Brian Snell

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment without parole for 20 years.

At trial, the defence argued that the main Crown witness was the actual shooter and attacked the integrity of the police investigation.

The trial judge permitted the lead detective to provide an investigative narrative to confirm the Crown witness's evidence.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the admission of this investigative narrative, the explanation for why a witness was not called, and the admission of prior consistent statements.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defence's attack on the investigation justified the Crown's response and that the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the limited use of the evidence.

The 20-year parole ineligibility period was also upheld given the appellant's violent criminal record.

The appellant was convicted of possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, possession of proceeds of crime, and possession of stolen property.

At trial, she testified that a passenger handed her the cocaine and she hid it in her wig out of panic.

The trial judge rejected her explanation, partly because she did not offer it to the police when searched.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge infringed the appellant's right to silence by using her failure to explain to the police as a basis for finding her incredible.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction for manslaughter and his effective sentence of 13 years arising from his participation in a bank robbery where a teller was fatally shot.

He argued the trial judge erred in his instructions regarding the rule in Brown v. Dunn, the Vetrovec warning, and the Corbett ruling admitting his criminal record.

The Court of Appeal found no errors in the trial judge's rulings or instructions.

The court also upheld the 13-year sentence, noting the appellant's active participation and brandishing of a handgun during the violent robbery.

The appeal from conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder following a trial where the cause of death and similar fact evidence were central issues.

The Crown alleged the appellant killed his partner during a contraband liquor deal, while the defence argued the death was accidental due to commotio cordis.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge misdirected the jury by misstating expert evidence regarding carbon monoxide and confusing medical diagnosis with legal causation.

The trial judge also erred in admitting the entirety of a fictitious 'Mr. Big' murder plot as similar fact evidence, as it lacked sufficient distinctiveness and was highly prejudicial.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a sentence imposed by the Ontario Court of Justice and upheld by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the imposition of consecutive sentences at or near the maximum for the serious offences committed.

Although fresh evidence presented an encouraging picture for the appellant's future, it did not warrant a reduction in the sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed for breach of trust against his employer and fraud involving identity theft of credit card holders.

The trial judge noted the significant disruption to victims and financial institutions, and although the actual loss was limited to $40,000 due to early detection, the potential for greater loss existed.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence fit and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder and his sentence of life imprisonment with 20 years of parole ineligibility.

He argued the trial judge erred in his jury instructions regarding eyewitness identification evidence and the availability of a manslaughter verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge's comments on the evidence were acceptable and did not usurp the jury's function, and that there was no air of reality to manslaughter.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 20-year parole ineligibility period was justified by the extraordinary violence of the murder and the appellant's high moral culpability.

The young person appealed a sentence of 18 months (12 secure custody, 6 community) for robbery with an imitation firearm.

The Crown conceded the trial judge erred by failing to consider open custody under the Young Offenders Act.

The Court of Appeal rejected the Crown's argument that its appellate powers were limited to adjusting the custody levels, holding it could impose a new sentence.

Noting the young person's significant rehabilitation, the Court varied the sentence to time served (15 weeks) followed by community supervision and probation.

The appeal of the DNA order was dismissed.

The youth appellants were convicted of armed robbery and related offences.

At trial, the judge admitted hearsay statements from a victim and a co-accused under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The appellants appealed their convictions and sentences.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's reliability analysis for the hearsay statements.

However, the sentence appeals were allowed.

The trial judge erred by considering general deterrence, which is not a principle of youth sentencing.

Given the passage of time and fresh evidence of the appellants' successful rehabilitation, the court reduced their sentences to periods of open custody and community supervision.

The appellants were convicted of first-degree murder in a contract killing.

At trial, the judge instructed the jury that lies told by one of the appellants to the police could be used to infer his participation in a murder scheme, rather than merely a carjacking scheme as the defence argued.

The Court of Appeal held this was a misdirection, as the post-offence conduct had no probative value in determining the level of culpability between manslaughter and murder.

The error tainted the convictions of all three appellants.

The appeals were allowed, convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant applied for an adjournment of her conviction and sentence appeal to obtain transcripts and adduce fresh evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the adjournment request, noting the appellant had failed to take steps to obtain transcripts and the proposed fresh evidence was irrelevant.

The appellant then declined to participate in the appeal.

The Court reviewed the materials, found no basis to interfere with the convictions or sentence, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction by a jury.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in his 'Oliver' instruction by failing to clarify that the caution applied only to the co-accused and not the appellant.

Furthermore, given the frailties in the evidence of two witnesses who could be viewed as accomplices, the trial judge should have cautioned the jury to proceed with care before acting on their evidence to convict the appellant.

The combined errors warranted a new trial, particularly as the Crown's case was not overwhelming.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Crown had proceeded at trial on the basis that the appellant's ex-wife was entitled to an interest in the former matrimonial home, which was erroneous in law.

Because no calculation of equalization of property was performed, the Crown failed to establish that the complainant was entitled to any equalization payment, thereby failing to prove the essential element of deprivation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that overturned the respondent's conviction for care and control while impaired and substituted an acquittal.

The Court of Appeal held that the summary conviction appeal judge overstepped her appellate jurisdiction by effectively retrying the case, as there was ample evidence to support the trial judge's finding of impairment.

However, because the trial judge failed to address the respondent's exculpatory evidence and improperly relied on an inculpatory statement, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed his conviction for using a firearm while committing an indictable offence and his sentence.

He had shot a friend in the eye with a pellet gun while intoxicated.

The trial judge found recklessness satisfied the mens rea for both aggravated assault and the firearm offence.

The Court of Appeal held that while the trial judge erred in equating the mens rea for the two offences, the factual finding that the appellant intended to point and fire the gun satisfied the general intent requirement for the firearm offence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal decision upholding his conviction.

The trial judge had rejected his defence under section 43 of the Criminal Code after finding he dangled a child's legs out of a 9th-floor window.

The Court of Appeal found no inconsistent credibility findings and held that such conduct is clearly unreasonable and cannot amount to a section 43 defence.

Leave to appeal was refused.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder of a former drug associate.

On appeal, he raised nine grounds of error, including the trial judge's instructions on the failure to call witnesses, the Crown's cross-examination on the failure to cross-examine Crown witnesses, the use of disclosure to tailor evidence, the right to silence, the admission of his criminal record, the voluntariness of statements, informer privilege, the trial judge's interventions, and the jury charge on alternative verdicts.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal.

While the trial judge erred in attributing an alternative defence of manslaughter to the appellant, the Court applied the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code, finding that the circumstantial evidence of guilt was overwhelming and the error occasioned no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his sentence for a vast conspiracy to traffic cocaine and launder money, committed while on bail pending appeal for another drug trafficking offence.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was at the high end of the range but not manifestly excessive.

The trial judge's findings of fact were consistent with the jury's verdict, and she did not err in refusing enhanced pre-sentence credit beyond 2:1.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal the sentence but dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge was entirely justified in imposing the sentence given the gravity of the breaches, the appellant's prior record, and the need for the protection of society.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, and criminal harassment against his former girlfriend.

The trial judge had convicted the appellant on four counts based primarily on the complainant's testimony, while acquitting him on five others.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his credibility assessment by failing to reconcile his finding that the complainant had no motive to fabricate with his acceptance of defence evidence showing she sought revenge.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge failed to give effect to the complainant's motive to falsely accuse the appellant and her deliberate lies during testimony.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.