C. Boswell

During a wrongful dismissal trial, the plaintiff objected to the defendant adducing evidence of financial irregularities, arguing the defendant breached the rule in Browne and Dunn by failing to confront her with this evidence during cross-examination.

The court dismissed the objection, finding the defendant had generally met its obligations as the plaintiff was well aware of the allegations from pleadings and discovery.

The court held that the appropriate remedy for any specific transactions not put to the plaintiff would be to recall her to testify, rather than excluding the defendant's evidence.

The applicant grandparents brought a motion for a contact order with their seven-year-old granddaughter after the respondent mother cut off contact due to ongoing family conflict.

The mother argued that her parental autonomy should be respected and that the grandparents' contact should be at her discretion.

The court found that the mother's decision to terminate contact was arbitrary and not in the child's best interests, given the child's close historical relationship with the grandparents.

The court granted a temporary contact order providing for monthly in-person visits, alternating between day visits and overnights, as well as weekly virtual contact.

The applicant previously obtained an urgent, ex parte temporary parenting order against the respondent, with a return date set for an open motions list.

When the respondent attempted to file a counter-motion, the court registry refused to accept it on the basis that the open list motion was already scheduled for the maximum one hour.

The court intervened, holding that it would be contrary to natural justice and procedural fairness to prevent the respondent from filing a counter-motion after an ex parte order had been made against him.

The court directed that the counter-motion be accepted and set strict time limits for both parties to make their submissions within the allotted one hour.

The defendant construction management firm moved under s. 44(5) of the Construction Lien Act to reduce the security it posted to vacate the plaintiff subcontractor's lien.

The parties' contract stipulated that payment was conditional on certification by an authorized engineer.

The engineer certified that the plaintiff had been overpaid, and the plaintiff provided no evidence of bad faith or fraud by the certifier.

The court held that the certifier's decision was binding and reduced the security from over $500,000 to $24,000, accounting only for unpaid holdbacks and HST.

The defendants in a complex defamation action brought motions for the production of documents related to 'Project Maple Tree', an operation undertaken by foreign investigative agents (including Black Cube) retained by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs asserted solicitor-client and litigation privilege over the documents.

The court held that it had jurisdiction to hear the motions despite the stay provision in s. 137.1(5) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court rejected the claims of solicitor-client privilege, finding the third-party investigators were not essential to the solicitor-client relationship.

The court also rejected the claims of litigation privilege for the vast majority of the documents, finding their dominant purpose was not legitimate litigation and that the 'Blank exception' applied because the agents engaged in improper conduct, including pretext stings on a former judge and opposing party employees.

The defendant was convicted of internet child luring following a police sting operation known as Project Raphael.

The defendant's initial application for a stay of proceedings based on entrapment was dismissed by the court, relying on horizontal precedent that found the project was a bona fide investigation.

Following a recent decision by another judge who reversed his own prior ruling and found the project constituted entrapment, the defendant applied to re-open his entrapment application.

The court granted the request, finding that the reversal in horizontal precedent constituted a material change in circumstances that justified re-opening the application to hear evidence and make an independent determination.

The accused, charged with assault and sexual assault, applied to vary his bail conditions to allow him to leave his residence without his surety.

He had been on strict house arrest for seven months without any breaches, despite 50 police compliance checks.

The court considered the accused's lengthy criminal record and the serious nature of the charges, but found that his unblemished compliance and the delayed trial date justified a modest loosening of his conditions.

The application was granted, and the release order was amended to permit the accused to leave the residence on specific days with his surety's written permission.

The plaintiff in a motor vehicle accident claim moved to strike the defendant's jury notice, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic created uncertainty about when in-person jury trials could proceed.

The court granted leave to bring the motion but dismissed it as premature.

The court noted that the case was not yet trial-ready, having not been pre-tried and with a recent medical report served.

Following a wait-and-see approach preferred in the Central East Region, the court held that the motion could be renewed if in-person hearings were suspended again or if the action was not scheduled for trial by April 1, 2021.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the defendant insurer's jury notice, arguing that the COVID-19 pandemic would cause indefinite delays for a civil jury trial.

The action arose from a 2014 motor vehicle accident involving an uninsured motorist.

The court granted leave to bring the motion under Rule 48.04(1), finding the pandemic constituted a substantial and unexpected change in circumstances.

However, the court dismissed the motion to strike the jury notice, adopting a 'wait and see' approach.

The court noted that the Central East Region had established a running civil trial list and was making efforts to accommodate in-person jury trials, making it premature to conclude that retaining the jury would cause disproportionate delay.

