Coroza

The appellant pled guilty to defrauding her employer of over $210,000 through fraudulent schemes and forgeries over several years.

She appealed her sentence of two years less a day, arguing the sentencing judge erred by not imposing a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's emphasis on the appellant's significant criminal record for similar offences and the need for specific and general deterrence, despite her guilty plea and full restitution.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and counselling to commit murder after his ex-girlfriend was shot with a concealed crossbow.

The Crown's case was entirely circumstantial, relying on the appellant's strong financial and emotional motive, his request to an ex-biker friend to find a hitman, and his counter-surveillance conduct after the attack.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no misapprehension of evidence, no palpable and overriding error in assessing the victim's testimony, no improper reliance on police opinion evidence, and that the verdicts were reasonable given the compelling circumstantial evidence.

The Law Society of Ontario (LSO) appealed a Divisional Court decision that quashed its administrative decision to void the registrations of 20 licensing candidates implicated in a cheating scandal.

The Divisional Court had found the LSO breached procedural fairness by not holding oral hearings before voiding the registrations.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Divisional Court misapplied the Baker factors and conflated the LSO's administrative licensing functions with its disciplinary good character functions.

The Court held that the written process provided by the LSO, which included disclosure and multiple opportunities to respond, satisfied the duty of procedural fairness.

The Court also admitted new evidence and found the Divisional Court breached procedural fairness by making costs orders without allowing submissions.

The appellants, a home builder and its owner, brought a defamation action against the respondent homeowners over negative social media posts following a renovation dispute.

The motion judge dismissed the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the online reviews reflected a purely private dispute and did not relate to a matter of public interest.

The Court also held that the motion judge erred in her approach to the 'no valid defence' requirement and the public interest weighing exercise, concluding that the defamation action should be permitted to proceed.

The appellants, defendants in a proposed class action arising from the 2022 Freedom Convoy protest in Ottawa, appealed the dismissal of their anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding no reversible error in his conclusions that there were grounds to believe the plaintiffs' claims for private and public nuisance had substantial merit, that the defendants had no valid defence, and that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendants' expression.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Bank of Montreal, sought to appeal an order lifting a stay of proceedings in a receivership, which allowed the respondent to terminate a project agreement.

The appellant argued it had an automatic right of appeal under s. 193(c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, or alternatively, sought leave to appeal under s. 193(e).

The Court of Appeal held that the order lifting the stay was procedural, did not directly bring into play the value of the debtor's property, and did not directly result in a loss, meaning there was no automatic right of appeal.

The court also denied leave to appeal, finding the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious, did not raise issues of general importance, and would unduly hinder the insolvency proceedings.

The appellant employer appealed a summary judgment decision awarding a former executive unpaid vacation pay, deferred bonuses, and the value of lost stock options.

The employer argued the motion judge erred in granting the relief, in finding that issue estoppel barred its just cause defence, and in determining the matter via summary judgment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's assessment of the evidence or his conclusion that the just cause defence was barred by issue estoppel following the earlier dismissal of the employer's counterclaim under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms offences, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to exclude a handgun under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The handgun was discovered during a lawful search incident to arrest, but police subsequently breached the appellant's s. 10(b) right to counsel and s. 8 privacy rights through warrantless entries into his apartment.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by failing to consider the breaches cumulatively.

Conducting a fresh s. 24(2) analysis, the Court concluded that while the breaches were serious, their impact was minimal as they occurred after the lawful discovery of the handgun, and society's interest favoured admission.

The appeal was dismissed.

The City of Ottawa appealed a remittal decision that found various provisions of a 1981 Agreement and related contracts governing golf course lands to be inoperative.

The Court of Appeal had previously struck down conveyancing provisions in the agreement for violating the rule against perpetuities.

The application judge held that without these provisions, the remaining obligations to operate a golf course in perpetuity fundamentally altered the parties' original bargain and were therefore inoperative.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the removal of the conveyancing provisions frustrated the balance of the agreement, rendering all provisions relating to the golf course lands void.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder by a jury.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by refusing to leave the included offence of manslaughter with the jury, by directing the jury to find he had the state of mind for murder if they concluded he was the shooter, and by improperly instructing the jury on after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge did not err in removing manslaughter, as there was no air of reality to an unintentional killing.

