Chris De Sa

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking.

He argued that a special jury instruction was required for his post-offence conduct and that simple possession should have been left to the jury.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding that possession was a continuing offence and there was no air of reality to the simple possession theory.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle by refusing a conditional sentence.

The accused, a tax protestor, was charged with making a false statement on his tax return and tax evasion after failing to report income and pay taxes based on his belief that the federal government lacked the constitutional power to impose income tax.

At trial, the jury convicted him of making a false statement but acquitted him of tax evasion.

The Crown appealed the acquittal, and the accused appealed the conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed both appeals and ordered a new trial on both counts.

The Court held that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury that an honest belief in the unconstitutionality of the Income Tax Act could negate the mens rea for tax evasion.

Furthermore, the Court found the jury's verdicts to be irreconcilably inconsistent, as the same defence was advanced for both charges.

The United States of America appealed the dismissal of an application to extradite the respondent for prosecution on charges of conspiracy to traffic in cocaine.

The extradition judge had discharged the respondent because there was no evidence that the alleged conduct occurred within the United States.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the extradition judge misinterpreted section 29(1)(a) of the Extradition Act.

The Court held that the extradition judge's role is limited to determining whether there is evidence of conduct that would amount to the Canadian offence described in the authority to proceed, regardless of where the conduct occurred.

The order of discharge was set aside and an order for committal was substituted.

The appellant appealed her committal for surrender and applied for judicial review of the Minister's surrender order.

She challenged the constitutionality of the new Extradition Act, which the Court of Appeal dismissed based on its previous decision in United States of America v. Yang.

She also argued that the surrender would be unfair and oppressive and that the Minister's reasons were inadequate.

The Court found no substance to her allegations and held that the Minister's reasons were adequate.

The appeal and application for judicial review were dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of importing heroin after customs officers found over a kilogram of the drug in his shoes upon his return from Ghana.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by allowing the Crown to introduce evidence of his receipt of Employment Insurance benefits to establish a financial motive, claiming it amounted to propensity reasoning based on poverty.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the financial evidence was properly admitted to show financial pressure rather than propensity, and that a flawed jury instruction on evaluating evidence did not mislead the jury.

However, the sentence appeal was allowed, as the trial judge erred in treating the appellant's role as a courier as an aggravating factor.

The sentence was reduced to seven years and three and one-half months.

The appellant was convicted of one count of trafficking in a narcotic, based entirely on the evidence of a single witness.

The trial judge had acquitted the appellant on three charges of sexual assault and another trafficking charge, finding that the same witness had deliberately fabricated those allegations to avoid paying a debt.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the conviction was unreasonable, as there was no clear or logical basis for the trial judge to accept the witness's evidence on the one charge after rejecting the rest of her testimony as fabricated.

The appeal was allowed and an acquittal entered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, arguing that the trial judge's jury instructions on reasonable doubt and credibility were inadequate.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on how reasonable doubt applies to credibility, omitting the necessary W.(D.) formula or equivalent instructions.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.