M. Mattis

The Crown brought an application during a first-degree murder trial to determine the voluntariness of two statements made by the accused to police.

The first statement was made to patrol officers investigating a trespass complaint prior to the murder, and the second was a six-hour interview following the accused's arrest by a tactical unit.

The court applied the Oickle framework and found no evidence of inducements, oppression, lack of an operating mind, or police trickery.

Both statements were ruled voluntary, with the first admissible in the Crown's case in chief and the second admissible for cross-examination.

The accused brought pre-trial applications alleging racial profiling by police, breach of his right to counsel, and seeking to quash a search warrant for his vehicle.

The accused also sought leave to cross-examine the affiant of the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant.

The court dismissed the application to cross-examine the affiant, finding no reasonable likelihood it would assist in challenging the warrant.

The court rejected the accused's evidence entirely, finding the police officer recognized the accused from a recent shooting investigation and did not engage in racial profiling when running his license plate.

The court found the accused was properly provided his right to counsel and that the search warrant was validly issued based on reasonable and probable grounds.

The offender, a youthful first-time offender, was convicted by a jury of assault causing bodily harm following an unprovoked group attack at a transit station.

The Crown sought 6 to 9 months of incarceration, while the defence sought a suspended sentence.

The court emphasized the principle of restraint and the strong prospects for the offender's rehabilitation, noting his lack of a criminal record, supportive family, and full-time employment.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with two years of probation, along with DNA and weapons prohibition orders.

The accused was charged with possession of a restricted firearm, ammunition, and heroin for the purpose of trafficking after police executed a search warrant at his apartment based on information from a confidential informer.

The accused challenged the validity of the search warrant under s. 8 of the Charter, arguing the redacted Information to Obtain lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court dismissed the Charter application, finding the warrant validly issued and holding that the evidence would not have been excluded under s. 24(2) regardless.

On the substantive charges, the court found the accused had knowledge and control of the lockbox containing the firearm and drugs, and convicted him of those offences.

The court also found the accused guilty of simple possession of a small amount of heroin found in the police cruiser after his arrest.

The applicant was unsuccessful in her motions and the respondent sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis.

The court found that the applicant had misappropriated funds contrary to a consent order and attempted to cover it up, which precipitated the motions.

The court awarded the respondent costs on a substantial indemnity basis, fixing the amounts at $24,817.63 for the family law proceeding and $29,443.41 for the civil proceeding.

The accused was charged with importing cocaine after returning from Jamaica.

During a customs inspection, a positive ion scan led to further questioning and a personal search.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application to admit the accused's statements as voluntary, while the defence sought to exclude the statements and drugs due to alleged breaches of ss. 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found the statements were voluntary and not the result of oppression.

However, the court held that the accused was detained when the CBSA officer began focused questioning after a second positive ion scan without providing Charter rights.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court excluded the accused's statements regarding a side trip to Panama made during this period of detention, but admitted subsequent statements made after rights were provided.

The offender was found guilty of sexual interference involving his 13-year-old niece.

The Crown sought a penitentiary term of four to five years, while the defence argued for 15 to 24 months.

The court noted the aggravating factors of breach of trust and the intrusive nature of the offence, balanced against the offender's lack of a prior record and stable employment.

The court sentenced the offender to two years' imprisonment, along with weapons prohibitions, a DNA order, and a 20-year SOIRA order.

The accused was charged with procuring a complainant to become a prostitute and with exercising control, direction, or influence over her movements for the purpose of gain contrary to s. 212(1)(d) and s. 212(1)(h) of the Criminal Code.

The evidence showed the complainant worked as a stripper performing lap dances and later engaged in additional sexual services for payment while regularly consulting with the accused, who assisted her in obtaining work, set prices for sexual services, transported her, remained in frequent contact, and received large portions of her earnings.

The court found significant credibility concerns in the complainant’s testimony and concluded there was a reasonable doubt that the accused had persuaded or induced her to become a prostitute.

However, the court was satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused exercised direction and influence that aided her prostitution for the purpose of financial gain.

The accused was acquitted of procuring but convicted of exercising control or influence for gain.

During a criminal trial for procuring a person to become a prostitute and exercising control or influence over a person engaged in prostitution, the accused brought an application for directed verdicts of acquittal at the close of the Crown’s case.

The court applied the test of whether there was any admissible evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could convict if the evidence were believed.

The evidence included testimony that the accused encouraged the complainant to work as a stripper, instructed her in lap dancing, advised her regarding sexual services for payment, transported her, controlled the proceeds of her earnings, and directed aspects of her work.

The court held that lap dancing involving sexual contact for payment could constitute prostitution and that the evidence could support findings of procuring and exercising direction or influence for the purpose of gain.

The application for directed verdicts was dismissed.

The accused was charged with conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, trafficking, and possession for the purpose of trafficking after acting as a courier to transport half a kilogram of cocaine from Toronto to Ottawa.

The Crown relied on intercepted communications and circumstantial evidence to prove the accused's knowledge.

The court found that the accused was wilfully blind to the fact that he was transporting a controlled substance, given the suspicious circumstances, urgency, and use of guarded language.

The accused was found guilty on all counts.

The accused was charged with stabbing the complainant during an altercation at a public picnic in a park.

The Crown alleged the accused approached the complainant from behind during a brief verbal exchange and stabbed him with scissors, causing severe injuries requiring removal of the complainant’s spleen.

The accused testified that the complainant produced the scissors first and that the stabbing occurred accidentally during a struggle in self-defence.

Applying the credibility framework in R. v. (W.D.), the court rejected the accused’s evidence due to internal inconsistencies, post-offence conduct, and false statements to police.

The court accepted the complainant’s evidence, supported in part by other witnesses and surrounding circumstances, and concluded the Crown proved the offence beyond a reasonable doubt.