David A. Taub

Following motions for security for costs brought by two defendants, the court addressed the costs of those motions.

The defendants had obtained security for costs orders but in amounts lower than requested.

The court considered the factors under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rules 1.04, 56.01, and 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

While the moving parties were largely successful, reductions were warranted due to incomplete success and procedural issues related to timing of a statement of defence.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs and instead fixed fair and reasonable partial indemnity costs payable by the plaintiff.

Defendants brought motions for security for costs under Rule 56.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure against a foreign corporate plaintiff resident in Russia with no assets in Ontario.

The court confirmed the two‑stage framework for security for costs motions and held the defendants met the initial burden because the plaintiff was ordinarily resident outside Ontario.

The plaintiff failed to demonstrate impecuniosity or other circumstances making a security order unjust, despite having substantial funds abroad.

The court exercised its discretion to order staged security for costs, including amounts related to pending motions to discharge a certificate of pending litigation.

The court also granted a sealing order over a document containing non‑party investors’ financial information and awarded partial indemnity costs to the plaintiff for the confidentiality motion.

Following a motion in which the plaintiffs were completely successful, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The court considered the defendants’ extensive submissions that went beyond the jurisdictional issues raised by the motion and addressed the merits of the case.

Applying the principles governing costs awards and recognizing the additional time and materials used by the defendants, the court held that costs somewhat above the partial indemnity scale were appropriate.

The plaintiffs were awarded a fixed all-inclusive costs amount payable within 30 days.

The defendants brought a motion to stay the plaintiffs' action based on a lack of jurisdiction, forum non conveniens, and abuse of process.

The plaintiffs alleged they released their interest in Ontario lands based on fraudulent misrepresentations regarding real estate and escrow funds in Dubai.

The court found a real and substantial connection to Ontario, noting the alleged fraud occurred in Ontario, the contract was governed by Ontario law, and the defendants attorned to the jurisdiction by arguing the merits of the claim.

The court dismissed the motion, finding Ontario was the appropriate forum and the claim was not an abuse of process.

These consolidated appeals addressed the interpretation and application of the amended summary judgment regime under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal held that summary judgment may be granted not only where claims or defences are without merit or the parties agree, but also where the motion judge can achieve a full appreciation of the evidence and issues required to make dispositive findings on the motion record, possibly supplemented by limited oral evidence.

The court articulated the “full appreciation” test, confirmed that the standard of review on whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial is correctness, and explained the proper use of the new powers to weigh evidence, evaluate credibility, draw inferences, and hear oral evidence on discrete issues.

Applying those principles, the court dismissed the Combined Air, Misek, and Parker appeals, dismissed the Mauldin appeal, and allowed the Bruno appeal by setting aside summary judgment and dismissing the motion.

The appellants appealed an application judge's finding that their solicitors' accounts were interim rather than final.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the determination was a question of fact and the application judge made no palpable and overriding error in concluding the accounts were interim based on the evidence.

The individual defendants, who were architects and a contractor, sought leave to appeal a motions judge's decision refusing to grant summary judgment dismissing the claims against them personally.

The plaintiffs had sued the individuals despite the relevant contracts being with their respective corporations.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's application of the summary judgment test.

The court noted that the motions judge allowed the claims to proceed based on 'just barely some factual basis' rather than requiring a genuine issue for trial, and that the scope of personal liability for corporate directors and employees is a matter of public importance.

The respondent's first action was dismissed for delay.

The motion judge permitted the respondent to proceed with a second identical action, subject to paying the costs of the first action, relying on Rule 24.05(2).

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the rule does not provide a right to commence a second identical action and that doing so constitutes an abuse of process.

The respondent brought an oppression application alleging that the appellants engaged in self-dealing by causing a corporation to fund outside companies owned by them.

The appellants moved to stay the application in favour of arbitration, relying on an arbitration clause in a shareholders' agreement.

The motion judge dismissed the stay motion, finding the oppression claim did not rely on the shareholders' agreement and the alleged conduct related to the appellants' capacities as officers and directors, not shareholders.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the dispute fell outside the scope of the arbitration clause.

The plaintiff tenant brought a motion for leave to appeal an order dissolving an ex parte injunction that had restored it to its commercial premises after a lockout.

The motion judge had dissolved the injunction on the basis that the tenant failed to make full and fair disclosure of material facts, specifically regarding its status as a single-purpose holding company and its inability to abide by an undertaking.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's exercise of discretion in enforcing the high onus of complete disclosure on ex parte motions.

The appellants appealed an order of Lane J. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no substance to it because a subsequent, unappealed order by Backhouse J. superseded the order of Lane J. The Court noted that the superseding order did not eliminate the appellants' bad faith or punitive damage claims.

The applicant sought an order of mandamus requiring the Registrar under the Business Names Act to cancel the registration of business names containing his surname, registered by the respondent company.

The applicant argued the respondent lacked his written consent.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that an ongoing civil action between the parties regarding the sale of the applicant's business provided an adequate alternative remedy to determine the contractual right to use the name.

The plaintiffs sought an interlocutory injunction against the defendant, who had purchased their business and assets.

The court applied the RJR MacDonald test and found that the plaintiffs failed to establish a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction.

The court noted the plaintiffs' delay and petulant interference in the defendant's affairs.

The motion was dismissed, with costs awarded to the defendant on a partial indemnity scale.

The appellant contractor obtained a judgment against the owner and garnished funds held by an escrow agent.

The respondent, another judgment creditor, also garnished the funds.

The sheriff distributed the funds pro rata under the Creditors' Relief Act.

The appellant appealed, arguing the funds were impressed with a trust under s. 7(2) of the Construction Lien Act.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the funds were trust funds, were not the property of the debtor, and were therefore not subject to pro rata distribution under the Creditors' Relief Act.

The appellant challenged a summary judgment order that had dismissed most of his claims arising from an alleged agreement concerning the purchase, development, and later sale of a Toronto property.

The Court of Appeal held that the dispute turned on conflicting evidence and the central question of good faith, which required findings of fact, weighing of evidence, and implicit credibility determinations.

Those issues could not properly be resolved on a summary judgment motion.

The appeal was allowed, the cross-appeal dismissed, and the summary judgment motion dismissed.