Apple C. Newton-Smith

The defendants, charged under the Occupational Health and Safety Act following a workplace fatality, brought motions for disclosure of Ministry inspectors' disciplinary files and a "Director's Memo" and for a stay of proceedings based on alleged abuse of process and unreasonable pre- and post-charge delay.

The court dismissed all motions, finding that the requested disciplinary files were not relevant first-party disclosure and that the Director's Memo was protected by solicitor-client privilege, with no "innocence at stake" exception met.

The court also determined that the pre- and post-charge delays were not unreasonable under the Charter's fair trial and delay provisions, and that the alleged investigative and prosecutorial misconduct did not meet the high threshold for an abuse of process stay.

The applicant, facing drug and firearm charges, brought a Charter application alleging violations of sections 7, 8, 9, and 10(b) during his arrests.

The Crown conceded violations of sections 8 and 9 regarding the "no-knock" entry during the second arrest but argued the delay in access to counsel was reasonable.

The court found that the police's unannounced entry into the applicant's home to execute a Feeney warrant, without judicial authorization for such entry and without exigent circumstances, violated his section 7 and 8 Charter rights.

The court found the delay in access to counsel was not unreasonable in the circumstances of both arrests.

As a remedy for the Charter violations related to the Feeney warrant execution, the court granted a partial stay of proceedings, specifically staying the firearm-related charges, but allowed the drug trafficking charges to proceed.

The applicant, Daveion Brown, sought a stay of proceedings under section 11(b) of the Charter due to unreasonable delay, arguing the total delay of 797 days (26 months and 6 days) exceeded the Jordan ceiling.

The Crown contended that defence delay and exceptional circumstances (discrete events, case complexity) justified the delay.

The court found 92 days of defence delay, resulting in a net delay of 705 days (23.2 months), which still exceeded the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

While acknowledging the case's complexity, the court rejected the Crown's arguments for discrete events and found the Crown's prosecution plan, despite a significant conflict-of-interest issue, was not unreasonable in minimizing delay for this complex case.

The application for a stay of proceedings was dismissed.

The accused, Coby McPherson, pleaded guilty to discharging a firearm and possessing a firearm while prohibited.

The court considered significant aggravating factors, including the brazen nature of the shooting in a residential complex and the accused's lengthy criminal record, alongside mitigating factors such as his youth, difficult upbringing, and efforts towards rehabilitation.

The court applied the mandatory minimum sentence of four years for discharging a firearm, giving credit for pre-sentence custody.

For the possession offence, a consecutive sentence of two months was imposed, taking into account the accused's understanding at the time of his plea and the goal of keeping him within the reformatory system rather than penitentiary.

A Toronto Police officer, Christopher Hutchings, was charged with assault following an incident on a TTC bus involving a "disorderly male" Chase Richards.

The court assessed whether Officer Hutchings had reasonable and probable grounds for arrest and if his use of force was reasonable, proportionate, and necessary.

The judgment relied on video evidence, expert testimony on police use of force, and witness credibility.

The court found that Officer Hutchings had objectively and subjectively reasonable grounds to arrest Mr. Richards for mischief due to his non-compliance and aggressive behaviour, which caused the bus to go out of service.

The court rejected Mr. Richards' claim of being choked, finding his actions on video inconsistent with such an event.

While acknowledging the social context of racial profiling, the court found no evidence that race influenced the officer's actions.

Officer Hutchings was found not guilty.

The accused, Faysal Adow, brought a Charter application to exclude evidence (drugs) seized following his arrest for impaired care and control and subsequent arrest for possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The court found that the initial arrest for impaired care and control was unlawful due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds.

Consequently, the subsequent search of the vehicle, which led to the discovery of drugs, was an unreasonable search in violation of section 8 of the Charter.

The court also found violations of section 10(b) of the Charter for delayed provision of rights to counsel.

Applying the s. 24(2) analysis, the court determined that the seriousness of the state conduct and the impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in the adjudication on the merits, leading to the exclusion of the evidence and a finding of not guilty on all counts.

The Crown applied to have Thomas Snowden declared a dangerous offender or, alternatively, a long-term offender, following his guilty pleas to multiple child pornography and breach of recognizance charges.

The court denied both dangerous offender and long-term offender designations, finding that the predicate offences did not meet the definition of a serious personal injury offence (SPIO) as there was no direct causal connection between Snowden's actions (possession/distribution of child pornography) and the severe psychological damage suffered by the victims, which largely stemmed from the original abuse.

