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Insurers owe a duty to defend a long-tail bridge collapse claim with costs allocated pro rata based on time on risk.
Three consolidated applications concerning the duty of various insurers to defend Ontario in connection with a bridge collapse in Elgin County in 2018.
Ontario sought orders requiring Aviva Insurance Company of Canada and Royal & Sun Alliance Insurance Company of Canada to defend two related lawsuits and to share defence costs equally.
The insurers argued they had no duty to defend or, alternatively, that defence costs should be allocated on a "time on risk" basis.
The court found that Aviva and RSA owed a duty to defend based on the allegations of property damage to anchor rods occurring during their respective policy periods, despite the loss of use occurring after the policies expired.
The court rejected the "all sums" approach and adopted a "time on risk" allocation, requiring Aviva to pay 5.5% and RSA to pay 11.1% of defence costs.
The secondary applications by Aviva and RSA against AIG and St. Paul were dismissed as moot.
The court upheld an arbitration award requiring an insurer to pay class counsel fees but not settlement administration costs.
This appeal concerns whether Honda Canada Inc. is entitled to indemnity from Tokio Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Ltd. for class counsel fees and settlement administration costs arising from the settlement of class actions related to defective air bag actuator components.
The court upheld the arbitration award requiring Tokio to indemnify Honda for class counsel fees under the umbrella liability policy, but not for settlement administration costs, which were found to be excluded as recall or product withdrawal expenses.
Minor's settlement approval dismissed due to outdated medical evidence and excessive proposed contingency fees.
The court was asked to approve a settlement for a minor plaintiff, Allythiah Thomas, arising from a motor vehicle accident.
The proposed settlement allocated $50,000 to Allythiah's claim and included legal fees based on a 30% contingency fee.
The court declined to approve the settlement due to concerns regarding the lack of an up-to-date expert medical report confirming the plaintiff's maximum medical recovery and future prognosis.
Additionally, the court found the proposed 30% contingency fee inappropriate given the minimal disbursements incurred by counsel, suggesting a range of 10% to 15% would be more suitable.
Appeal dismissed; departing school boards have no right to a proportionate share of the insurance exchange's Guarantee Fund.
The appellant school boards appealed an arbitral award that dismissed their claim for a proportionate share of the respondent insurance exchange's Guarantee Fund upon terminating their memberships.
The court upheld the arbitrator's interpretation of the Reciprocal Agreement, finding that section 7 clearly extinguished a departing subscriber's rights to the fund.
The court also rejected the argument that an implied trust existed outside the contract.
The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.
The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the municipality was 100 percent liable for a motor vehicle accident caused by icy road conditions.
The County of Simcoe appealed a trial judgment finding it 100% liable for catastrophic injuries sustained by Melinda Wasylyk in a motor vehicle accident caused by hazardous road conditions.
The County argued the trial judge erred in finding the road in disrepair, in her causation analysis, and in finding no contributory negligence.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings that the road was in disrepair due to ice and snow, that these conditions caused the accident, and that the plaintiff was not contributorily negligent, deferring to the trial judge's factual assessments.
The court granted leave to appeal an arbitration award, finding that the interpretation of a standard form insurance agreement is a question of law.
The applicants, Toronto District School Board and Simcoe County District School Board, sought leave to appeal an arbitration decision that dismissed their claim for a share of a guarantee fund upon terminating their membership in the Ontario School Boards’ Insurance Exchange (OSBIE).
The court granted leave to appeal, determining that the interpretation of the standard form Reciprocal Insurance Exchange Agreement constituted a question of law, which is subject to correctness review and of precedential value, thus satisfying the criteria for granting leave under the Arbitration Act.
The Court of Appeal dismissed Ontario's appeal, finding the insurer had no duty to defend because the self-insured retention threshold was not met.
His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario appealed a decision denying a declaration that its general liability insurer, St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Company, had a duty to defend Ontario in a class action.
The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in interpreting the Second Policy's Personal Injury coverage, which did not include the "neither expected nor intended" limitation applicable to Bodily Injury.
However, the appeal was ultimately dismissed because the claim for coverage under the Second Policy was premature.
Ontario had not yet incurred the $5,000,000 "Ultimate Net Loss" self-insured retention, which included defence costs, required to trigger St. Paul's duty to defend.
The Court of Appeal affirmed that a $50,000 pandemic business loss limit in an insurance policy applied per location, not globally.
The appellant insurer appealed a lower court's interpretation of a business interruption insurance policy's pandemic coverage limit.
The policy covered seven daycare locations, and the dispute centered on whether the $50,000 limit of liability for pandemic losses applied as a global total or per location.
The Court of Appeal, applying principles of insurance contract interpretation, found the clause unambiguous when read in the context of the policy as a whole, concluding that the limit applied on a per-location basis.
The appeal was dismissed, affirming the lower court's decision in favour of the insured.
Accused found guilty of fraud over $5,000 for participating in elaborate scheme to defraud his brother.
The accused, a police officer, was charged with fraud over $5,000 for his role in an elaborate scheme that defrauded his brother of $750,000.
The scheme, orchestrated with the accused's girlfriend, involved a fake civil lawsuit, a fictitious trust fund, and a fabricated cancer diagnosis.
The accused claimed he was an innocent agent who believed his girlfriend's lies.
The court rejected his testimony, finding he actively participated in deceiving his brother and was, at the very least, wilfully blind to the numerous red flags.
The accused was found guilty.
Motion for leave to appeal dismissed with $5,000 in costs awarded to the plaintiffs.
