Bruce W. Duncan

The defendant was charged with breaching section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act for using a cell phone while driving.

A police officer testified that he observed the defendant holding and scrolling through a cell phone while stopped at a red light.

The defendant testified that his phone was mounted on the dashboard and he only touched it to activate Bluetooth connectivity.

The trial judge convicted the defendant, finding the officer's evidence more credible.

The defendant appealed, arguing the trial judge's reasons failed to adequately explain the path to conviction and that the trial judge failed to apply the burden of proof correctly.

The defendant was charged with exceed 80 (impaired driving) following a roadside breath test.

The Crown sought to admit breath sample results showing a blood alcohol content of 180 mg%.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the evidence, alleging multiple Charter breaches during his arrest and detention, including unlawful handcuffing before arrest, failure to provide section 10(b) rights, an unlawful pat-down search, and unlawful detention in a police vehicle.

The court found that while the pat-down search was justified on officer safety grounds and the detention in the police vehicle did not constitute a Charter breach, the defendant was unlawfully handcuffed before his arrest.

This serious Charter infringement was found to outweigh the minimal intrusiveness of the breath test itself under the section 24(2) analysis.

The breath sample results were excluded and the charge was dismissed.

The defendant, charged with serious drug offences, brought an application seeking a stay of proceedings or exclusion of evidence based on allegations that police treatment as a confidential informant constituted an abuse of process.

The defendant argued that police broke their promise to provide consideration in exchange for information and failed to keep proper records of interactions.

The court found that the police officer formed a genuine belief that the information provided was not useful and therefore did not break any promise.

The court also found that the initial exploratory interaction did not require adherence to full confidential informant procedures and that the officer's failure to retain notes was not abusive given the defendant's concerns about recordings.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving following a sobriety checkpoint stop on February 14, 2017.

The defendant challenged the timing of the stop, the administration of the breath demand, and the timing of the breath tests relative to the two-hour statutory requirement.

The defendant testified that he was stopped at 2:15 pm and waited 15 minutes in line, placing the first breath test outside the two-hour window.

The officer testified that the stop occurred at 3:08 pm, placing the first test within the statutory timeframe.

The court found the defendant's evidence unreliable and untrustworthy, particularly regarding his claim of consuming only two beers when his blood alcohol content was almost twice the legal limit.

The court rejected all of the defendant's challenges and found him guilty as charged.

A helicopter operated by an air ambulance service crashed shortly after takeoff from Moosonee, Ontario on May 31, 2013, killing four crew members.

The Crown charged the operator with six counts under the Canada Labour Code, alleging failure to ensure employee safety.

At trial, three counts remained: two alleging failure to provide pilots with means to maintain visual reference while operating at night (counts 3 and 4), and one alleging failure to provide adequate supervision by eliminating the Base Manager position (count 10).

The Crown argued that night vision goggles should have been provided.

The court found that while the crash was caused by controlled flight into terrain, the defendant exercised due diligence and complied with all regulatory requirements.

All three counts were dismissed.

The defendant was charged with importing opium, possession for the purpose of trafficking in opium, and conspiracy to commit both offences.

The defendant brought a section 11(b) Charter application alleging unreasonable delay in trial.

The total delay from arrest to scheduled trial was 20.5 months, exceeding the presumptive ceiling established in R v Jordan.

The court found no defence delay attributable to the defendant and rejected the Crown's arguments regarding exceptional circumstances and transitional exceptions.

The court concluded that the delay, particularly the Crown's failure to prioritize the case and complete disclosure in a timely manner, constituted a breach of the defendant's right to trial within a reasonable time.

The proceedings were stayed.

The defendant corporation brought a motion to quash counts 10 and 11 of an information charging it with offences under the Canada Labour Code.

The defendant argued the counts were defective because they failed to specify which prescribed regulations had been breached, contrary to the principles established in R v Wis Developments.

The Crown sought to amend the counts to allege breaches of section 124 rather than section 125 of the Act.

The court found the counts were fatally deficient in failing to identify the specific regulations allegedly breached, but permitted amendment to reframe the charges under section 124 as a single statutory duty to ensure employee health and safety, rather than specific regulatory violations.

The Crown sought committal of five accused persons on charges of manslaughter in the death of Madad Kenyi, who died from blunt force trauma to the head during an altercation.

Two accused conceded committal; three contested it.

The defendants argued that exculpatory evidence was substantial while inculpatory evidence was weak and inconsistent, relying on R v Arcuri to contend that consideration of all evidence should result in discharge.

The court rejected this argument, clarifying the proper application of Arcuri and the limited role of exculpatory evidence in preliminary inquiries.

All accused were committed to stand trial on manslaughter.

The accused brought a Charter section 11(b) application seeking a stay of proceedings on the grounds that his right to be tried within a reasonable time had been infringed.

The accused was arrested on April 7, 2016, and charged with assault, firearms offences, and possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking.

He remained in custody throughout the proceedings.

The trial was scheduled to begin on May 10, 2017, approximately 13 months after arrest.

The court applied the Jordan framework and found that while the case took markedly longer than it should have, the accused failed to demonstrate meaningful and sustained steps to expedite the proceedings.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant was charged with exceeding 80 milligrams of alcohol per 100 millilitres of blood (exceed 80) following a roadside sobriety check.

A police officer observed the defendant exiting a bar at 2:39 am, conducted an approved screening device (ASD) test at 2:49 am after the defendant reported consuming a shot of tequila at approximately 2:35 am, and obtained a "Fail" result.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the ASD result on two grounds: (1) violation of the right to counsel under section 10(b) of the Charter by failing to facilitate contact with counsel at the roadside, and (2) potential unreliability of the ASD test due to insufficient waiting time to account for mouth alcohol contamination.

