Cedric Nahum

The Children's Aid Society apprehended the child at birth and sought a finding that the child was in need of protection.

After the Society closed its case at the adjudicative stage of the trial, the father brought a motion for a non-suit, arguing the Society failed to establish a prima facie case.

The court dismissed the non-suit motion, finding that the father's impulsivity, history of domestic violence, inconsistent access visits, and inability to control his emotions posed a real risk of physical and emotional harm to the child.

The court concluded the child was in need of protection and directed the matter to proceed to the dispositional stage.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to find the child in need of protection and to place her in extended Society care for the purpose of adoption.

The mother consented to the order, while the father opposed it.

The court found that the parents had a history of domestic violence and the father had not presented a viable plan of care.

Applying the test for summary judgment in child protection proceedings, the court concluded there was no genuine issue for trial, found the child in need of protection, and ordered her placed in extended care for adoption.

The applicant, having been found guilty of two counts of sexual assault, was subject to a fitness hearing during a dangerous offender assessment application.

The applicant brought a motion for a mistrial, alleging actual bias and a reasonable apprehension of bias on the part of the trial judge based on various evidentiary and scheduling rulings made during the hearing.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the rulings were made in accordance with the law and trial management principles, and did not demonstrate any bias or predisposition.

The accused was found guilty of criminal harassment for sending threatening messages to the victim via WhatsApp.

The Crown sought a suspended sentence with probation, while the defence requested an absolute discharge to avoid negative impacts on the accused's permanent residency application.

The court noted the accused's lack of remorse but acknowledged his compliance with bail conditions.

Balancing the principles of sentencing and the potential immigration consequences, the court granted a conditional discharge with two years of probation and a 10-year weapons prohibition.

In a child protection application, the Children's Aid Society sought to admit out-of-court statements made by two children to child protection workers and a forensic psychiatrist.

The mother opposed the admission of some statements, arguing the children should testify.

Following a voir dire, the court found that the necessity requirement was met because testifying would likely cause the children stress and harm.

The court assessed the threshold reliability of the statements, admitting several for the children's state of mind and some for the truth of their contents, while excluding others that lacked sufficient detail or reliability.

During a criminal trial, the trial judge noted a discrepancy between the dates of the offence in the indictment and the evidence presented, and requested written submissions from the parties on the issue.

The defence subsequently brought a motion for a mistrial, arguing that the judge's intervention raised a reasonable apprehension of bias by allegedly suggesting the Crown reopen its case to amend the indictment.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the motion, finding that the judge merely demonstrated vigilance by noting the discrepancy and requesting submissions, which did not constitute bias or an appearance of bias.

In a child protection trial, the father served a summons to compel the 12-year-old child to testify.

The Office of the Children's Lawyer brought a motion to quash the summons, supported by the applicant society and the mother.

The court granted the motion to quash, finding that compelling the child to testify posed a significant risk of emotional harm and that the father's primary purpose was to impeach her credibility rather than prove material facts.

The court also ruled on the father's request to introduce the entirety of the child's police interview video, holding that only specific prior inconsistent statements relating to substantive issues, and not collateral facts, could be admitted.

In a child protection application, the applicant sought to introduce out-of-court statements made by the child to child protection workers and a counsellor for the truth of their contents.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine the threshold reliability of these hearsay statements.

Applying the principled exception to the hearsay rule, the court evaluated the circumstances under which the statements were made, including the child's spontaneity, the absence of leading questions, and the timing of the recordings.

The court found that the majority of the statements met the threshold reliability test and were admissible, with the exception of one response to a directive question.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a finding that three children were in need of protection and an order placing them in the care and custody of the mother, subject to a six-month supervision order.

The mother consented to the order.

The father opposed the motion, arguing against the protection finding and the condition that his access be supervised at the Society's discretion.

The court found no genuine issue for trial, noting overwhelming evidence of the father's controlling behaviour, parental conflict, and interference with medical care for the medically fragile children.

The court granted the summary judgment, finding the children in need of protection and ordering them to remain with the mother under supervision, with the father's access to be supervised at the Society's discretion.

The maternal grandparents of two Crown wards brought a motion for leave under s. 65.1(5) of the Child and Family Services Act to bring a status review application.

The children had been in care for over four years, and the children's aid society had recently identified an adoptive family and was preparing to place the children for adoption.

The court applied the five-part test for granting leave and found that the grandparents failed to demonstrate unusual circumstances or a prima facie case that a status review would result in the children being placed in their care.

The court emphasized the children's need for permanency and stability, and dismissed the motion for leave.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for a temporary order to place the child in the care of the mother under the Society's supervision pending the final disposition of the application.

The child had been in the temporary care of the father since apprehension.