The moving party sought leave to appeal an order of the lower court.
The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding plaintiffs in the amount of $5,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.
Motion for leave to appeal dismissed with costs of $5,000 awarded to the plaintiffs.
The defendants brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Lococo J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and ordered costs payable forthwith to the plaintiffs in the amount of $5,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.
Insurer owes no duty to defend where underlying claims allege harms expected from insured's policy choices.
The applicant, Ontario, sought a declaration that its insurer, St. Paul, owed a duty to defend it in an underlying class action regarding bail system delays.
Ontario argued St. Paul was estopped from denying coverage due to its delay in communicating its position.
The court found no estoppel, as Ontario controlled its own defence and suffered no prejudice.
On the coverage issue, the court held the true nature of the underlying claims involved harms that were expected from Ontario's policy choices, which fell outside the policy's definition of an 'occurrence' or 'accident'.
The application was dismissed.
Insurers owe no duty to defend where negligent misrepresentation claims are derivative of intentional breach of contract.
The applicant developer sought declarations that its insurers, Aviva and Northbridge, owed a duty to defend and indemnify it in a class action.
The class action alleged the developer negligently misrepresented that condominium units would include a heating system and storage locker, which were not provided.
The insurers denied coverage on the basis that the developer's failure to provide the items was an intentional business decision, not an 'occurrence' or accident.
The court agreed with the insurers, finding that the negligent misrepresentation claims were entirely derivative of the intentional breach of contract.
The applications for coverage were dismissed.
Insurer's summary judgment motion dismissed; triable issues exist regarding alleged negligent misrepresentation during settlement.
The defendant insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for negligent misrepresentation.
The plaintiffs alleged that during a settlement meeting for a fire loss claim, the insurer misrepresented that the plaintiffs could sue their former insurance broker for the shortfall in coverage, inducing them to sign a release and settle for less than they were entitled to.
The insurer argued the action was barred by the release and the limitation period.
The court dismissed the motion, finding genuine issues requiring a trial regarding whether the misrepresentation was made, whether reliance was reasonable, and when the limitation period commenced.
Insurance policy interpreted to provide $50,000 business interruption coverage per location, not in the aggregate.
The applicants sought a declaration that they were entitled to further coverage under the pandemic-related business income interruption provision of their insurance policy.
The insurer argued the coverage was restricted to an aggregate maximum limit of $50,000 for the policy period, while the insured argued the limit applied to each of their seven daycare locations.
Applying the principles of contractual interpretation, the court found the policy ambiguous but concluded that reading the policy as a whole supported the insured's interpretation.
The court granted the application, declaring the limit of liability is $50,000 for each of the seven scheduled risk locations, for a maximum aggregate coverage of $350,000.
Insurance appraisal process permanently terminated due to severe procedural dysfunction and bickering among participants.
The insurer brought an application to regularize a dysfunctional insurance appraisal process following a fire at a condominium construction project.
The insured brought a cross-application to terminate the appraisal process.
The court found that the appraisal process had become a 'procedural shipwreck' due to the joint and several fault of the umpire, the appraisers, and the lawyers for both parties.
The court dismissed the insurer's application and granted the insured's cross-application, permanently terminating the appraisal process and leaving the valuation of the loss to be determined in the concurrent court action.
Leave to appeal refused; motion judge properly struck jury notice due to COVID-19 delays and prejudice.
The defendants sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision to strike their jury notice due to delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Divisional Court refused leave, finding that the motion judge properly exercised their discretion in balancing the increased uncertainty of civil jury trials against the significant financial prejudice to the plaintiffs, who required extensive attendant care.
The court applied the recent framework from Louis v. Poitras and awarded costs to the plaintiffs.
Jury notice struck and trial adjourned for six months due to COVID-19 pandemic delays.
The plaintiffs, who suffered catastrophic injuries in a motor vehicle accident, brought a motion to strike the jury notice due to the suspension of civil jury trials during the COVID-19 pandemic.
The defendants brought a cross-motion to adjourn the trial because the pandemic interfered with their ability to obtain responding medical reports.
The court granted the adjournment for six months to allow the defendants to obtain their medical assessments.
However, the court also struck the jury notice, finding that the indefinite delay of jury trials would cause undue financial prejudice to the plaintiffs, whose accident benefits were nearly exhausted.
Summary judgment dismissing a negligence claim against a bar and bus company was set aside.
The appellants appealed the dismissal of their negligence action on summary judgment motions brought by the respondents.
The plaintiff was assaulted after exiting a chartered bus at a plaza in Barrie, sustaining a serious head injury.
The respondents operated a bar with a transportation and security system designed to prevent violence.
The motions judge found the case suitable for summary judgment and held that the respondents met the applicable standard of care.
The Court of Appeal found that the motions judge failed to properly articulate and apply the standard of care, effectively treating the plaintiff's contributory negligence as a bar to the claim.
The court held that the respondents owed a duty not to place the plaintiff in a position where foreseeable injury could occur, and that a trial was necessary to properly assess the standard of care and causation.
The Court of Appeal affirmed an insurer's duty to defend an ATV accident claim based on a broad reading of the pleadings.
The appellant insurer appealed an order requiring it to defend the respondents in an action arising from an ATV accident.
The insurer denied coverage on the basis that the ATV was not required to be insured as it was being operated on private property and did not fall under the definition of "automobile" in the OAP 1.
The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's decision, finding that the pleadings alleged facts permitting a finding that the respondents were not occupiers of the property at the time of the accident, which was sufficient to trigger the insurer's duty to defend under the policy.