Daniel MacAdam

The applicant was charged with numerous firearm offences, possession of Schedule 1 controlled substances for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime arising from his arrest and execution of a search warrant at 3-42 Pendeen Avenue in Toronto on March 27, 2023.

The applicant brought a section 8 Charter application challenging the validity of the search warrant.

The court found that the Information to Obtain (ITO), after excision of inaccurate material, did not establish reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of the offences would be located at the target address.

The court concluded that the applicant's Charter rights under section 8 were breached and, applying the Grant balancing test, excluded the evidence seized from the search.

Melanie Pereira was found guilty of conspiracy to traffic cocaine, conspiracy to traffic fentanyl, and possession for the purpose of trafficking in both drugs.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the significant amounts of fentanyl and cocaine, and mitigating factors, such as her status as a first offender, her remorse, and the impact of incarceration on her two young children.

The Crown sought an eight-year sentence for fentanyl and a 5-6 year concurrent sentence for cocaine, while the defence sought a reformatory sentence of two years less a day.

The court sentenced Ms. Pereira to 60 months (5 years) imprisonment for each count, to be served concurrently, along with a 10-year section 109 order and a DNA order.

This endorsement addresses the repeated failure of the Ottawa-Carleton Detention Centre (OCDC) to produce the accused, Thornell Shah, for his scheduled sentencing hearings.

Shah had pleaded guilty and was awaiting sentencing.

Despite court orders for his appearance, first by videoconference and then in person, the OCDC failed to comply without explanation.

Citing precedent, the court emphasized the judiciary's authority over prisoner production and the executive branch's obligation to comply.

The judge ordered the Superintendent or a Deputy Superintendent of the OCDC to appear before the court to provide an explanation for the non-compliance.

Patrick Williams pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit robbery and one count of impaired driving.

The court considered the serious nature of the uncommitted robberies (including planned home invasions), the offender's related criminal record, and the impaired driving incident as aggravating factors.

Mitigating factors included the offender's youth, guilty plea, harsh pre-sentence custody conditions during the pandemic, and a disadvantaged background marked by anti-Black racism.

The Crown sought a three-year prison sentence, while the defence sought 12 months.

The court imposed a total sentence of 30 months imprisonment, but due to pre-sentence custody credit, the effective sentence was one day in prison (time served).

The accused was charged with multiple drug trafficking offences and criminal organization offences related to his activities in Thunder Bay in the spring of 2020.

The Crown alleged that the accused, a member of the Eglinton West Crips (EWC), trafficked cocaine and fentanyl with the assistance of other gang members.

The court found that the EWC met the definition of a criminal organization and that the accused was a member.

Relying on extensive circumstantial evidence, including intercepted communications and surveillance, the court concluded the accused was in constructive possession of drugs found on a co-conspirator, trafficked in fentanyl, and committed these offences for the benefit of and in association with the EWC.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused brought a lost evidence application arguing his s. 7 Charter right to make full answer and defence was violated when police lost surveillance video footage from a covert camera.

The footage was properly bookmarked by the investigating officer but failed to save due to a software glitch in the police Genetec system.

The court dismissed the application, finding the Crown established the loss was not due to unacceptable negligence, as police were unaware of the specific software issue at the time.

Furthermore, the accused failed to show the lost video would have played an important role in his defence, as the view was obstructed and the issue of joint possession rendered the specific location of the bag insignificant.

The Crown sought to admit preliminary inquiry evidence of a police officer (PC Stamplecoskie) at trial under s.715 or s.715.01 of the Criminal Code, as the officer was unavailable due to a workplace injury.

The defence argued the unavailability under s.715 was not sufficiently proven.

The court found the evidence insufficient to establish unavailability for s.715 but admitted the transcript under s.715.01.

The court declined to compel the officer's attendance for cross-examination, finding no suggestion of unfairness or lack of full opportunity to cross-examine at the preliminary inquiry, and rejecting the defence's argument to read a necessity requirement into s.715.01.

The applicant, facing drug and firearm charges, brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) during his arrests.

The Crown conceded violations of sections 8 and 9 regarding the "no-knock" entry during the second arrest but argued the delay in access to counsel was reasonable.

The court found that the police's unannounced entry into the applicant's home to execute a Feeney warrant, without judicial authorization for such entry and without exigent circumstances, violated his section 7 and 8 Charter rights.

The court found the delay in access to counsel was not unreasonable in the circumstances of both arrests.

As a remedy for the Charter violations related to the Feeney warrant execution, the court granted a partial stay of proceedings, specifically staying the firearm-related charges, but allowed the drug trafficking charges to proceed.

The applicant, Daveion Brown, sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay, arguing the total delay of 797 days (26 months and 6 days) exceeded the Jordan ceiling.

The Crown contended that defence delay and exceptional circumstances (discrete events, case complexity) justified the delay.

The court found 92 days of defence delay, resulting in a net delay of 705 days (23.2 months), which still exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

While acknowledging the case's complexity, the court rejected the Crown's arguments for discrete events and found the Crown's prosecution plan, despite a significant conflict-of-interest issue, was not unreasonable in minimizing delay for this complex case.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, Prasath Thanigasalam, sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on secondary grounds due to multiple breaches of prior recognizances.

The reviewing judge found no error in the Justice of the Peace's initial decision regarding the application of secondary grounds or sufficiency of reasons.

However, the accused's new proposal to wear a GPS ankle bracelet, with his parents agreeing to cover the costs, constituted a material change in circumstances.

This new evidence addressed the Justice of the Peace's primary concern about the accused's compliance.

