 50 kmph zone, passed a construction zone and school, and collided with another vehicle.

Trial counsel conceded the actus reus and causation.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the driving constituted a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person in the appellant's circumstances.

The trial judge found it did, and the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.

The appellant also sought leave to appeal sentence but was unsuccessful.

The defendants applied to replace police bail conditions imposed under section 503(2.1) of the Criminal Code with a judicial bail order under section 515.

The defendants were charged with aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, and public mischief arising from an altercation with a civilian.

The Crown sought to maintain three contested conditions: residency in Ontario, a curfew from 10:00 pm to 6:00 am, and abstention from alcohol consumption.

The court found that the residency condition was unnecessary to ensure attendance in court, the curfew was punitive and unnecessary given the situational nature of the alleged offence, and the alcohol prohibition lacked evidentiary support and was not necessary to address public safety or confidence in the administration of justice.

The court replaced the police bail with a judicial bail order removing the three contested conditions while maintaining no-contact provisions, weapons prohibitions, and notification requirements.

The accused brought a second third-party records application under s. 278.3 of the Criminal Code, seeking records from the Children's Aid Society (CAS) and Ottawa Police Service (OPS).

The defence argued the records were relevant to the complainant's credibility and reliability, particularly concerning her alleged drug and alcohol use, which was a factor in her leaving the family home and subsequently making allegations.

The court, applying the two-part test from R. v. Mills, reviewed the records.

It found that certain OPS records (incidents from March 18, 2016, and April 16, 2016, and a related video), which suggested the complainant may have been intoxicated, were relevant and producible, subject to redactions, consistent with a prior ruling by Gilmore J. regarding similar York Regional Police Service records.

However, a 911 audio call and OPS records from April 18, 2016, relating to Algonquin College, were deemed irrelevant and not produced.

The court emphasized the need to avoid stereotypical conclusions about complainants.

The applicant, Jesse Bonello, charged with robbery and related offences, sought disclosure of police occurrence reports relating to the principal Crown witnesses, Tyrone Saunders and Lauren Smith, under *Stinchcombe* and, alternatively, via an *O'Connor* application.

The Crown argued the records were not in its possession and thus not subject to *Stinchcombe* disclosure.

The court found that the occurrence reports were not "fruits of the investigation" and therefore not subject to *Stinchcombe* disclosure.

Applying the *O'Connor* principles, the court determined that the applicant met the "likely relevance" threshold for Tyrone Saunders' records due to his extensive criminal record and expected credibility issues, ordering a review of those sealed documents.

However, the application for Lauren Smith's records was dismissed as a "fishing expedition" due to the absence of a criminal record or case-specific evidence demonstrating likely relevance.

A police officer was convicted of sexually assaulting a complainant by performing searches of her while transporting her to a police station.

At trial, the trial judge admitted a prior consistent statement made by the complainant to a female officer at the police station, in which the complainant stated she had already been searched three times.

The summary conviction appeal judge quashed the conviction, finding the trial judge erred in admitting and relying on the prior consistent statement.

The Crown appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the prior consistent statement was admissible under the narrative as circumstantial evidence exception to the rule against prior consistent statements, and that the trial judge properly used the statement to assess the complainant's credibility by considering the context, timing, and spontaneous nature of the complaint.

The defendant, a police officer, was charged with sexual assault arising from an alleged incident in 1986 involving a woman he had investigated during a traffic stop.

The complainant alleged the defendant contacted her early the next morning, came to her home under the pretext of needing additional information, and forced her to perform fellatio.

The defendant testified the encounter was consensual and involved only kissing and touching.

The court found both witnesses had credibility concerns but ultimately determined that while the complainant's version was more probable, the Crown had not proven guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The charge was dismissed.

Three police officers appealed the penalty of dismissal (or order to resign) imposed by a Hearing Officer after they pled guilty to multiple counts of misconduct, including deceit, discreditable conduct, and insubordination.

The misconduct primarily involved their participation in a BBM group where they shared degrading and discriminatory photographs and comments about members of the public and other officers, as well as failing to report another officer's criminal activities.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the appeals, finding that the Hearing Officer did not misapprehend expert psychiatric evidence regarding group dynamics, properly weighed mitigating factors such as rehabilitation and guilty pleas against the egregious nature of the misconduct, and correctly applied the legal test for dismissal.

The Commission upheld the conclusion that the officers' actions irreparably damaged the reputation of the police service, justifying the ultimate penalty of dismissal.

The moving party, a police officer found guilty of misconduct and ordered dismissed, brought a motion to extend the time to perfect his disciplinary appeal to the Commission until the conclusion of parallel criminal proceedings arising from the same incident.

The officer had been convicted of sexual assault but had not yet been sentenced and intended to appeal.

The Commission granted the motion on consent, applying the Supreme Court of Canada's direction in Toronto v. C.U.P.E. Local 79 that lower tribunals should await the outcome of criminal proceedings dealing with the same facts to avoid collateral attacks and inconsistent verdicts.

