D. Andrew Thomson

Parents appealed a child protection decision finding three children in need of protection under the Child and Family Services Act and ordering Crown wardship without access for two children, with the third placed with the biological father under supervision.

The trial judge had concluded that one or both parents inflicted serious injuries on one child but could not determine which parent was responsible, and that the other parent failed to protect the child.

The appellants argued errors in credibility findings, failure to properly assess evidence, and improper consideration of changed circumstances.

The court held that the trial judge’s findings were supported by the evidence and attracted appellate deference absent palpable and overriding error.

Considering the severity of the injuries and the ongoing risk to the children, the court found that the disposition was in the children’s best interests.

The defendant brought a motion seeking to remove the plaintiffs’ solicitor of record on the basis of an alleged conflict of interest arising from the solicitor’s prior representation of the defendant in a property purchase.

Applying the test from MacDonald Estate v. Martin, the court considered whether the lawyer had received confidential information relevant to the current litigation and whether there was a risk that such information could be used to the defendant’s prejudice.

The court found that any information obtained during the earlier retainer was outdated, minimal, and largely discoverable through ordinary litigation processes.

The court also noted that the defendant delayed bringing the motion until shortly after service of a summary judgment motion, suggesting a tactical motive.

Balancing the integrity of the profession with the plaintiffs’ right to counsel of choice, the court declined to disqualify counsel.

The applicant brought a motion to change a prior custody order, alleging denial of access, interference with telephone contact, and failure by the custodial parent to address the child’s medical needs.

She also brought a contempt motion, while the respondent sought an order declaring the applicant a vexatious litigant.

The court held that the applicant failed to establish a material change in circumstances under the Children’s Law Reform Act and that the variation motion was effectively an attempt to relitigate or appeal the prior custody determination.

The contempt motion was also dismissed because the applicant herself had repeatedly failed to comply with the access terms of the order.

Although declining to impose the broadest restrictions under s. 140 of the Courts of Justice Act, the court declared the applicant a vexatious litigant and prohibited her from commencing further proceedings relating to custody or access without leave of the court.

The applicant mother brought a motion seeking leave to relocate with the parties' two children from Parry Sound to Aurora, to vary the respondent father's access schedule, and for retroactive child support.

The father opposed the relocation, arguing it would further alienate him from the children, particularly the daughter who already refused to see him.

The court applied the best interests of the child test from Gordon v. Goertz.

Despite two Office of the Children's Lawyer reports recommending against the move, the court granted the relocation, finding it would provide the mother with better economic opportunities and would not disrupt the father's existing alternate-weekend access with the son.

The court also ordered the mother to seek treatment to repair the father-daughter relationship and ordered the father to pay retroactive child support.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside a noting in default.

The appellants had delivered but not filed a statement of defence, and waited over a year before retaining counsel to bring the motion to set aside, just days before the scheduled undefended trial.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion, agreeing that the appellants failed to demonstrate a continuing intention to defend, provided an incredible explanation for the delay, and failed to bring the motion expeditiously.

The appeal was dismissed.

The father brought a motion to change custody of his son from the mother and sought child support following a change of custody.

The mother had relocated to Nova Scotia with the child in 2007 without the father's consent and remained there for five years, during which the father had minimal contact with the child.

The father initially pursued criminal charges of child abduction rather than family court proceedings.

The court found that the child's habitual residence was in Nova Scotia and declined to exercise jurisdiction, dismissing the father's motion to change custody.

The court found the mother's conduct in violating court orders to be outrageous but determined that Nova Scotia was the more appropriate forum given the child's connections to that province.

A custody and support trial concerning a child born of a short-term common‑law relationship.

The court assessed the best interests of the child under s. 24 of the Children's Law Reform Act, examining stability of the home environment, parental ability to facilitate the child’s relationship with the other parent, involvement in schooling, and responsiveness to service providers.

The court found the father’s household offered greater stability and that the mother’s hostility toward the father risked impairing the child’s relationship with him.

Custody was therefore awarded to the father with structured access to the mother.

The court denied spousal support but awarded $6,000 to the mother for unjust enrichment arising from labour improving the father’s property.

The appellants sought access to the back of their property across a grassy strip of city-owned land bordering a cul-de-sac.

The city council denied the request.

The application judge ruled the appellants had no right of access but found the city's process was tainted by bad faith and ordered a new hearing.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the finding that the grassy strip was not part of the public road, dismissing the appellants' appeal.

The Court allowed the city's cross-appeal, finding the application judge misapprehended the evidence and improperly applied adjudicative procedural fairness standards to an elected municipal council.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that she failed to rebut the presumption that a lost will was destroyed by the testator with the intention of revoking it.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge was entitled to consider the testator's intention as circumstantial evidence supporting the presumption of revocation, and that the appellant failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the loss of the original will.

Costs were not awarded to the appellant out of the estate.

The applicant dentist sought judicial review of a decision by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board, which upheld a Complaints Committee decision requiring him to be cautioned.

The Committee found the applicant failed to obtain informed consent before treating an elderly patient with Alzheimer's disease, having instead obtained a signature from the patient's son after treatment was largely complete, despite the existence of a Power of Attorney for Personal Care held by the patient's daughter.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Board and Committee were entirely reasonable in concluding that the circumstances required the applicant to be vigilant in obtaining informed consent from the proper person.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the trial judge on three issues of liability and the allocation of costs.

The Court of Appeal found no reversible error on the liability issues and no error in principle in the discretionary allocation of costs.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $6,000.