Andrew J. Hotke

The appellant sought bail pending appeal following conviction on four counts: sexual assault, sexual interference, incest, and assault against his biological daughter when she was 13-14 years old.

He was sentenced to eight years in penitentiary.

The Crown opposed bail on public interest grounds, arguing that the seriousness of the offence and length of sentence warranted detention.

The Court of Appeal granted bail, finding that the grounds of appeal were sufficiently strong to meet the threshold under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, particularly given the incomplete reasons for conviction and the appellant's lengthy history of bail compliance without incident.

The appellant appealed her sentence for contempt of court, imposed for refusing to testify at her father's perjury trial.

The father was charged with perjury for allegedly lying under oath at a previous trial of the appellant's fiancée.

The appellant had been sentenced to one year imprisonment consecutive to time already being served for perjury convictions related to testimony given at the fiancée's earlier trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the sentence was not unfit.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sought leave to appeal his sentence of 22 months imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant raised issues regarding DNA testing of the complainant's underwear and challenged the trial judge's credibility findings regarding his alibi.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's detailed reasons for rejecting the appellant's evidence.

On sentencing, the Court found the trial judge erred in principle by treating the absence of remorse as an aggravating factor, but concluded the error did not justify a lesser sentence given the victim's young age, the breach of trust, the serious impact on the victim, and the appellant's prior criminal record.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence for assault against his girlfriend.

The appellant was convicted under s. 265 of the Criminal Code and received a suspended sentence with nine months of probation.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed his appeal.

The appellant argued that leave to appeal should be granted because the Summary Conviction Appeal Court erred in relying on aggravating factors not considered by the sentencing judge and in misapplying the law regarding immigration consequences.

The Court of Appeal denied leave to appeal, finding that any errors were inconsequential and that both the sentencing judge and Summary Conviction Appeal Court properly considered the appellant's immigration status.

The applicant, convicted of sexual assault, applied under s. 684 of the Criminal Code for the appointment of counsel for his appeal after being denied Legal Aid on financial grounds.

A previous application was denied based on his girlfriend's income, but new evidence clarified she could not assist him.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, finding the applicant lacked sufficient means, had an arguable case regarding the trial judge's credibility findings, and could not effectively present the nuanced legal issues without counsel.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's credibility findings were not supported by the evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's decision to accept the complainant's evidence and reject the defence witness's testimony was reasonable and well-supported by the record.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible for sexual assault and attempt to choke, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board ordering a conditional discharge.

The appellant sought an absolute discharge, arguing the Board's finding that he remained a significant risk to public safety was unreasonable and overly focused on potential medication non-compliance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the Board reasonably relied on expert psychiatric evidence indicating the appellant would likely discontinue treatment if absolutely discharged, which would increase his risk of violent behaviour.