The accused pleaded guilty to dangerous driving causing bodily harm after striking his neighbour with his pick-up truck.

A Gardiner hearing was held to determine whether the accused struck the victim intentionally, an aggravating factor for sentencing.

The Crown presented circumstantial evidence, including accident reconstruction and mechanical expert testimony, to prove the accused deliberately drove off the road and into the victim due to suspicions of an affair with his wife.

The court rejected the accused's testimony that the collision was accidental, finding it implausible and inconsistent with physical evidence.

The court concluded the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the collision was intentional.

The plaintiff, who was injured after falling from scaffolding while doing drywall work at the defendants' home, sought to amend his statement of claim after the expiry of the limitation period.

The original claim was framed in occupiers' liability, alleging acts of omission.

The proposed amendments alleged acts of commission, specifically that the defendant distracted the plaintiff or bumped the scaffolding.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the amendments raised a new cause of action that was statute-barred, as the plaintiff knew or ought to have known of the facts giving rise to the new claim on the date of the incident.

The defendant in a medical malpractice action brought a motion to compel the plaintiffs to re-attend examinations for discovery to answer questions they previously refused.

The questions related to when the deceased and the plaintiffs first retained counsel and requested medical records, which the defendant argued was relevant to their limitation period defence.

The court granted the motion, finding that facts regarding the date a cause of action arises and when counsel was retained are relevant to discoverability and are not protected by solicitor-client privilege.

The plaintiffs were ordered to re-attend at their own expense.

The Crown applied for certiorari with mandamus in aid to quash a preliminary hearing judge's decision discharging the accused on firearms offences.

The accused was the driver of a vehicle in which a loaded handgun was found under the passenger seat.

The reviewing court found that the preliminary hearing judge committed a jurisdictional error by failing to consider the whole of the circumstantial evidence, including the accused's evasiveness and evidence of drug dealing, which could reasonably support an inference of constructive possession.

The discharge was quashed and the matter remitted with a direction to commit the accused to trial.

The plaintiff mortgage lender obtained default judgment and lawfully evicted the defendants from the mortgaged premises.

The plaintiff then entered into an agreement to sell the property.

Taking advantage of the COVID-19 suspension of evictions, one of the defendants unlawfully re-entered the premises and sought to stay enforcement proceedings to redeem the mortgage.

The court found the defendant's actions to be an unlawful resort to self-help and granted the plaintiff's motion for a writ of possession, directing police assistance if necessary.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a default judgment obtained by the plaintiffs in a mortgage enforcement action.

The defendants' counsel had served a Notice of Intent to Defend and requested a brief indulgence due to the defendants' cognitive disabilities, but the plaintiffs' counsel obtained default judgment without replying or providing notice.

The court found the plaintiffs' counsel's actions to be unprofessional and set aside the default judgment as of right.

Alternatively, the court found the defendants had an arguable defence on the merits, alleging unconscionability, undue influence, and deficient independent legal advice regarding the mortgage.

The motion was granted, and costs were awarded to the defendants on a substantial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff in a slip and fall action moved to strike the jury following the defendants' opening statements, arguing that defence counsel made improper arguments, impugned plaintiff's counsel, and injected personal opinions.

The court reviewed the impugned statements and found that while some comments crossed the line into argument and unfairly bolstered credibility, the transgressions were minimally prejudicial.

The court dismissed the motion to strike the jury, concluding that a short curative instruction would adequately address the issues without compromising the plaintiff's right to a fair trial.

In a slip and fall action arising from an incident in a grocery store parking lot, the parties raised evidentiary issues regarding the admissibility of business records before the commencement of a jury trial.

The plaintiff sought to introduce Ministry of Transportation records regarding weather and road conditions, while the defendants sought to introduce daily work sheets to establish their snow and ice clearing system.

The court found both sets of records to be logically relevant to the live issues of prevailing weather conditions and the defendants' response.

The court admitted both sets of records, noting that any potential prejudice from the MTO records could be addressed with a limiting instruction to the jury.

The accused was charged with being a party to a robbery and possession of stolen property.

The Crown alleged she aided the principals of a $250,000 jewellery robbery by renting a vehicle used as a scout and getaway car.

The case was entirely circumstantial.

The court found that the cumulative effect of the evidence, including her association with the principals and presence during the arrival of the stolen goods, led to the inexorable inference that she knew of the robbery and intended to aid it.

She was found guilty of the robbery charges but acquitted of possessing stolen travellers' cheques found in her vehicle due to lack of evidence of knowledge.