Christine Bartlett-Hughes

The applicant appealed his conviction for assault, which arose from an attack by a group of skinheads on an unidentified black man.

The trial judge convicted the applicant based on a process of elimination, relying on the testimony of an accomplice and independent witnesses to conclude the applicant was the third participant in the chase.

The Court of Appeal found the independent evidence regarding the number of participants was too contradictory and unsatisfactory to form a safe basis for conviction.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his convictions and sentences for assault, criminal harassment, breach of recognizance, and breach of probation arising from the termination of a common-law relationship.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in applying the rule in Brown v. Dunn to reject the appellant's self-defence evidence on the assault charge, as the record showed the complainant had been cross-examined on the issue.

The assault conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The remaining convictions were upheld.

The global sentence was reduced from four years to two years less a day, plus three years' probation, to account for pre-trial custody and to avoid double punishment for conduct already sentenced.

The appellant was convicted of living off the avails of prostitution and exercising direction for the purpose of aiding prostitution in relation to an escort agency.

On appeal, he argued that business records containing double hearsay were improperly admitted and that breaches of a publication ban deprived him of a fair trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the records admissible under the co-conspirators exception to the hearsay rule and that the publication ban issues did not cause a miscarriage of justice.

The sentence appeal was allowed, reducing the sentence from two years less a day to 12 months' imprisonment due to the appellant's lack of prior record and the trial judge's refusal to allow time for sentencing submissions.

The accused was charged with murder.

A third party, the appellant, had allegedly confessed to the murder to his girlfriend and to his lawyers.

The accused brought a McClure application seeking production of the appellant's solicitor-client files to raise a reasonable doubt.

The motions judge granted the application.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appellant's appeal, finding the application was premature.

The accused had not established that the information was unavailable from any other source, as the girlfriend's testimony might be admissible.

Furthermore, it was not yet clear that the accused could not raise a reasonable doubt in any other way.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal decision that ordered a new trial and the production of joint counselling records in a sexual assault case.

The summary conviction appeal judge held that the Criminal Code's third-party records provisions did not apply to counselling sessions attended by both the accused and the complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that the provisions do apply, as the complainant retains a reasonable expectation of privacy in therapeutic records despite the accused's presence.

However, the Court of Appeal upheld the order for a new trial on the alternative ground that the trial judge misapprehended critical evidence regarding the complainant's statements during the alleged assault.

The appellant appealed his criminal conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in failing to give limiting instructions regarding a videotaped experiment, another individual's prior assault and alleged confession, and the appellant's after-the-fact conduct.

The appellant also argued the Crown's closing address improperly contained personal opinions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the jury instructions and concluding that while the Crown's expressions of personal opinion were improper, they did not undermine the fairness of the trial.

The respondents, operators of adult entertainment parlours, were charged with keeping a common bawdy-house contrary to s. 210 of the Criminal Code.

At trial, the charges were stayed on the basis that the terms 'acts of indecency' and 'prostitution' were unconstitutionally vague under s. 7 of the Charter.

The Crown appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals, holding that it was bound by stare decisis, as previous Supreme Court of Canada and Court of Appeal decisions had already established that the community standard of tolerance test provides an intelligible standard and that the terms are not impermissibly vague.

The stays were set aside and the matters remitted for trial.

The appellant appealed a conviction involving a forged endorsement on a cheque.

The central issue was whether the named payee was a non-existent entity or merely a misdescription.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding of fact that it was a misdescription, meaning the cheque was not payable to bearer under the Bills of Exchange Act.

Consequently, the forged endorsement was a material addition to a genuine document, and the appeal was dismissed.

The applicant, appealing a conviction for second degree murder, brought an application for the disclosure of an affidavit relating to the mental state of the principal Crown witness.

The Crown had put the witness's mental state in issue at trial to support her credibility.

The Court of Appeal found that the information in the affidavit suggested a previous diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder might have been in error, making it necessary for the applicant to make full answer and defence.

The court ordered the disclosure of the affidavit subject to conditions.

The appellant operated an escort agency, arranging dates between male clients and female escorts, and keeping one-third of the fee.

