Alex Finlayson

The mother sought $7,000 in partial recovery costs after successfully resisting the father's motion for reunification therapy and achieving substantial success on her request for life insurance.

The father argued no costs should be awarded or they should be limited to $1,500, citing divided success and the mother's unreasonable conduct.

The court found the mother was the successful party but discounted her costs due to findings of poor behaviour by both parties.

The father was ordered to pay $5,000 in costs to the mother.

This ruling addresses ongoing high-conflict family litigation, specifically concerning the mother's non-compliance with previous court orders and direct communication with the court, and the father's improper ex parte motion for a change in primary residence.

The court dismissed the father's ex parte motion but ordered an in-person hearing under section 81(4) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, to determine if grounds exist for a child protection hearing or for the children to be brought to a place of safety.

The Durham Children's Aid Society was directed to file an affidavit explaining its actions regarding the child protection concerns.

This decision addresses a long motion in a high-conflict family litigation case between a mother and father concerning parenting and support.

The mother withdrew her application and refused to participate in the father's motion, even attempting to call the police in court.

The court heard the father's unopposed motion, dismissing many of his requests due to lack of jurisdiction (e.g., child welfare-like orders, compelling a "Miglin Release") or insufficient evidence (e.g., sole decision-making, imputed income, life insurance).

The court ordered the continuation of the existing week-about parenting schedule, mandated both parents' participation in previously ordered custody/access and mental health assessments, and prohibited both parties from bringing any further motions without leave due to their history of abusive litigation conduct.

The court also cancelled a matrimonial home designation on the paternal grandfather's property.

No costs were awarded, as the judge found both parties contributed to the litigation's chaos.

The applicant father brought a motion to vary a temporary parenting order, seeking primary residence and sole decision-making responsibility for the parties' 4-year-old child, with supervised parenting time for the respondent mother.

The mother had repeatedly denied the father parenting time based on unsubstantiated allegations of physical and sexual abuse, and drugging, which were investigated and closed by police and child protection services.

The court found compelling circumstances to change the status quo prior to trial, noting the mother's failure to support the child's relationship with the father and the emotional harm caused by her conduct.

The court granted the father's motion, awarding him primary residence and sole decision-making, and ordered the mother to have supervised parenting time.

This decision addresses two motions: a request for costs by A.V. against the Durham Children's Aid Society due to procedural missteps regarding police records, and a motion by the children's maternal great grandparents for party status.

The court dismissed A.V.'s costs claim, finding that the Society had taken ameliorative steps and that a costs order would transfer public funds without further achieving the objectives of costs.

The court also dismissed the great grandparents' motion for party status, concluding they were not statutory parents and did not meet the discretionary test under Rule 7(5) of the Family Law Rules, citing concerns about delay, lack of a clear plan, and potential for increased family conflict.

This Status Review proceeding involved a motion by the Durham Children's Aid Society and the father (S.M.) to permit the father to relocate with his 3-year-old child (A.M.) from Ontario to New Brunswick.

The kin caregiver (C.C.) opposed the relocation and sought temporary care and custody of A.M. in Ontario.

The court found the father's unilateral departure from Ontario with the child improper and questioned his credibility, compliance with orders, and willingness to facilitate the child's relationship with the kin caregiver, especially in light of an outstanding criminal warrant for an alleged assault in A.M.'s presence.

The court also noted the Society's incomplete assessment and lack of a detailed interjurisdictional access plan.

Applying the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA) and relocation principles, the court dismissed the Society's and father's motions, ordering A.M. to remain in C.C.'s temporary care and custody in Ontario.

The respondent father brought a motion to compel his 15-year-old child to attend reunification therapy and sought a determination on the quantum of life insurance to secure child support.

The applicant mother and the Office of the Children's Lawyer (OCL) opposed the reunification therapy, citing the child's strong and consistent refusal and the potential for harm.

The court found both parents contributed to the family dysfunction, acknowledging the mother's inappropriate involvement of the child in parental conflict and the father's history of family violence.

The court dismissed the motion for reunification therapy, prioritizing the child's autonomy and well-being.

Regarding life insurance, the court ordered the father to maintain a policy of $165,950.00, securing child support and a portion of future post-secondary education costs, with annual reductions.

The child protection agency brought a motion within a status review proceeding to change the temporary placement of an Indigenous child from the father's care to the mother's care pending trial.

The mother supported the motion, citing her progress in substance abuse recovery, while the father opposed it, arguing the child had stability in his care and the mother's progress needed to be tested at trial.

The court applied a flexible approach to varying a supervision order and determined that the father had provided stability for over two years.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the evidence regarding the mother's recovery and the child's best interests required a full trial.

This decision provides an update on an ongoing child protection application, detailing the progress of the Durham Children's Aid Society and respondent father A.V. in implementing previous court orders regarding the child J.'s care, schooling, and counselling.

It notes less positive developments with respondent parents D.F. and C.S., including a new child's removal and potential file transfer from another jurisdiction.

The court addressed an informal request by the maternal great grandparents for party status, directing them to bring a formal motion with evidence and legal submissions.

The decision also sets out a schedule for costs submissions from A.V. against the Society and adjourns the matter for further attendance.

The parties engaged in a highly conflicted 16-day trial regarding parenting issues for their two children.

The mother had previously obtained a sole custody order for the older child against her former partner using a falsified DNA test, a scheme in which the father was found to be complicit.

