Robert Richardson

The accused were charged with multiple offences arising from an armed robbery of a jewellery store.

One accused pled guilty to several charges but contested the charge of attempted murder, while the other accused contested all charges based on identity.

The court found the circumstantial evidence, including cell tower data and intercepted communications, insufficient to prove the identity of the second robber beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court also acquitted the first accused of attempted murder, finding she lacked subjective awareness of any intent to kill by her co-perpetrator.

Both accused were acquitted of the contested charges.

In a murder trial, the Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of a 911 call purportedly made by a central Crown witness.

The Crown argued the call was admissible as the best evidence of the event and to rebut recent fabrication.

The defence argued the recording lacked context and amounted to improper oath-helping.

The court ruled the 911 call-back was inadmissible at this stage, finding it devoid of material information and that its admission would serve solely to bolster the witness's credibility before it was attacked, thereby offending the rule against oath-helping.

The Crown brought a pre-trial motion to admit four out-of-court statements made by a witness, Kulwant Litt, for the truth of their contents under the principled exception to the hearsay rule (a K.G.B. application).

The witness, who is the father of one accused and father-in-law of the other, had previously confessed to his son (acting as a police agent) and the police about the accused's involvement in a murder and the subsequent disposal of the body, but later recanted.

The court found that necessity was established by the recantation and that threshold reliability was met through a combination of procedural reliability (the witness was available for cross-examination and the statements were recorded) and substantive reliability (confirmatory physical evidence and lack of motive to lie at the time).

The statements were ruled admissible.

During a jury trial for second-degree murder and accessory after the fact, the accused brought a motion seeking further disclosure relating to certified translations of Punjabi-language recordings and interviews relied upon by the Crown.

The defence identified material discrepancies between police, Crown-certified, and defence-certified translations of a key intercepted conversation and sought documentation relating to the commissioning, preparation, and certification of translations.

The court found that the requested materials had a sufficient nexus to the reliability of the translations relevant to a proposed s. 9 Canada Evidence Act application under R. v. K.G.B. The judge ordered limited disclosure of communications, requests, drafts, and information concerning the preparation and certification of specific transcripts prepared by a particular translator.

Broader disclosure requests were withdrawn without prejudice.

During a jury trial for second‑degree murder and accessory after the fact, the Crown sought a preliminary ruling regarding disputed Punjabi-to-English translations of intercepted communications.

The Crown requested that the court appoint a neutral third‑party translator to resolve discrepancies between the Crown and defence transcripts or, alternatively, determine that the Crown translation was accurate before addressing a defence disclosure application.

The court declined to order a court-appointed translator, emphasizing that calling its own witnesses should occur only rarely and with extreme caution.

Given material discrepancies between translations and incomplete argument on the defence disclosure application, the court directed that submissions continue on the defence request for further disclosure relating to the translations.

The accused applied for directed verdicts at the close of the Crown’s case in a jury trial involving multiple firearm offences arising from the discovery of a loaded handgun and other weapons in an apartment.

The Crown’s case was entirely circumstantial and relied on evidence connecting both accused to the premises and the location of the firearm within a shared laundry hamper.

The court reviewed the directed verdict test and principles governing circumstantial evidence, constructive possession, and joint possession.

It held that the circumstantial evidence could support reasonable inferences of knowledge and control sufficient for a properly instructed jury to convict on the firearm-related counts.

However, there was no evidence supporting the mental element required for possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace regarding a stun gun.

The accused faced a single remaining count of obstructing justice after resolving other charges by plea.

The allegation was that he misled the court about his identity by allowing himself to be presented under an assumed name and by providing a false birth date during a bail appearance.

The court held that giving a knowingly false birth date that perpetuated the court’s misunderstanding of the accused’s identity constituted the actus reus of obstruction under s. 139(2) of the Criminal Code.

Although the accused testified that he intended only to maintain the status quo until consulting counsel, the court found that his purpose at the time was to preserve concealment of his true identity.

The Crown proved both the actus reus and specific intent beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused, charged with firearms and drug offences, brought applications to cross-examine the affiant and sub-affiants of an Information to Obtain (ITO) a wiretap authorization, and a Garofoli application to exclude the intercepted communications.

The applicants argued that the ITO relied heavily on confidential informants and lacked sufficient detail to establish reasonable and probable grounds.

The court dismissed the application to cross-examine, finding no evidentiary basis to suggest it would elicit testimony discrediting the statutory preconditions.

The court also dismissed the Garofoli application, concluding that the redacted ITO and judicial summary provided sufficient evidence to establish reasonable and probable grounds to believe the interceptions would afford evidence of the offences.

The three accused were arrested while exiting an apartment building and entering a taxi, and each was found in possession of a loaded handgun.

They brought a Charter motion alleging violations of their rights under ss. 7, 8, 9, and 10, arguing they were unlawfully detained and searched.

The court found that the police had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative detention and pat search based on the totality of the circumstances, including the high-crime area, a recent shooting, and the accused's behaviour.

The Charter motions were dismissed, the firearms were admitted into evidence, and the accused were found guilty.

The accused were charged with importing approximately 30 kilograms of cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

They brought pre‑trial applications seeking exclusion of statements, cell phone evidence, and evidence obtained during a residential search, alleging multiple Charter breaches including violations of ss. 10(b) and 8.

The court found serious breaches including delays in implementing the right to counsel, police questioning prior to consultation with counsel, failure to ensure the accused understood their rights due to language barriers, and unlawful warrantless searches of a cell phone.

The unlawfully obtained phone evidence formed a central basis for a search warrant; once excised from the Information to Obtain, the warrant could not stand.

Applying the framework from R v Grant, the court excluded the accused’s statements and the cell phone evidence, resulting in exclusion of all derivative evidence from the residential search.

The accused, charged with importing cocaine, brought pre-trial motions challenging the admissibility of their statements to police, the lawfulness of a cell phone search incident to arrest, and the validity of a search warrant for a residence.

The court found multiple breaches of the accused's s. 10(b) right to counsel, including delays in facilitating access, eliciting evidence prior to access, and failing to ensure comprehension given language barriers.

The court also held that the warrantless search of the accused's cell phone contents incident to arrest violated s. 8 of the Charter, as cell phones attract a high expectation of privacy requiring prior judicial authorization absent exigent circumstances.

The determination of remedies under s. 24(2) was deferred.