While the trial judge erred in directing the jury on the state of mind for murder, the error was harmless and cured by the proviso, as the jury's finding of planning and deliberation necessarily included an intention to kill.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants were convicted of various drug-related offences following a large-scale police investigation involving wiretaps, tracking warrants, and search warrants.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the application judge erred in dismissing their pre-trial Garofoli applications challenging the constitutionality of the searches and interceptions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no errors in the application judge's assessment of the wiretap authorizations, the reliance on confidential informants, the refusal to excise certain information from the warrants, and the determinations regarding reasonable expectations of privacy in condominium units and common areas.

The appellant pleaded guilty to sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching involving a young female relative and was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence was excessive and sought a reduction to four to five years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal against the length of the sentence, finding no error in the sentencing judge's balancing of mitigating and aggravating factors.

However, on joint agreement of the parties, the court amended the ancillary prohibition orders under section 161 of the Criminal Code to accurately reflect the trial judge's original order.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and other offences arising from a bar shooting, as well as his 17-year global sentence.

He argued the trial judge erred in relying on recognition evidence and rejecting exculpatory testimony, and failed to give sufficient credit for harsh pre-sentence custody conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's assessment of the circumstantial identification evidence or his discretionary application of credit for harsh conditions.

The moving parties, a syndicate of six banks, sought to partially lift an automatic stay of a bankruptcy order pending appeal under s. 195 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The banks argued that the appellant was frustrating the bankruptcy process and might dissipate her assets.

The court found that the appellant's grounds of appeal were extremely weak and that maintaining the stay would prejudice the banks by preventing the trustee from identifying and preserving assets.

The court granted the motion, partially lifting the stay to allow the trustee to exercise specific powers under the BIA.

The respondent was charged with speeding.

A justice of the peace ordered the prosecutor to disclose the entire user manual for the speed measuring radar device used by the police officer.

The Ontario Provincial Police brought an application for certiorari to quash the disclosure order, arguing a third party records hearing was required.

The Superior Court dismissed the application, finding that while the justice of the peace erred by not making a specific finding that the manual was first party disclosure, there was no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice because the entire manual (except for one section on legal requirements) was obviously relevant and constituted first party disclosure.

The parties were involved in a dispute over the estate of the deceased, who allegedly died intestate.

The applicant sought the appointment of an Estate Trustee Without a Will and an advance from the estate, while the respondents sought the appointment of an Estate Trustee During Litigation and directions regarding estate properties.

The court consolidated the two applications, appointed an Estate Trustee During Litigation to administer the estate pending the resolution of the dispute, deferred the request for an advance, and authorized the payment of outstanding property taxes on estate properties.

The accused, charged with fraud over $5,000 for allegedly defrauding the government of customs duties, brought a pre-trial motion to adduce alternate suspect evidence implicating five employees.

The Crown conceded for three employees but opposed for two.

The court granted the accused's application, finding sufficient connection between the employees and the crime.

The Crown also brought a motion to admit the videotaped statement of a deceased employee.

The court dismissed the Crown's application as premature, without prejudice to renew it before the close of its case.

The Crown applied for prerogative writs to quash a preliminary hearing judge's decision to continue an ongoing preliminary inquiry after Bill C-75 came into force.

Bill C-75 amended s. 535 of the Criminal Code to eliminate preliminary inquiries for offences with a maximum penalty of less than 14 years.

The Superior Court dismissed the Crown's application, holding that the amendments do not apply retrospectively to a preliminary inquiry that had already commenced, as doing so would affect substantive rights and lead to absurd results.

The accused was arrested for domestic assault while sitting in his car parked in his driveway.

Following the arrest, a police officer searched the car and found heroin in the centre console.

The accused brought a pre-trial application to exclude the heroin under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing the search violated his s. 8 rights.

The court found the officer's stated reasons for the search—related to the accused's demeanour—were not objectively reasonable and the search was not truly incidental to the arrest for domestic assault.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded the Charter breach was serious and the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The application was granted and the heroin was excluded.

The applicant vendor brought an application under Rule 14.05(3) to enforce a settlement agreement reached with the respondent purchasers after an aborted real estate transaction.

The respondents argued they lacked funds to pay and that the applicant sold the property at an improvident price.

The court found it had jurisdiction under Rule 14 as there were no material facts in dispute regarding the existence of the settlement.

The court held that a binding settlement was reached and ordered the respondents to pay the agreed $50,000 balance in installments, plus legal fees and costs.