The court found both parties engaged in family violence, including coercive and controlling behaviour, but determined the mother was more likely to marginalize the father and withhold information.

The court awarded the father final decision-making responsibility for health and education, maintained the existing equal parenting schedule, granted a declaration of parentage for the younger child, and authorized hyphenated name changes for both children, subject to notifying the older child's biological father of the fraud.

The children's aid society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of three children, seeking to place them with their great grandparents.

The parents opposed the placement, raising concerns about violence, drug use, and criminal activity in the proposed home.

The court found the society's evidence regarding the proposed placement to be incomplete and lacking transparency.

The court dismissed the society's motion to place the children with the great grandparents and ordered that the children remain in the temporary care and custody of the society.

The court also ruled that the society does not require a court order to use police occurrence reports already provided to it pursuant to the duty to report.

The applicant wife brought a motion seeking to amend her application to claim a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) against the former matrimonial home and to add the husband's sister as a respondent.

The wife alleged two fraudulent conveyances: first, the husband secretly purchased the matrimonial home through a corporation he owned, and second, he transferred the property from the corporation to his sister without consideration.

The court granted the CPL and added the sister as a party, finding a high probability of the wife succeeding on her claims for an unequal division of net family property and support.

The court emphasized the husband's surreptitious conduct, non-disclosure, and lack of assets as factors favoring the CPL, and ordered the husband to pay costs.

This child protection case involved an interim motion by the respondent mother to vary a temporary access order for her 8-year-old child, A., who resides with his maternal aunt and uncle.

The mother sought to lift supervision and expand parenting time, including weekend visits.

The court denied the mother's request for expanded unsupervised access, citing concerns about the child's diagnosed special needs, the mother's mental health, her inconsistent attendance at visits, and the aunt's rigid stance threatening to place the child in care if weekend access was ordered.

The court ordered the continuation of supervised and therapeutic access, emphasizing the need for all parties to cooperate and implement professional recommendations for the child's best interests and long-term stability.

This decision addresses a motion brought by the wife (S.R.) to enforce a consent order regarding the release of $77,000 from the sale proceeds of the matrimonial home, representing retroactive child support, and past and future spousal support.

The husband (S.C.H.) argued that the funds should be held in trust until the final resolution of all issues, including costs, based on the interpretation of the consent order's holdback provisions.

The court applied principles of contractual interpretation, reading the order as a whole and considering surrounding circumstances, and found that the holdback language in paragraph 2 applied to all financial allocations, not just the property equalization payment.

The wife's motion was dismissed, and the funds are to remain in trust pending further order or agreement.

This ruling addresses the costs of a six-day trial concerning a father's motion to change and a mother's response, primarily focused on spousal support and child support termination.

The court had previously dismissed the father's claims to set aside a consent order and terminate spousal support, and the mother's claim for student loan contributions, while ordering increased spousal support for the mother without a termination date.

The mother sought approximately $80,000 in costs, and the father argued for no costs or a maximum of $15,000.

The court found the mother to be the successful party on the most significant issue (spousal support) and awarded her $55,000 in costs, inclusive of HST and disbursements.

The decision considered the importance and complexity of the issues, the parties' behaviour, and offers to settle, ultimately declining to impose increased costs for unreasonable behaviour.

The parties in this family law case disagreed on their date of separation.

The applicant wife argued the date was May 1, 2018, when she began moving out of the matrimonial home, while the respondent husband argued it was October 15, 2015, when he moved into a separate bedroom.

After a focused trial, the court applied the Oswell indicia for separation under the same roof and found that the parties' financial arrangements, social activities, and communications did not support a 2015 separation.

The court concluded that the parties separated on May 1, 2018, with no reasonable prospect of resuming cohabitation.

The child welfare agency sought to proceed with a child protection trial but was unable to complete its trial directions due to the youth's new criminal charges and the agency's inability to obtain the youth's records from the Youth Court under the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The Superior Court of Justice adjourned the trial and provided a detailed analysis of the intersection between child welfare proceedings and youth criminal justice privacy provisions.

The court concluded that the agency has a right of access to the records under section 119 of the YCJA, although the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to make the access order.

The moving party father brought a motion for the production of his children's health and counselling records from four service providers, including records relating to one child's gender-affirming care.

The children, who were capable of consenting under the Personal Health Information Protection Act, refused consent.

The court dismissed the father's request under section 20(5) of the Children's Law Reform Act, finding broad disclosure was not in the children's best interests given the high-conflict separation and allegations of family violence.

Under Rule 19(11) of the Family Law Rules, the court ordered production of the reunification therapist's records and limited information about the children's enrollment in counselling.

However, the court found the individual counselling and gender-affirming care records were privileged under the Wigmore test and dismissed the motion for their production.

The father brought a motion to change to terminate child and spousal support, and to set aside a prior consent order regarding child support termination dates.

The mother responded, seeking an increase in spousal support due to her permanent disability and the father's increased income, as well as a retroactive contribution to the adult children's student loans.

The court dismissed the father's request to set aside the consent order and his request to terminate spousal support, finding the mother remained permanently disabled and in need.

The court also dismissed the mother's claim for retroactive section 7 expenses due to lack of timely notice and insufficient evidence.

Ultimately, the court ordered an increase in ongoing spousal support to meet the mother's needs.

Following a previous decision regarding an adjournment request in a child protection matter, the court selected a lawyer from a list provided by Legal Aid Ontario to act as amicus curiae.