The court granted the motion, emphasizing the statutory requirement to return the child to the custodial parent if safe, the benefit of reuniting the child with siblings, and concerns regarding the father's pending criminal sentencing.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order for Crown wardship for three children.

The mother and the two fathers of the children opposed the application, seeking to have the children returned to their care.

The court found that the children were in need of protection due to the parents' significant mental health issues, substance abuse, and inability to provide a stable environment.

The mother was physically disabled and insisted on caring for one of the fathers, who suffered from severe mental illness and required constant supervision.

The other father had a history of substance abuse and an unstable lifestyle.

The court concluded that the parents' plans of care were unworkable and that it was in the best interests of the children to be made Crown wards for the purpose of adoption, with some transitional access and potential openness agreements.

The children's aid society brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a final order of Crown wardship for an 11-year-old child who had been in care for over two years.

The mother opposed the motion but filed no responding materials, while the father was noted in default.

The court applied the summary judgment framework and found no genuine issue requiring a trial, noting the mother's ongoing struggles with alcohol addiction and failure to complete recommended treatment programs.

The motion was granted, and Crown wardship was ordered with access provided to the mother on a regular basis, including attendance at cultural events.

The applicant brought a motion seeking an order to allow a witness to testify via videoconference at an upcoming trial.

The witness suffered from severe back pain and had limited ability to travel or remain seated for long periods.

The court granted the motion, finding that the balance of convenience favoured videoconference testimony and that any concerns regarding cross-examination or assessing credibility could be addressed by the court's directions.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion for a temporary court order placing the two-year-old child with the paternal grandmother.

The child had previously been residing with the maternal grandparents under a temporary supervision order, which included a condition that the mother not reside in their home.

The maternal grandparents breached this condition when the mother arrived in distress, leading to the child's apprehension.

The court found that the maternal grandparents had provided good care for two years and now understood the necessity of complying with the order.

The court ordered the child returned to the maternal grandparents under a temporary supervision order with conditions.

The Children's Aid Society brought a status review application seeking to terminate its supervision order over a young child.

Both parents agreed to the termination but disputed the subsequent custody and access arrangement under section 57.1 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The mother sought primary care or joint custody with primary residence, while the father sought sole or joint custody with primary residence.

The court considered the child's best interests, noting the parents' high conflict, the father's pending deportation proceedings, and the child's positive development under the existing shared parenting arrangement.

The court ordered joint legal custody with primary residence to the mother, maintaining the child's attendance at an Ontario school, and granted the mother a restraining order against the father.

Parents sought costs against a child protection agency after the agency withdrew its protection application and entered into a voluntary agreement with the family.

The parents argued the agency acted unfairly by apprehending the children without a sufficient investigation and relying on uncorroborated allegations.

The court held that costs against a children’s aid society are awarded only in exceptional circumstances where conduct is patently unfair or indefensible.

Given the agency’s reliance on multiple police reports, the family’s prior history with the agency, and the existence of a warrant authorizing the apprehension, the court found the investigation and apprehension were reasonable.

The court concluded the agency had fulfilled its statutory duty and that an ordinary observer would not view its conduct as unfair.

The Crown brought an application under s. 715 of the Criminal Code to admit preliminary inquiry testimony of an independent witness who had moved to Nicaragua and was therefore unavailable to testify at trial.

The defence argued the Crown failed to make sufficient efforts to secure the witness’s testimony through technological means such as videoconference under ss. 714.1 and 714.2 of the Criminal Code.

The court held that while efforts to obtain live testimony are a relevant factor, failure to pursue electronic testimony is not fatal to an application under s. 715.

Applying the principles in Potvin and Saleh, the judge concluded the accused had a full opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the preliminary inquiry and that the evidence was reliable and corroborated.

The prior testimony was therefore admitted to be read into the trial record.

The Aboriginal defendant pleaded guilty to sexually assaulting his step-daughter over a period of time, resulting in her pregnancy at age 13.

Following a Gardiner hearing, the court found the defendant committed multiple assaults and breached a fundamental position of trust.

The court conducted a Gladue analysis but found no connection between the defendant's Aboriginal background and the commission of the offences.

Given the serious aggravating factors, including the profound impact on the victim, the court sentenced the defendant to 8 years in penitentiary, less 2 years of pre-trial credit.

A Gardiner hearing was conducted following the accused’s guilty pleas to sexual assault and sexual touching of a child under 14 to determine disputed aggravating facts relevant to sentencing.

The Crown alleged that the accused repeatedly sexually assaulted the complainant over an extended period, while the accused admitted only a single incident initiated by the complainant.

Applying the principles in W(D.), the court rejected the accused’s account as implausible and unreliable.

After considering the complainant’s inconsistent prior statements and the surrounding evidence, the court accepted the essential substance of the complainant’s testimony.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused repeatedly sexually assaulted and sexually touched the complainant over many months and that he occupied a parental role toward the child.