Charles Murray Klaas Loopstra

The defendants brought a motion under r. 24.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to dismiss a libel action for delay.

The action arose from allegedly defamatory statements published during a 1997 municipal election campaign.

Although the action was commenced in 1998, little progress occurred beyond limited discoveries in 1998, and no steps were taken after the Court of Appeal dismissed a related appeal in 2005.

The court held that the plaintiffs were responsible for inordinate and inexcusable delay and that a presumption of prejudice arose, reinforced by the death of witnesses and the unavailability of key participants.

The plaintiffs failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice, and the action was dismissed for delay; the defendant’s counterclaim was also dismissed by consent.

Following the dismissal of a defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the court addressed the issue of costs.

The plaintiff sought partial indemnity costs totaling $17,234.66 plus HST, while the defendant argued the plaintiff should recover only $6,795.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principle of proportionality, the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to the full amount claimed.

The requested costs were reasonable, particularly as they were less than the amount originally claimed by the defendant when it anticipated success on the motion.

A municipality sought a permanent injunction restraining landowners from depositing large quantities of fill on property located on the Oak Ridges Moraine.

The respondents argued the dumping of approximately 300,000 cubic metres of fill constituted a normal farm practice intended to improve agricultural land and therefore was protected from municipal bylaw restrictions under provincial legislation.

The court held that the scale of the fill operation constituted a prohibited site alteration under the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Plan and did not qualify as a normal farm practice.

The respondents had also ignored multiple municipal orders and a prior agreement restricting fill placement.

A permanent injunction was granted restraining further site alteration except as permitted under the building permit and applicable bylaws.

The appellant landowner sued the Town of Newmarket for negligence after its tenant allowed third parties to deposit significantly more fill on the demised land than the appellant had authorized.

The source of some of the fill was a subdivision within the municipality.

The motion judge dismissed the claim, finding the municipality owed no duty of care to the appellant.

The Court of Appeal agreed, distinguishing the case law relied upon by the appellant, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant Township appealed a decision setting aside a master's order that required the respondent to deliver a further and better affidavit of documents.

The master's order was based on admissions made by the respondent in response to a request to admit regarding the existence of documents proving damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that using a request to admit to force a party to state whether it has documents evidencing damages is improper and a nullity.

Consequently, the respondent's admissions were also a nullity, and the appeal judge did not err in setting aside the master's order.

The appellant insurers appealed a summary judgment finding them liable under a Commercial General Liability policy to indemnify condominium owners for extensive foundation damage caused by the insured general contractor's negligence.

The contractor had negligently installed a dewatering system that washed away the natural foundation beneath the building.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the damage to the natural foundation and structural columns constituted third-party property damage, not merely damage to the contractor's own work product.

Furthermore, the negligent installation that caused the damage was an 'accident' and therefore an 'occurrence' within the meaning of the policy.

The parties made written submissions on costs following an appeal where success was substantially divided.

The appellants succeeded on the issues of the base period of reasonable notice and prejudgment interest, while the respondent succeeded on Wallace damages and bonus compensation.

The Court of Appeal held that the divided success did not warrant a departure from the general rule that no costs should be awarded.

The court also considered the respondent's settlement offer but found it did not propose a sufficiently meaningful compromise.

No costs of the appeal were awarded.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent 34 months' notice (30 months base plus 4 months Wallace damages) for wrongful dismissal.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in awarding a base notice period in excess of 24 months without exceptional circumstances, reducing the base period to 24 months.

The court upheld the 4-month Wallace extension due to the appellants' bad faith conduct during the dismissal.

The court also varied the prejudgment interest award, holding that interest should be calculated on an installment basis rather than a lump sum basis for the period during which salary continuance payments were made.

The appellants, defendants in a libel action, sought a stay of proceedings or security for costs after one of the plaintiffs disappeared with unpaid costs orders.

The motion judge denied the stay but ordered the remaining plaintiffs to post security for costs under rule 56.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Divisional Court set aside the order, holding that the Libel and Slander Act exclusively governed security for costs in such actions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the Act and the Rules can co-exist, the motion judge erred in applying rule 56.09 because no relief was being granted to the plaintiffs to which a security term could attach.

The appellant limited partnership appealed the dismissal of its application for declaratory and mandatory relief regarding a Sale and Dissolution Agreement.

The dispute centered on whether a conditional offer to purchase real estate satisfied the agreement's requirement that the property be 'sold' before the listing period expired.

The Court of Appeal held that in the commercial context of the agreement, which aimed to provide a clear end to the listing period and trigger a standstill obligation, the word 'sold' meant an unconditional sale.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants, plaintiffs in a defamation action against a newspaper and others, appealed an order requiring them to post security for costs under Rule 56.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motions judge erred in law by not applying section 12 of the Libel and Slander Act.

The Court held that section 12 provides a specific, more onerous procedure for security for costs in libel actions involving newspapers, which takes precedence over the general provisions of Rule 56 pursuant to Rule 1.02(1)3.

The parties appealed and cross-appealed a trial judgment arising from the dissolution of their horse business relationship.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in awarding unjust enrichment for foal expenses, dismissing the claim for purse monies, overcompensating for a horse's reduced value, and denying damages from an interlocutory injunction.

The court also awarded the appellant solicitor and client costs based on a Rule 49 offer to settle.

The cross-appeal was allowed in part to grant the respondent pre-judgment interest.