Alex Finlayson

This child protection case involved an interim motion by the respondent mother to vary a temporary access order for her 8-year-old child, A., who resides with his maternal aunt and uncle.

The mother sought to lift supervision and expand parenting time, including weekend visits.

The court denied the mother's request for expanded unsupervised access, citing concerns about the child's diagnosed special needs, the mother's mental health, her inconsistent attendance at visits, and the aunt's rigid stance threatening to place the child in care if weekend access was ordered.

The court ordered the continuation of supervised and therapeutic access, emphasizing the need for all parties to cooperate and implement professional recommendations for the child's best interests and long-term stability.

This decision addresses a motion brought by the wife (S.R.) to enforce a consent order regarding the release of $77,000 from the sale proceeds of the matrimonial home, representing retroactive child support, and past and future spousal support.

The husband (S.C.H.) argued that the funds should be held in trust until the final resolution of all issues, including costs, based on the interpretation of the consent order's holdback provisions.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation, reading the order as a whole and considering surrounding circumstances, and found that the holdback language in paragraph 2 applied to all financial allocations, not just the property equalization payment.

The wife's motion was dismissed, and the funds are to remain in trust pending further order or agreement.

This ruling addresses the costs of a six-day trial concerning a father's motion to change and a mother's response, primarily focused on spousal support and child support termination.

The court had previously dismissed the father's claims to set aside a consent order and terminate spousal support, and the mother's claim for student loan contributions, while ordering increased spousal support for the mother without a termination date.

The mother sought approximately $80,000 in costs, and the father argued for no costs or a maximum of $15,000.

The court found the mother to be the successful party on the most significant issue (spousal support) and awarded her $55,000 in costs, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The decision considered the importance and complexity of the issues, the parties' behaviour, and offers to settle, ultimately declining to impose increased costs for unreasonable behaviour.

The parties in this family law case disagreed on their date of separation.

The applicant wife argued the date was May 1, 2018, when she began moving out of the matrimonial home, while the respondent husband argued it was October 15, 2015, when he moved into a separate bedroom.

After a focused trial, the court applied the Oswell indicia for separation under the same roof and found that the parties' financial arrangements, social activities, and communications did not support a 2015 separation.

The court concluded that the parties separated on May 1, 2018, with no reasonable prospect of resuming cohabitation.

The child welfare agency sought to proceed with a child protection trial but was unable to complete its trial directions due to the youth's new criminal charges and the agency's inability to obtain the youth's records from the Youth Court under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Superior Court of Justice adjourned the trial and provided a detailed analysis of the intersection between child welfare proceedings and youth criminal justice privacy provisions.

The court concluded that the agency has a right of access to the records under section 119 of the YCJA, although the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to make the access order.

The moving party father brought a motion for the production of his children's health and counselling records from four service providers, including records relating to one child's gender-affirming care.

The children, who were capable of consenting under the Personal Health Information Protection Act, refused consent.

The court dismissed the father's request under section 20(5) of the Children's Law Reform Act, finding broad disclosure was not in the children's best interests given the high-conflict separation and allegations of family violence.

Under Rule 19(11) of the Family Law Rules, the court ordered production of the reunification therapist's records and limited information about the children's enrollment in counselling.

However, the court found the individual counselling and gender-affirming care records were privileged under the Wigmore test and dismissed the motion for their production.

The father brought a motion to change to terminate child and spousal support, and to set aside a prior consent order regarding child support termination dates.

The mother responded, seeking an increase in spousal support due to her permanent disability and the father's increased income, as well as a retroactive contribution to the adult children's student loans.

The court dismissed the father's request to set aside the consent order and his request to terminate spousal support, finding the mother remained permanently disabled and in need.

The court also dismissed the mother's claim for retroactive section 7 expenses due to lack of timely notice and insufficient evidence.

Ultimately, the court ordered an increase in ongoing spousal support to meet the mother's needs.

Following a previous decision regarding an adjournment request in a child protection matter, the court selected a lawyer from a list provided by Legal Aid Ontario to act as amicus curiae.

The father, who previously had primary custody of the children, was charged with sexual offences, leading to a temporary order placing the children with the mother.

Following his acquittal, the father brought a motion to reinstate the previous final parenting order.

The mother opposed, citing the 13-year-old child's preference to remain with her and attend a specific high school.

The court found the acquittal constituted a material change in circumstances and that the child's views and preferences were not sufficiently strong or independent to override the historical status quo.

The court reinstated the final order granting the father primary custody and decision-making responsibility.

The child welfare agency sought an adjournment of a protection application involving an Indigenous youth with complex needs, intending to withdraw the application in favour of a Voluntary Youth Service Agreement once the youth turned 16.

The court noted significant delays, multiple placement breakdowns, and a failure by the agency to implement recommendations from a psychological assessment.

While the court granted the adjournment due to the agency's failure to prepare for the trial scheduling conference, it imposed strict trial directions and appointed amicus curiae to ensure the court receives the necessary evidence and submissions regarding available services and the child's best interests.

The applicant father sought unsupervised parenting time, decision-making authority for counselling, and damages for parental alienation following a high-conflict separation.

The respondent mother, who frequently failed to participate in the proceedings, alleged the father had alcohol issues and committed family violence.

The court found the mother engaged in family violence and psychological abuse, alienating behaviours, and repeatedly breached court orders.