The applicant, a police officer, brought a motion to set aside a Registrar's order dismissing his appeal for delay.

The appeal was from a disciplinary decision of the Ontario Civilian Police Commission.

The applicant failed to perfect the appeal and did not respond to the respondent's inquiries.

The court applied the four factors for setting aside a dismissal order and found that the applicant failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay, did not act inadvertently, failed to move promptly to set aside the order, and that the merits of the appeal were highly questionable.

The motion was dismissed.

The applicant, a complainant in a sexual assault prosecution, sought certiorari to review a preliminary inquiry ruling refusing to admit proposed expert evidence regarding the limited reliability of facial demeanour in assessing credibility.

The proposed expert intended to testify about social science literature suggesting that observing facial expressions does not meaningfully improve the ability to detect dishonesty.

The court applied the admissibility framework from R. v. Mohan and held that the preliminary inquiry judge did not err in declining to qualify the expert or admit the evidence, noting that the proposed opinion relied primarily on a literature review outside the expert’s field of direct research and lacked necessity.

The court further held that the complainant, as a third party whose Charter interests were directly affected, could seek certiorari review, but no jurisdictional error or error of law was established.

The appellant police officer appealed a finding of discreditable conduct and a penalty of forfeiture of five days' pay for conducting unauthorized CPIC searches on an individual involved in a domestic relationship with the officer's friend.

The officer argued that the Hearing Officer erred by refusing to order the disclosure of a 2007 investigation file regarding similar CPIC searches for which the officer was cleared.

The Commission dismissed the appeal, finding that the strict criminal disclosure standards from Stinchcombe do not apply to administrative police discipline hearings, and that the disclosure provided was sufficient to allow the officer to know the case to be met.

The appellant police officer appealed a finding of discreditable conduct and a penalty of demotion imposed by a Hearing Officer.

The appellant argued that the Hearing Officer was biased, the prosecutor was unfair, and that it was fundamentally unfair to proceed with the hearing in his absence while he was on long-term disability.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence of bias or prosecutorial unfairness.

The Commission held that the Hearing Officer was legally correct to request medical information to substantiate the need for further adjournments and acted reasonably in proceeding in the appellant's absence after numerous delays and a persistent lack of cooperation.

The penalty of demotion was upheld as reasonable.

The appellant, a police sergeant, brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence on his appeal of a discreditable conduct finding and demotion penalty.

The appellant argued the evidence, though chronologically available at the time of the hearing, was functionally unavailable because he was on long-term disability and did not participate.

The Commission applied the Palmer test and dismissed the motion, finding the first branch was not met because the evidence could have been adduced at the hearing.

The issue of whether the hearing officer erred in proceeding in the appellant's absence was deferred to the main appeal.

In a criminal appeal involving a niqab-wearing complainant at a preliminary inquiry, the Court addressed how to reconcile freedom of religion with fair-trial rights.

The majority held neither an absolute ban nor an absolute permission rule is acceptable, and adopted a contextual four-step framework.

A witness may be required to remove a niqab only where necessary to prevent a serious trial-fairness risk that cannot be avoided by alternatives, and where the benefits of removal outweigh the harms.

The appeal was dismissed and the matter remitted for application of that framework.

The appellant, a police constable, appealed the penalty of dismissal imposed by a Hearing Officer after she pled guilty to two counts of misconduct under the Police Services Act.

The misconduct stemmed from two off-duty incidents of impaired driving for which she was criminally convicted.

The appellant argued that her misconduct was driven by her alcohol addiction and anxiety disorder, which were now in sustained remission, and sought reinstatement with a demotion.

The Commission applied the reasonableness standard of review and upheld the Hearing Officer's decision, finding that the repeated and serious nature of the misconduct, combined with her prior disciplinary record, outweighed the mitigating factors of her rehabilitation efforts.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, a parking enforcement officer, was charged with assault contrary to section 266 of the Criminal Code.

The accused was struck and knocked to the ground on Ossington Avenue, sustaining a mild concussion.

Approximately one hour later, at a police station, the accused assaulted the person who had attacked him.

The defence raised the common law defence of non-insane automatism, arguing the accused's actions were involuntary due to impaired consciousness from the concussion.

The Crown argued the accused acted voluntarily.

The trial judge found the defence had not established a proper evidentiary foundation for automatism and convicted the accused.

Three police constables from the Barrie Police Service were charged with assault causing bodily harm following their arrest of a civilian, Michael Ullman, at his residence on July 5, 2009.

The Crown alleged the officers entered the home without permission, without exigent circumstances, and used excessive force during the arrest, resulting in a broken arm.

The defendants claimed they were invited into the home, had reasonable grounds to believe firearms were present (exigent circumstances), and used only necessary force to subdue an actively resisting suspect.

The trial focused on whether the entry was lawful and whether the force used was reasonable.