W. Danial Newton

The accused brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter to stay charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from arrest to the anticipated end of trial was over 53 months.

After deducting defence delay and delay caused by exceptional circumstances, including the COVID-19 pandemic and the death of the preliminary hearing judge, the net delay was calculated at 35 months and 21 days.

As this exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling and the case was not particularly complex, the court found the delay unreasonable and stayed the charges.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder, uttering death threats, and forcible confinement following the stabbing death of his brother's common-law partner.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence and the testimony of three highly intoxicated witnesses, which contained inconsistencies.

The court accepted the evidence that the accused had a knife, threatened the occupants, and fled the scene before police arrived.

Applying the test for circumstantial evidence, the court found that the only reasonable inference was that the accused stabbed the victim and had the requisite intent for murder despite his intoxication.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Ontario Land Tribunal regarding compensation for the expropriation of contaminated land.

The Tribunal had determined the property's market value to be $290,000 based on a speculative value, rejecting the appellant's higher valuation due to prohibitive environmental remediation costs.

The Tribunal also awarded $51,683 for wasted costs.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found no palpable and overriding error in the Tribunal's factual findings regarding market value and wasted costs.

The Court also rejected the appellant's argument that it was denied procedural fairness when the Tribunal refused an interlocutory motion for third-party document production.

The appeal was dismissed.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to adduce evidence of an alternate suspect and inadequate police investigation.

The defence sought to cross-examine police officers about information they received regarding another individual who allegedly had a motive and recent violent encounter with the victim, but whom police failed to investigate.

The court allowed the application, finding there was an air of reality to the alternate suspect theory and that the proposed evidence was relevant to the adequacy of the police investigation.

The applicant sought remedies under the Business Corporations Act after discovering the respondent co-director had forged his signature on pandemic relief loans and deposited fraudulent cheques, leaving the corporation in debt.

The respondent admitted to the forgeries.

The court granted judgment for the $35,000 the applicant paid to cover the overdraft, awarded $25,000 in punitive damages, set aside the forged loan agreements and personal guarantees, and awarded substantial indemnity costs.

The appellant municipality appealed a Drainage Referee's order denying it costs and sought a declaration that a referee who conducts a pre-hearing cannot preside at the hearing.

The respondent landowners cross-appealed the Referee's finding that a proposed drainage project was an 'improvement' under the Drainage Act rather than a new drainage works requiring a petition.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the costs award and holding that a declaration was unnecessary given existing rules.

The cross-appeal was also dismissed, as the Referee correctly distinguished prior case law and made no palpable and overriding error in concluding the project was an improvement despite an increase in capacity.

The mother appealed a summary judgment order concerning the protection of and access to her child.

At the hearing, the parties presented a mutually acceptable agreement to dismiss the appeal on consent.

The Children's Aid Society undertook not to place the child for adoption without consent for seven months, to evaluate the possibility of reintegration, to increase access to at least twice a month, and to bring an early status review application if reintegration is deemed possible.

The Divisional Court granted the consent endorsement request and dismissed the appeal on those terms.

The accused was arrested for drug trafficking and a loaded handgun was found in his vehicle pursuant to a search warrant.

At trial, the accused brought a Charter application to exclude the handgun, alleging breaches of his ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) rights.

The court found no breaches of ss. 8 or 9, as there were reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest and the strip search was necessary.

However, the court found a breach of s. 10(b) because the police unreasonably delayed the accused's right to counsel for their own convenience prior to executing a search warrant.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that the evidence should not be excluded, as the breach was not causally connected to the discovery of the firearm and society has a heightened interest in adjudicating serious firearms offences on the merits.

The offender was convicted of first degree murder and kidnapping with a firearm in relation to a drug debt.

The court imposed the mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without parole eligibility for 25 years for the murder.

For the kidnapping, the court agreed with the Crown that the context of enforcing a drug debt required denunciation and deterrence, imposing a concurrent life sentence.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee finding he committed professional misconduct by sexually abusing an adolescent patient and engaging in disgraceful conduct towards another adolescent boy.

The Committee ordered the mandatory revocation of his certificate of registration.

On appeal, the appellant argued the Committee made palpable and overriding errors of fact and held his evidence to an uneven standard of scrutiny.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Committee properly evaluated the evidence, made reasonable credibility findings, and correctly concluded the conduct amounted to masturbation requiring mandatory revocation.

The parties in a high-conflict divorce sought a determination on decision-making authority, parenting time, and child support for their two daughters.

The court granted the mother final decision-making authority due to the parties' inability to communicate effectively and the father's ongoing anger and trust issues.

A 7/7 shared parenting schedule with a midweek visit was ordered to provide stability and reduce exchanges.

Child support payable by the father was reduced by half to $295.50 monthly, as the mother chose not to work while on maternity leave with a new child, and her new partner earned a significant income.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Myers J. dated March 2, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties in the fixed amount of $1,095.99.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the lower court.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal and fixed the costs of the motion at $5,000, with the determination of entitlement reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an earlier order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded all-inclusive costs of $3,500 to the municipal respondent and $5,000 to the regional and corporate respondents, payable within 30 days.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of J.R. McCarthy J. dated December 22, 2021.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal, with costs reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

This decision addresses cross-motions for temporary relief in a family law matter concerning an eight-year-old child.

The mother sought sole decision-making and child support, while the father sought joint decision-making, a residence restriction, and increased parenting time.

The court ordered the father to pay child support based on his income, disallowing a deduction for prior support obligations for the temporary order.

Joint decision-making was granted, and the existing parenting schedule was maintained, denying the father's request for more frequent weekend time.

The mother consented to the residence restriction.

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) brought a motion for direction regarding the return of property purchased by Kristina Munson, former attorney for property for Jean Cherneyko, and third parties (Munson's father and common-law partner) using Cherneyko's funds.

A previous court order had terminated Munson's power of attorney and ordered her to repay over $334,000.

The PGT argued that the "doctrine of knowing receipt" applied to the third parties who received property purchased with these funds.

The court found the doctrine applicable, obliging the third parties to return the property or its value, even if initially received innocently, as they were now aware of the breach of trust.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Office of the Independent Police Review Director (OIPRD) to screen out his complaint against officers of the London Police Service.

The applicant alleged that the officers discriminated against him based on his gender during an intimate partner dispute.

The OIPRD screened out the complaint under s. 60(4) of the Police Services Act, concluding that the underlying issues regarding access to the matrimonial home and corporate property were better suited for family, civil, or landlord and tenant courts.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no breach of procedural fairness and holding that the OIPRD's decision was reasonable and adequately explained.

The appellants appealed a costs order from a summary judgment motion where they were granted an injunction regarding a wood stove and $1,500 in damages for nuisance, but no costs.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, noting that the respondents had offered to consent to the injunction early on and the appellants had claimed $60,000 in damages but only recovered $1,500.

The court found no error in principle in the motion judge's decision that each party bear their own costs.

This case involved a dispute over a real estate transaction where the plaintiff sought specific performance and the defendant counterclaimed for breach of contract and conversion of a trailer.

The parties had an informal agreement for the sale of property for $40,000, which the plaintiff paid in installments and began renovations.

The transaction failed to close due to the defendant's later assertion that the price was $80,000, influenced by an unexpected mortgage amount.

The court found the defendant's claim of an $80,000 purchase price incredible and dismissed the counterclaim regarding the trailer due to insufficient evidence.

The court ordered specific performance, vesting title in the plaintiff.