The court granted the father unsupervised parenting time and decision-making authority for the child's health assessments and counselling.

The father's claim for damages for parental alienation was dismissed.

Child support was ordered based on the father's imputed income, while the mother's claim for section 7 expenses was dismissed due to lack of disclosure.

The court also requested the involvement of the Children's Aid Society to assist the family.

The Durham Children’s Aid Society initiated a child protection proceeding concerning A.M., whose parents struggled with drug addiction.

The child had been informally cared for by C.C., a maternal cousin, for several months.

The Society and C.C. brought motions regarding C.C.'s party status and access to the child, while the parents sought reunification.

The court addressed whether C.C. qualified as a statutory party or a party with "care and control" under the Family Law Rules, ultimately deciding to add C.C. as a party under Rule 7(5) due to her significant role in the child's life and her legal interest in seeking access.

The court also determined a temporary access schedule for C.C. with the child, balancing the child's best interests with the parents' reunification efforts, which remained tentative.

This is a supplementary judgment addressing outstanding issues from an appeal of family arbitration awards concerning property, spousal support, and costs.

The court recalculated the lump sum spousal support, reducing it from $227,185.00 to $170,816.00, based on revised asset bases due to a successful equalization payment appeal and correction of a calculation error regarding the retirement age/duration.

The arbitrator's costs award, which ordered the wife to pay the husband $67,500.00, was set aside, with the court finding divided success and an erroneous approach to assessing reasonableness based on settlement offers.

No costs were awarded for the arbitration or the appeal.

The husband brought a motion to vary a temporary spousal support order, seeking a reduction due to the alleged end of his contract employment and his intention to pursue farming.

The wife opposed the motion, arguing that the husband failed to prove the unavailability of further contracts and that his credibility was questionable.

The court dismissed the husband's motion, finding that he did not meet the test for varying a temporary order, particularly regarding material change, hardship, urgency, and clean hands.

The court emphasized that complex factual and credibility issues, including the husband's income, health, and the appropriate length of the relationship for support calculations, were best reserved for a full trial, which the parties had delayed.

The applicant children's aid society brought a temporary care and custody motion regarding an 8-year-old child following allegations of sexual abuse by the respondent father.

The father argued the court lost jurisdiction because the society effectively removed the child by suspending his parenting time but failed to bring the matter to court within five days as required by the CYFSA.

The court found that while the society's actions amounted to a removal, it did not complete the process of taking the child to a 'place of safety', resulting in an irregularity rather than a loss of jurisdiction.

The court ordered the child to remain in the temporary care of the mother, with the father's parenting time to be supervised, finding reasonable grounds to believe the child would be at risk of harm if returned to a shared parenting schedule.

The applicant brought a motion to vary a supervision order on an interim basis to allow the father and the child to relocate to southwestern Ontario.

The applicant had already facilitated and funded the move without prior judicial authorization.

The court granted a temporary, without prejudice order allowing the child to remain with the father in the new location, but strongly criticized the applicant for bypassing judicial oversight and failing to ensure the self-represented parents and the child's counsel were properly involved before the move.

The children's aid society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of a child, seeking to suspend the father's parenting time due to allegations of sexual abuse.

The society initially withheld the specific allegations and evidence from the parents and the Court, citing an ongoing police investigation.

The Court held that the society had no legal basis to withhold relevant evidence, emphasizing that fundamental fairness, the legislative framework, and Charter principles require full and early disclosure.

The Court strongly cautioned against proceeding ex parte or withholding evidence to protect a police investigation, noting the severe consequences of child protection proceedings.

Amicus curiae brought a pre-trial motion to determine whether the respondent mother was a 'special party' under the Family Law Rules, which would require the appointment of the Public Guardian and Trustee.

The mother also brought a motion to adjourn the proceedings on health grounds and alleged unavailability of counsel.

The court applied the functional test for capacity and concluded that while the mother was an ungovernable litigant who frequently failed to comply with court orders and procedures, there was insufficient medical evidence to rebut the presumption of capacity.

The court dismissed the motion to find the mother a special party and denied her request for an adjournment, ordering the trial to proceed.

The applicant brought a motion for temporary child and spousal support and an advance of $250,000 on her equalization payment.

The parties disputed the respondent's income, whether income should be imputed to the applicant, the entitlement of their 24-year-old child to support, and the advance on equalization.

The court determined the respondent's income at $147,629 for the interim motion, declining to impute unreported cash sales at this stage but adding back certain personal expenses.

The court declined to impute income to the applicant, noting her long absence from the workforce and the impact of the pandemic.

The court found the 24-year-old child remained a child of the marriage and ordered support.

Finally, the court ordered an advance of $200,000 on the equalization payment, finding sufficient certainty that the ultimate payment would exceed this amount.

In a protracted family law dispute, amicus curiae brought a motion to determine whether the self-represented respondent mother was a 'special party' lacking capacity to litigate.

Amicus sought production of the mother's health records from non-party doctors and requested broad confidentiality orders, including excluding the applicant father from the capacity hearing and denying him access to the records.

The Superior Court of Justice ordered the production of the health records for judicial vetting, applying the Stavro and Wigmore tests.

The court granted a sealing order over the file but refused to exclude the father from the proceedings, allowing his counsel restricted access to the vetted medical records to ensure trial fairness.