Consequently, the application for bail review was allowed, and the accused was released on strict conditions including house arrest, a $75,000 surety, and mandatory GPS monitoring.

This ruling addresses the appropriate jury instruction when directed verdicts of acquittal and stays of proceedings are granted against some, but not all, defendants in a joint criminal trial.

The court considered arguments from defence counsel, who sought to withhold reasons for the defendants' departure, and the Crown, who advocated for instructions consistent with R. v. Rowbotham.

The judge decided to instruct the jury on the directed verdicts and stays, have the Crown enter stays in the jury's presence, and provide a cautionary instruction to prevent speculation and ensure individual assessment of guilt for the remaining defendants.

This decision provides supplemental reasons for directed verdict applications in a criminal trial involving charges of manslaughter, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm.

The Crown sought to rely on s. 21(2) of the Criminal Code to establish liability for manslaughter against all defendants, clarifying a previous misunderstanding of their position.

The court, however, found that even with the application of s. 21(2), there was insufficient evidence to establish a common intention among the defendants to commit a group assault on the pedestrians, which is a prerequisite for extended liability under s. 21(2).

Consequently, the earlier directed verdicts of acquittal for manslaughter against two defendants and assault causing bodily harm against two others remained undisturbed.

The court ruled on directed verdict applications for four defendants charged with manslaughter, assault with a weapon, and assault causing bodily harm following a fatal altercation.

The judge dismissed the assault with a weapon charge for all defendants due to insufficient evidence.

Manslaughter charges were dismissed for two defendants (Ampadu and Paniccia) but proceeded for two others (Clare and Zenczuk).

Assault causing bodily harm charges proceeded for two defendants (Ampadu and Paniccia) but were dismissed for the other two (Clare and Zenczuk).

The court found insufficient evidence for a common intention to attack all pedestrians, requiring individual assessment of party liability.

The Crown sought to exclude cell phone copies of surveillance video in a manslaughter trial, arguing they were unreliable due to unexplained differences from the original and violated the best evidence rule.

The defence contended the cell phone copies offered superior clarity and had been used without objection in a prior mistrial.

The court dismissed the Crown's application, finding the cell phone copies met the threshold for reliability, provided the clearest images, and thus satisfied a common sense application of the best evidence rule, emphasizing that "original" does not always mean "better" in terms of evidence quality.

The defendants, jointly charged with manslaughter and assault, brought a motion seeking further disclosure from the Crown.

The applications concerned two areas: notes taken by police officers during witness preparation meetings with the Crown, and materials the Crown intended to use to cross-examine a proposed defence expert witness (a toxicologist) on the issue of bias.

The Crown opposed both applications, arguing that the notes contained no new relevant information and were subject to litigation privilege, and that the expert's prior testimony transcript was a matter of public record and not part of the "fruits of the investigation." The court ruled that the Crown was obliged to disclose both the officers' notes, finding them relevant and not privileged, and the transcript of the expert's prior evidence, as it related to the expert's impartiality and the accused's constitutional right to make full answer and defence.

The court emphasized the Crown's role as a minister of justice, prioritizing the proper administration of justice over tactical litigation advantages.

The request for "will-say" statements from officers who did not take notes was denied, as it would amount to creating evidence rather than disclosing existing material.

The Crown brought an application to relitigate two prior evidentiary rulings made during an initial trial that ended in a mistrial.

The rulings concerned the admissibility of a witness's statement and the scope of cross-examination regarding an alleged attempt to influence testimony.

Applying s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code and the "interests of justice" factors from R. v. Victoria, the court found that the prior rulings were not clearly wrong and that no new evidence or arguments were presented to justify relitigation.

The application was dismissed, affirming the binding nature of the previous evidentiary decisions for the re-trial.

The accused, charged with sexual assault involving allegations of drugging the victim, brought a pre-trial motion to prevent the mention of his stage name, 'Bill Cosby', in front of the jury.

The defence argued the name would create an odious association with the notorious allegations against the American entertainer of the same name.

The court directed the Crown to make its best efforts to present the case without reference to the stage name, noting that the ruling could be reconsidered if the Crown is unable to fully and fairly present its case.

The Crown sought to admit statements made by the accused following his arrest for sexual assault, while the accused brought a Charter application alleging a breach of his s. 10(b) right to counsel.

The court found that the accused's initial statements to police were voluntary and admissible.

However, during a subsequent video interview, the police failed to ensure the accused understood his right to counsel after he expressed confusion.

The court held this was a serious breach of s. 10(b) and excluded the video interview statements and a buccal swab obtained for DNA analysis under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

During a trial for sexual offences against a minor, the Crown objected to the defence's anticipated cross-examination of the complainant's father, arguing the defence failed to put its theories of fabrication to the complainant during his cross-examination, violating the rule in Browne v. Dunn.

The defence conceded the violation but argued the complainant should be recalled to testify.

The court held that recalling the vulnerable 14-year-old complainant would subject him to an unreasonable burden and risk giving the evidence disproportionate attention.

Instead, the court ordered that a special instruction be given to the jury regarding the defence's failure to cross-examine the complainant on these issues.

During a trial for sexual offences against a minor, the defence cross-examined a Crown witness about a previously withdrawn criminal charge for obstructing a court proceeding.

The Crown objected to this line of questioning.

The court ruled that cross-examination on the fact of a withdrawn charge is generally impermissible as it has no bearing on credibility, though the underlying facts may be explored.

The court directed a mid-trial instruction to the jury to disregard the fact of the charge, but permitted the defence to further cross-examine the witness on the underlying facts.