She was convicted of living on the avails of prostitution, attempting to procure, and breach of probation.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the conviction for living on the avails, finding her business relationship with the escorts was parasitic.

The court upheld one procuring conviction but set aside another, and quashed the breach of probation conviction.

The sentence was varied from ten months' imprisonment to a $10,000 fine.

The Crown appealed from an acquittal, arguing that the trial judge misapplied the principles governing the admissibility of similar fact evidence during a voir dire.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge stated the correct principles and fully appreciated the legal significance of the proposed evidence during submissions.

Given the high degree of appellate deference owed to trial rulings on similar fact evidence, the court declined to interfere.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction on the basis that the verdict was unreasonable and sought to adduce fresh evidence.

The proposed evidence consisted of post-conviction recorded telephone conversations in which the complainant explicitly and implicitly admitted that her trial testimony was false.

The court held that, although inconsistencies in the Crown's case did not render the verdict unreasonable, the fresh evidence satisfied the Palmer requirement that it could reasonably affect the result.

The fresh evidence was admitted, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant challenged his conviction for indecent assault and a sentence of two years less one day arising from prolonged historic sexual abuse of his stepdaughter.

The principal issue on conviction concerned refusal of third-party therapeutic records under the post-Bill C-46 production regime in the Criminal Code.

Applying the Supreme Court's decision in Mills, the court held the request was supported only by speculative assertions and lacked a case-specific evidentiary foundation for likely relevance.

The court also rejected an attack on the trial judge's credibility assessment based on the complainant's differential memory of incidents, and dismissed the sentence appeal after granting leave.

The Crown sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal decision that had granted a Charter application and awarded $5,000 in costs after an unsuccessful firearm storage prosecution.

The Court of Appeal held that the summary conviction appeal court had jurisdiction because a Charter claim had been raised and either determined or left undecided at trial, engaging the appeal right under s. 830(1) of the Criminal Code.

However, the court found no evidentiary basis for concluding that the Crown's conduct in proceeding to trial was egregious, oppressive, or high-handed so as to constitute a breach of s. 7 or justify a remedy under s. 24(1).

The court also held that the record could not support an award of costs under s. 809(1), and set aside the costs order.

The respondent was convicted of touching his six-year-old daughter for a sexual purpose.

The trial judge admitted the child's videotaped statement under s. 715.1 of the Criminal Code, despite inconsistencies with her viva voce testimony on cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal overturned the conviction, holding that the contradicted portions of the videotape were inadmissible.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the strict adoption test for prior inconsistent statements does not apply to s. 715.1.

A videotaped statement is adopted if the child acknowledges making it and attempting to be truthful at the time.

Inconsistencies elicited during cross-examination go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.

The police stopped a car for speeding and, after the driver could not produce documentation, conducted a computer check.

While waiting, the officer questioned the passenger and noticed garbage bags full of new clothing with price tags in the back seat and trunk.

The driver and passenger were charged with possession of stolen property.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the passenger had no reasonable expectation of privacy in the vehicle or the bags.

Although the search violated the driver's section 8 Charter rights, the evidence was admitted under section 24(2) because the breach was minimal, the evidence was reliable, and its exclusion would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The appellants, the owner and manager of a tavern, were charged with allowing indecent performances under s. 167(1) of the Criminal Code after undercover police observed lap dancing involving sexual contact between nude dancers and patrons.

The trial judge acquitted both, finding the performances were not indecent and the owner lacked mens rea.

The Court of Appeal overturned the acquittals.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the performances were indecent as they exceeded the community standard of tolerance due to the degrading nature of the sexual contact in a public tavern.

The manager's conviction was upheld.

However, the Court restored the owner's acquittal, finding the Court of Appeal erred in overturning the trial judge's factual finding that the owner lacked the requisite mens rea because he had reasonably delegated entertainment responsibilities to the manager.

The appellant, a young offender, appealed his convictions for theft, break and enter, and mischief.

The first part of his statement to police was inadmissible due to non-compliance with s. 56 of the Young Offenders Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the second part of the statement was a continuation of the first, and the caution preceding it did not constitute a 'fresh start' because the effect of the first statement was not dispelled by appropriate language.

The appeal was allowed, convictions quashed, and acquittals entered.