The court also found no substantial risk of violent re-offending, which is required for a long-term offender designation.

Snowden was sentenced to a determinate sentence of 5 years, with 3 years credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in 2 years in penitentiary.

The accused, John, David, and Jonathan Pham, brought a Charter application under section 11(b) for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from charge to anticipated end of trial was nearly 28 months, exceeding the 18-month presumptive ceiling for provincial court.

The Crown argued that the delay was due to an "exceptional circumstance" related to their post-ruling investigation into surveillance evidence.

The court found that the Crown's decision to investigate and introduce new evidence after a section 8 ruling (which found police misrepresentations) was not a reasonably unforeseen or unavoidable event, as the issues were central to the litigation from the outset.

Therefore, the delay was not attributable to an exceptional circumstance, and the presumptive ceiling for delay was exceeded without justification.

This ruling addresses a Section 8 Charter application by the accused, Paul Spencer, seeking to exclude evidence obtained from a search warrant for his apartment unit.

The warrant was based on police surveillance conducted without permission in the common areas (hallways, stairwells) of his apartment building and exterior observations of his balcony.

The court found that Mr. Spencer had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common areas of his building, especially near his unit, and that the police's surreptitious entry and surveillance constituted a warrantless search, violating his Section 8 rights.

Applying the R. v. Grant analysis, the court determined that the seriousness of the breach, the significant impact on the accused's privacy, and the need to maintain the repute of the justice system outweighed society's interest in admitting the evidence.

Consequently, all evidence obtained from the search of the accused's residence was excluded.

The case concerns an entrapment application brought by Joshua Hill following his conviction for drug trafficking.

Hill argued that police entrapped him during a dial-a-dope investigation.

Applying the principles from R. v. Ahmad and R. v. Williams, the court assessed whether the police had reasonable suspicion before offering the opportunity to commit an offence.

The court found that the detailed information received by the undercover officer, combined with Hill's responses during the initial call, established reasonable suspicion, thereby dismissing the entrapment application.

The accused brought a Charter application challenging the issuance of a tracking warrant, alleging violations of their s.8 rights due to misrepresentations and omissions in the Information to Obtain (ITO).

The application also included a s.7 claim for a stay of proceedings due to lost evidence (CCTV footage).

The court found that the affiant made significant misrepresentations and omissions regarding a confidential human source's criminal record and surveillance observations, particularly concerning a trip to Whole Foods characterized as "counter-surveillance" driving and an alleged "drug transaction." These misrepresentations were found to be intentional or reckless, tainting the reliability of the ITO.

Consequently, the court excised the misleading portions, rendering the warrant invalid.

The s.7 application for a stay was not granted, as the s.8 remedy was deemed sufficient at this stage.

The accused, Duval Smith, challenged the validity of CDSA search warrants, seeking to exclude seized evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging a violation of his s. 8 rights.

The challenge was sub-facial, arguing the Information to Obtain (ITO) was misleading due to affiant carelessness, including erroneous source history, improper investigative file maintenance, and inadequate presentation of previous warrant information.

The court found the affiant careless but not intentionally misleading, and that despite the deficiencies, the ITO, when excised and amplified, still provided reasonable and probable grounds for the warrant's issuance based on compelling and corroborated confidential source information and surveillance.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.

Following conviction for drug trafficking offences, the accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings based on entrapment.

The Crown sought to rely on confidential informant information to establish that the officer had reasonable suspicion prior to offering the accused an opportunity to commit the offence, as required under Ahmad.

The Crown sought to use the Step Six procedure from Garofoli to present redacted information to the defence while allowing the court to review unredacted materials.

The court ruled that Step Six is available in the entrapment context, extending its application beyond the traditional warrant review setting.

The accused challenged the validity of two search warrants issued under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act on the basis that they violated section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court conducted a Garofoli application to determine whether reasonable and probable grounds existed for the issuance of the warrants.

The accused also brought a constitutional challenge to the "Step Six" procedure and sought the appointment of amicus curiae.

The court rejected the constitutional challenge, declined to appoint amicus, and found that the warrants could have been issued based on credible, compelling, and corroborated information from a confidential informant combined with independent police investigation, including OPP wiretap evidence of firearms trafficking.