Andrew Alfonso Evangelista

The applicants sought a declaration that their automobile insurer had a duty to defend them in a personal injury action arising from an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) accident.

The insurer denied coverage, arguing the ATV was an off-road vehicle driven on private property and not an automobile under the Insurance Act.

The court found that the underlying statement of claim contained alternative allegations that the applicants owned the ATV but were not occupiers of the property where the accident occurred.

If proven, these facts would mean the ATV was a newly acquired automobile covered by the policy.

The court granted the application, holding the insurer had a duty to defend.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the action against four defendants, the defendants sought costs on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiffs had commenced the action seeking damages for a severe brain injury sustained in an assault.

The court declined to award costs to the successful defendants, finding this to be a rare case where the plaintiffs' impecuniosity and exceptionally sympathetic circumstances justified a departure from the normal costs rules.

The defendants First Student Canada, David Ribble, 1853780 Ontario Inc. o/a Kee to Bala, and Ryan Zaroski sought summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claim for damages arising from an assault on Ryan Turcotte.

The assault occurred in a parking lot after Turcotte disembarked from a chartered bus service provided by the defendants.

The plaintiffs alleged negligence under the Occupiers’ Liability Act, Liquor Licence Act, and general negligence.

The court found no evidence that the defendants failed in their duty of care regarding premises safety, bus security, or intoxication monitoring.

The court also rejected allegations that the defendants should have diverted the bus, prevented Turcotte or the assailants from leaving, or provided more explicit warnings, concluding that Turcotte was aware of the potential danger.

The motion for summary judgment was granted, dismissing the action against the moving defendants.

The insured, McKeown & Wood Limited, sought a declaration that its insurer, Federated Insurance Company of Canada, owed a duty to defend a third-party claim arising from a fuel tank leak.

The insurer denied coverage and later moved for summary judgment dismissing the third-party claim based on a one-year contractual limitation period in the policy.

The motion judge found the limitation period unenforceable.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal applied a correctness standard of review and held that the insurance policy was a 'business agreement' under s. 22 of the Limitations Act, 2002.

Consequently, the one-year contractual limitation period was valid and enforceable, barring the insured's claim for a defence.

In a personal injury action arising from a bicycle and motor vehicle collision allegedly caused in part by unlit streetlights on a boundary bridge, a municipal defendant appealed summary judgment dismissing its crossclaim and the action against a co-defendant utility contractor.

The appeal court held that the servicing agreement and the evidence about responsibility for identifying and maintaining boundary-road streetlights were ambiguous and contradictory.

The motion judge erred by treating the parties' common understanding as determinative despite live disputes over contractual allocation of responsibility.

The claims against the contractor were restored for trial.

The appellant appealed a Master's order dismissing her action for delay.

The action had been struck from the trial list due to the inaction of her first lawyer, and a subsequent motion to restore it was delayed by her second lawyer, who concealed his neglect from her.

On appeal, the Divisional Court admitted fresh evidence detailing the second lawyer's neglect.

The court found the Master made reversible errors by inferring intentional delay without considering the appellant's instructions to her lawyers, and by presuming prejudice due to the expiry of a limitation period.

Applying the conjunctive test from Nissar, the court held the appellant had an acceptable explanation for the delay (solicitor negligence) and the defendants suffered no non-compensable prejudice.

The appeal was allowed and the action restored to the trial list.

The plaintiff's action was struck from the trial list and subsequently dismissed by a Master due to the inaction of her former counsel.

The plaintiff's second lawyer failed to advise her of the dismissal or her right to appeal.

Upon retaining new counsel, the plaintiff brought a motion to extend the time to file a Notice of Appeal of the Master's order.

The Divisional Court granted the motion, finding that the delay was attributable to the plaintiff's former counsel and that extending the time would not prejudice the defendants, in accordance with the principle that matters should be determined on their merits.

The plaintiff sued the property owner and the winter maintenance contractor after slipping on black ice.

The contractor had breached its service contract by failing to name the property owner as an additional insured on its liability policy.

The motion judge ordered the contractor to defend and indemnify the property owner.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the order, holding that the indemnification order was premature and that the breach of the insurance obligation gave rise to a remedy in damages for defence costs, not a duty to defend.

The contractor was ordered to pay the property owner's defence costs, except those incurred exclusively to defend claims not arising from the contractor's performance of the contract.

Following a successful appeal overturning the dismissal of an action and awarding damages for false arrest and trespass, the court was tasked with determining trial costs payable by one defendant.

The successful plaintiffs sought full or substantial indemnity costs exceeding $400,000, arguing the litigation raised issues of public importance and that the defendant advanced meritless positions.

The defendant argued the claim was disproportionate to the modest damages award and that much of the trial addressed unsuccessful allegations including conspiracy and punitive damages.

Applying s.131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court emphasized proportionality, the conduct of the parties, and the reasonable expectations of the losing party.

Costs were awarded on a partial indemnity basis in a reduced amount reflecting the complexity and importance of the issues while accounting for excessive litigation steps.

The appellants, residents of a social housing complex, were arrested by security guards for trespass after refusing to answer questions and acting belligerently.

At trial, the jury returned inconsistent answers, and the trial judge dismissed the action, finding the guards had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred by engaging in fact-finding to fill gaps in the jury's answers.

The Court found that the guards lacked reasonable and probable grounds to believe the appellants were trespassing, as residents have no legal obligation to answer security guards' questions.

Judgment was entered for the appellants for false arrest and assault.

The appellant appealed a decision upholding a case management master's order that denied full documentary production prior to a motion to stay the action for arbitration.

The Divisional Court clarified the standard of review for orders of case management masters, holding that discretionary decisions and interlocutory matters of law not vital to the disposition of the lawsuit are subject to a standard of deference and should not be interfered with unless clearly wrong.

Finding that the master's decision on documentary production was not vital to the disposition of the lawsuit, the court dismissed the appeal.

The appellant hydro company and respondent property owner appealed a Small Claims Court decision finding them both liable in negligence for a power surge caused by a fallen tree limb that damaged the plaintiff's electrical equipment.

The Divisional Court found that the trial judge committed palpable and overriding errors by failing to determine whether the limb was dead or alive before assessing the property owner's liability, and by failing to properly analyze the hydro company's standard of care given uncontradicted evidence of its adherence to industry-standard tree inspection cycles.

The appeal and cross-appeal were allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed an arbitration order dismissing his claim for income replacement benefits (IRBs) following a motor vehicle accident.

The arbitrator had found the appellant disentitled to benefits under section 33 of the SABS-96 for failing to provide sufficient financial and medical information, and alternatively, that he failed to prove disability and pre-accident income.

On appeal, the Director's Delegate found the arbitrator erred in applying section 33 to the financial documents, as the appellant had cooperated but the documents were simply insufficient to prove his claim.

However, the arbitrator correctly applied section 33 to the medical records, as the appellant intentionally withheld them.

The penalty was varied from a complete disentitlement to a suspension effective February 1, 2000.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed, as the arbitrator's findings that the appellant failed to prove disability and quantum were upheld.

The applicant, a self-employed taxi driver, sought income replacement benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The insurer denied the claim on the basis that the applicant failed to provide sufficient financial and medical information to determine entitlement.

The arbitrator found that the applicant failed to comply with his obligations under section 33 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule by providing inadequate financial records and refusing to authorize the release of clinical notes from his treating physicians.

Consequently, the applicant was disentitled to benefits.

The arbitrator also found that the applicant failed to prove a substantial inability to perform the essential tasks of his employment.

The claim for a special award was dismissed.