The court found no violation of the right to counsel and, assuming arguendo a potential breach regarding the mouth alcohol protocol, concluded that the evidence should be admitted under section 24(2) of the Charter.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and exceeding 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood, with an offence date of September 27, 2015.

The Crown's case was overwhelming.

The primary issue was whether in-court identification of the defendant by Crown witnesses was necessary to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that while no Crown witness explicitly pointed out the defendant in court, identification could be established through three alternative routes: video evidence of the defendant during breath testing procedures, the "circle" of continuity from arrest through release to court appearance, and evidence of name and address identifiers.

The court found the defendant guilty of both offences and conditionally stayed the exceed 80 charge.

Sentencing was adjourned to November 18, 2016, with the court indicating that all sentencing options, including jail, would be considered given the aggravating circumstances.

The defendant appealed his conviction for careless driving, challenging the trial judge's dismissal of a Charter section 11(b) application regarding delay in trial.

The defendant was charged on August 22, 2014, and tried on October 5, 2015, approximately 13.5 months later.

The trial judge accepted an unsupported assertion by defence counsel that the defendant had attended court in person requesting a trial but was compelled to attend an early resolution meeting instead.

The appellate court found this assertion had no evidentiary foundation and was not supported by the defendant's affidavit.

The court held that the time to the resolution meeting should have been excluded from the Charter calculation, and that the remaining delay was within constitutional tolerance for a careless driving charge.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and exceeding 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood following a traffic stop for speeding in Brampton on February 16, 2015.

Police officers observed aberrant driving, detected alcohol on the defendant's breath, and noted red watery eyes and slurred speech.

The defendant was arrested and provided breath samples showing readings of 141 and 135.

The court found the defendant guilty of exceeding 80 but acquitted on the impaired driving charge due to reasonable doubt regarding impairment.

The defendant was charged with possession of cocaine and possession of heroin following a warrantless police search of a public washroom stall.

A police officer, responding to a call about a suspicious person, observed the defendant in a bathroom stall and, suspecting drug use, opened the stall door without a warrant.

The defendant was found with drug paraphernalia and subsequently arrested.

The court found that while the defendant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the washroom stall and the search was unreasonable and violated section 8 of the Charter, the evidence was admissible under section 24(2) after balancing the Grant factors.

The court considered the public health hazard created by drug use in public washrooms and the minimal nature of the police intrusion.

The defendant was found guilty on both charges.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine and had previously elected trial by judge and jury and requested a preliminary inquiry.

At the scheduled preliminary inquiry, the accused engaged in disruptive and obstructionist conduct, presenting a self-created identification document and repeatedly demanding the judge provide identification, claiming to be a sovereign person.

The accused refused to participate in the proceedings and declared himself the highest authority in the court.

The judge found that the accused's conduct made it impossible to conduct the preliminary inquiry and that he was effectively withdrawing his request for one.

The judge ordered the accused to stand trial pursuant to section 536(4.3) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant was charged with exceed 80 (impaired driving) following a RIDE checkpoint stop on November 8, 2013.

The defendant sought to contact counsel of choice (Shauna Pemberton) but was unable to reach her.

Police made reasonable efforts to contact her, left a message, waited approximately 29 minutes, and then offered duty counsel.

The defendant spoke with duty counsel and subsequently provided breath samples registering 106 and 101.

The defendant challenged the admissibility of the breath test results, arguing his right to counsel was infringed.

The court found no breach of Charter rights and admitted the evidence.

The defendant sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of an Information to Obtain (ITO) used to obtain a search warrant at a preliminary inquiry.

The defendant was charged with possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, possession of a controlled substance, and possession of proceeds of crime.

The court dismissed the Dawson application, finding that the cross-examination was not necessary to enable the defendant to make full answer and defence, and that the information provided by a confidential informant was substantially corroborated by independent police surveillance evidence.

The defendant was charged with exceed 80 following a traffic stop on March 4, 2014.

While the defendant's impairment was not disputed, the case was defended on Charter grounds and the contention that the "as soon as practicable" requirement had not been met.

The court found that police violated the defendant's Charter section 7 rights by failing to provide access to toilet facilities, a change of wet clothing, adequate warmth, and food during approximately 12 hours of custody.

The court determined that the totality of this neglect amounted to a violation of the defendant's right to fair, humane, and dignified treatment.

A stay of proceedings was granted as the appropriate remedy.

The defendant was charged with possession of marijuana and possession of cocaine following a pat down search during a traffic stop.

The Crown's case rested on evidence obtained from the search.

The court found that the initial stop, while ostensibly for Highway Traffic Act violations, was a pretext to investigate bail compliance.

The detention that followed was unlawful and arbitrary.

The subsequent pat down search, characterized as a safety search, was in fact conducted to locate drugs rather than weapons.

The court excluded the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter and dismissed the charges.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving, exceeding 80 mg of alcohol per 100 ml of blood, and resisting arrest following a motor vehicle stop on June 5, 2014.

The Crown presented evidence of erratic driving, physical signs of impairment, breath test results of 180 mg/100 ml, and expert toxicology evidence.

The defence raised multiple Charter arguments and challenged the sufficiency of evidence.

The court found the defendant guilty of impaired driving but acquitted him of resisting arrest due to language barriers and lack of clarity regarding directions.