Bruce A. Glass

The defendant, Salvatore Joseph Badali, was sentenced for living on the avails of prostitution from a person under 18, obtaining sexual services from a female under 18, and procuring a female under 18 into prostitution.

The court had previously found mandatory minimum sentences under sections 212(2) and 212(4) of the Criminal Code unconstitutional.

Considering the victim's impact statement, the defendant's extensive criminal record, and the principles of denunciation and deterrence, the court imposed a global sentence of 3 years in custody, less 60 days for pre-trial custody and restrictive bail conditions, resulting in a net sentence of 34 months.

Specific sentences were 22 months for living on avails (concurrent for procuring) and 12 months consecutive for obtaining sexual services.

A DNA order and a 20-year Sex Offender Information Registration Act order were also issued.

Sharon Baksh pleaded guilty to manslaughter during her second-degree murder trial.

The sentencing hearing considered aggravating factors, including a home invasion, the victim's age (89), and 149 stab wounds, alongside mitigating factors such as her drug/alcohol dependency and troubled childhood.

The court accepted a joint submission for a 12-year custodial sentence, which, after 1.5x credit for pre-sentence custody, resulted in a net sentence of 7 years, 8 months, and 13 days.

Non-communication, DNA, and lifetime weapons prohibition orders were also issued.

The defendant was found guilty of possession of MDMA and possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine, marihuana, and psilocybin.

The court considered the large quantities of drugs, including 4.7 kilograms of cocaine, and the commercial nature of the enterprise as aggravating factors.

Mitigating factors included the defendant's lack of a criminal record, employment history, and family ties.

The court imposed a global sentence of 8 years imprisonment, reduced to 6 years and 6 months after applying 18 months of credit for pre-trial custody and strict bail conditions, along with various forfeiture and prohibition orders.

The defendant, having been found guilty of living on the avails of prostitution of a person under 18 and obtaining sexual services from a person under 18, brought a motion challenging the constitutional validity of the mandatory minimum sentences under sections 212(2) and 212(4) of the Criminal Code.

The defendant argued the sentences violated sections 7 and 12 of the Charter.

The court applied the reasonable hypothetical framework and found that the mandatory minimum sentences would be grossly disproportionate in reasonably foreseeable scenarios.

The court concluded the provisions violated section 12 of the Charter, could not be saved under section 1, and declared them of no force or effect.

The appellant appealed his conviction for failing to provide a breath sample.

At trial, the adult witnesses, including the police officer and the appellant, were asked to promise to tell the truth rather than being sworn or affirmed.

The summary conviction appeal court held that this was not a minor procedural irregularity curable under s. 686(1)(b)(iv) of the Criminal Code.

The failure to have adult witnesses testify under oath or solemn affirmation meant there was no properly sworn evidence before the trial court.

The conviction was quashed.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court decision granting judgment to the respondent insurer for $5,567.10.

The insurer had paid for massage therapy treatments but later discovered the appellant was not a licensed massage therapist.

The appellant argued the insurer paid her even after discovering she was unlicensed and raised a limitation period defence.

The Divisional Court found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant was not entitled to compensation as an unlicensed practitioner who had misrepresented her status on the treatment forms.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant brought a contempt motion alleging that the respondent breached a prior parenting order requiring both parents to consult regarding their child’s medical care.

The evidence established that the respondent unilaterally took the child to medical professionals without consulting the applicant despite clear terms requiring consultation and knowledge of the order.

The court held that civil contempt requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt that a party deliberately and wilfully breached a clear court order.

The respondent’s conduct met this threshold.

The court found the respondent in contempt but imposed no fine or custodial sanction, instead directing compliance with the existing order.

The plaintiffs were awarded $35,000 each in Family Law Act damages following a motor vehicle accident.

The defendant argued the plaintiffs should be denied costs because their recovery fell below the $100,000 Simplified Rules threshold.

The court rejected this argument, finding it was reasonable to proceed under the ordinary procedure because the claims were part of larger companion actions involving allegations of contributory negligence.

The court awarded the plaintiffs $30,000 in fees plus disbursements and HST on a partial indemnity scale.

Following a trial in which the plaintiffs succeeded on Family Law Act claims for loss of companionship, guidance, and care, the court determined costs.

The defendant argued that no costs should be awarded because each plaintiff recovered less than $100,000 and should have proceeded under the Simplified Procedure rules.

The court held that where claims formed part of broader litigation involving companion actions and allegations of contributory negligence, it was reasonable to proceed as ordinary actions.

Exercising its discretion, the court rejected the defendant’s objections to the plaintiffs’ bill of costs and awarded partial indemnity costs together with disbursements and additional costs for the costs hearing.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle collision.

The defendant argued that the plaintiff’s prior conviction under the Highway Traffic Act for failing to yield the right of way precluded the civil claim and resolved the issue of liability.

The court held that the offence proceeding determined only whether the plaintiff failed to yield and did not address the manner of driving by the defendant.

As issues such as speed, passing behaviour, and whether the defendant had a last clear chance to avoid the collision remained unresolved, genuine issues requiring a trial existed.

The motion for summary judgment was therefore dismissed.

The plaintiffs advanced Family Law Act claims for loss of care, guidance, and companionship following the death of a sibling in a motor vehicle accident.

Liability was not disputed, leaving quantum as the sole issue.

