Brendan Gluckman

The appellants were convicted of various drug-related offences following a large-scale police investigation involving wiretaps, tracking warrants, and search warrants.

They appealed their convictions, arguing the application judge erred in dismissing their pre-trial Garofoli applications challenging the constitutionality of the searches and interceptions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no errors in the application judge's assessment of the wiretap authorizations, the reliance on confidential informants, the refusal to excise certain information from the warrants, and the determinations regarding reasonable expectations of privacy in condominium units and common areas.

The accused, charged with drug trafficking and conspiracy to commit murder, brought an application to exclude evidence seized during multiple warrantless searches.

The court found the warrantless entry at 10 York Street was justified by exigent circumstances to prevent a planned shooting.

The warrantless entry at 88 Harbour Street and the seizure of a vehicle breached section 8 of the Charter, but the evidence was admitted under section 24(2).

However, the search of a bedroom at 15 Danum Road involved egregious Charter breaches, including a violation of the right to counsel and an invalid consent, leading the court to exclude the drugs and cash found there.

The applicant, charged with offences under the Security of Information Act for allegedly attempting to communicate safeguarded information to a foreign entity, brought an application to stay the proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The prosecution had been ongoing for over eight years, complicated by extensive litigation over national security privilege under s. 38 of the Canada Evidence Act regarding a CSIS warrant.

The court applied the Jordan framework, calculating the total delay and subtracting defence delay and discrete exceptional events, including the time taken for the national security litigation and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court found that the remaining delay of over 40 months significantly exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling and that the case was not particularly complex.

Consequently, the court held that the applicant's s. 11(b) rights were breached and ordered a stay of proceedings.

The applicant, charged under the Security of Information Act, brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained from an undercover operation pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The applicant argued that the evidence was derived from a CSIS wiretap warrant that violated his s. 8 Charter rights due to a lack of candour by the affiant.

The court assumed a s. 8 breach had occurred but applied the Grant factors and concluded that the breach was not at the most serious end of the scale, the impact on the applicant's rights was diminished by several factors, and society's interest in adjudicating the serious national security charges on their merits was exceptionally high.

The motion to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

The applicant, charged under the Security of Information Act, brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 38.14 of the Canada Evidence Act.

He argued that his right to a fair trial was compromised because relevant information in a CSIS wiretap affidavit was withheld from him due to an Attorney General's certificate, preventing him from making full answer and defence on a s. 24(2) Charter application.

The court found that while the judicial editing process was fair, the Attorney General's unreviewable redactions of relevant information adversely affected trial fairness by precluding a subfacial challenge to the warrant.

Instead of a stay, the court fashioned a lesser remedy, declaring a s. 8 Charter breach and directing that the reviewing judge assume the affidavit contained false or misleading information.

The Crown brought an application for a sealing order and to hold part of the proceedings in camera regarding charges under the Security of Information Act.

The charges stemmed from intercepted telephone calls to a foreign embassy.

The Crown sought to prevent public disclosure of a redacted CSIS affidavit and warrant, arguing it would injure Canada's international relations.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the court found that the orders were necessary to prevent a serious risk to the proper administration of justice and that the salutary effects outweighed the deleterious effects on the open court principle.

The application was granted.

The three accused, charged with conspiracy to import cocaine and breach of trust, brought applications under s. 24(2) of the Charter to exclude intercepted private communications.

They alleged their s. 8 rights were violated because the police affiant deliberately misled the authorizing judge regarding the investigative plan to establish reasonable and probable grounds for the wiretap.

The court found the affidavit was materially misleading, though not deliberately so, and that without the misleading information, the authorization lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court concluded the wiretap violated s. 8 of the Charter and excluded the evidence under s. 24(2), finding the serious police carelessness and subsequent false testimony by the affiant outweighed society's interest in a trial on the merits.

The accused, charged with drug importation offences, brought a pre-trial Charter application challenging five successive wiretap authorizations.

The Crown objected to his standing to challenge the first authorization, as he was not named and his communications were not intercepted under it.

The court held that the accused lacked standing to challenge the first authorization directly because he had no reasonable expectation of privacy.

However, the court ruled he had standing to challenge the subsequent authorizations that did intercept his communications, and in doing so, he could seek to excise information from their supporting ITOs that was allegedly obtained in violation of his co-accused's Charter rights under the first authorization.

The defendant brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained pursuant to various wiretap authorizations, general warrants, and search warrants, alleging violations of his s. 8 Charter rights.

The Crown conceded a s. 8 breach regarding a May 3, 2016 general warrant due to an error in identifying the specific condominium unit.

The court found that the other authorizations and warrants were validly issued and that the police did not act negligently or in bad faith.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that the evidence obtained from the May 3, 2016 general warrant should not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, as the police acted in good faith and the evidence was highly reliable and important to the prosecution.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant brought a pre-trial Charter application seeking to exclude evidence obtained from searches of his condominium pursuant to a general warrant and a search warrant.

The defendant challenged the validity of the warrants on facial and sub-facial grounds, arguing the affiant made misleading statements and omissions.

The court found that while there were some minor errors in the Information to Obtain (ITO), the affiant acted in good faith and the errors did not invalidate the warrants.

Applying the Debot test, the court found the confidential informant information was compelling, credible, and corroborated.

The court concluded the warrants were valid and there was no s. 8 Charter breach.

Even if there had been a breach, the court held the evidence would not be excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The application was dismissed.

The applicant, a lawyer charged with money laundering and possession of property obtained by crime, sought to vary or vacate three restraint orders freezing his bank and securities accounts.

He argued the orders were based on information obtained in breach of his s. 8 Charter rights, PIPEDA, and a production order, and that the banks acted as state agents.

The court dismissed the application, finding the accounts were properly restrained as offence-related property or proceeds of crime.

The court held the applicant had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the banking information disclosed, the banks acted independently to protect their own interests and not as state agents, and the disclosures complied with PIPEDA.

The court also found the CRA tax information was properly acquired and used.