The court reviewed jurisprudence concerning the scope of compensable loss under s. 61 of the Family Law Act, emphasizing that such awards must be assessed objectively and do not compensate grief or emotional anguish.

Considering the unusually close lifelong relationship among the siblings, but distinguishing the case from those involving dependency or daily interaction, the court assessed damages for loss of companionship at $35,000 for each surviving sibling.

Following a successful wrongful dismissal trial, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The plaintiff sought substantial indemnity costs relying on settlement offers, including a global offer combining arbitration and the civil action.

The court held that the global offer did not constitute a valid Rule 49 offer because it combined two separate proceedings and did not allow the defendants to evaluate liability separately.

Costs were therefore fixed on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $225,000 plus HST and disbursements.

The court also declined to award costs to a discontinued individual defendant after drawing a negative inference from the refusal to disclose whether those costs were indemnified under the Ontario Business Corporations Act or insurance.

The plaintiff brought an action for wrongful dismissal after being terminated for alleged cause from a senior executive position following the sale of his company’s assets to the defendant.

The employer alleged misconduct including abusive language, conflict of interest, and dishonesty regarding the employment of an individual facing fraud charges.

The court found these allegations were exaggerated or unsupported and that the employer had failed to follow progressive discipline contemplated in its employee handbook.

The dismissal was found to be without cause and motivated in part by a dispute over financial adjustments under an asset purchase agreement.

Damages were awarded pursuant to the employment contract together with punitive damages for the employer’s bad faith conduct, and the employer’s counterclaim for fiduciary breaches was dismissed.

The accused was charged with possession of a restricted firearm and readily accessible ammunition contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code after police executed a search warrant at a residence and located a handgun and ammunition in the accused’s bedroom closet.

The accused denied knowledge or control of the firearm and testified that numerous family members had access to the room in a crowded household.

Evidence showed that the search warrant was obtained following a social media post by the accused’s brother displaying a firearm.

The court found the accused’s testimony credible and accepted that multiple occupants could freely enter the room.

The evidence raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the accused knowingly possessed the firearm or ammunition.

The Crown brought an application seeking to admit evidence of discreditable conduct consisting of mail belonging to the deceased that was found in the apartment occupied by the accused and another individual.

The deceased had lived across the hall from the accused and there was no evidence of any relationship that would explain the presence of the deceased’s mail in the accused’s residence.

The court considered whether the evidence was relevant and whether its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

Applying the principles governing admissibility of discreditable conduct evidence, the court found the evidence was capable of supporting an inference relevant to the identity of the person responsible for the death.

The probative value was found to outweigh any potential prejudice to a fair trial.

The accused brought a pre-trial application seeking permission to sit at counsel table with defence counsel during a jury trial for second-degree murder rather than in the prisoner’s dock.

The Crown opposed the request, relying on customary courtroom practice and security concerns.

The court reviewed authorities recognizing that the location of the accused in the courtroom is a matter within the trial judge’s discretion and that the traditional use of the dock does not create a presumption of guilt.

Given the absence of flight risk, anticipated violence, or disruption, and considering the modern courtroom setting, the court held that there was no reason to insist on the traditional arrangement.

The accused was therefore permitted to sit beside counsel without restraints in the presence of the jury.

The accused brought a third party records application seeking production of correctional, parole and probation, telephone, and Children's Aid Society records relating to an alleged jailhouse informant expected to testify about admissions to a murder.

Applying the framework from R. v. O’Connor, the court assessed the likely relevance of the records and balanced the accused’s right to make full answer and defence against privacy interests of the witness and other inmates.

The court found the probative value of certain correctional, parole, probation, and limited telephone records outweighed privacy concerns, given the need to scrutinize jailhouse informant evidence.

Limited disclosure with redactions was ordered, while Children's Aid Society records were withheld.

Strict conditions were imposed governing use, disclosure, and eventual destruction of the records.

A municipality brought a motion to enforce an alleged settlement agreement regarding insurance coverage and joint legal representation with a contractor and its insurer in a slip‑and‑fall action involving winter maintenance.

The municipality argued that email correspondence created a binding settlement requiring the insurer to provide legal representation for all potential municipal liability.

The insurer contended that any agreement was limited to liability arising from the contractor’s conduct and did not extend to the municipality’s independent negligence.

The court held that the communications did not demonstrate a meeting of the minds on all essential terms and that factual disputes remained regarding the scope of any agreement.

As a result, the court found no enforceable settlement under Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The offender was found guilty of second degree murder after beating the victim to death with a baseball bat.

The Crown sought a 14-year parole ineligibility period, arguing the offence was akin to a domestic homicide because the victim was dating the offender's former partner.

The court rejected the domestic homicide categorization.

After considering the offender's Aboriginal heritage, Gladue factors, health issues, and the jury's recommendations, the court imposed a life sentence with no parole eligibility for 10 years.

The plaintiffs sued for unpaid amounts arising from an oral cottage renovation arrangement, asserting a substantial balance plus interest and non-pecuniary damages.

The court found the agreement was not a flat-price contract but an unsubstantiated time-and-materials arrangement, and fixed compensation on a quantum meruit basis.

Expert evidence established overbilling, deficient workmanship, and improper electrical and plumbing work by an unlicensed contractor.

Having concluded the plaintiffs had already been overpaid and were not entitled to interest or general damages, the court dismissed the action.