Allison McGregor

The applicant children's aid society brought a temporary care and custody motion regarding an 8-year-old child following allegations of sexual abuse by the respondent father.

The father argued the court lost jurisdiction because the society effectively removed the child by suspending his parenting time but failed to bring the matter to court within five days as required by the CYFSA.

The court found that while the society's actions amounted to a removal, it did not complete the process of taking the child to a 'place of safety', resulting in an irregularity rather than a loss of jurisdiction.

The court ordered the child to remain in the temporary care of the mother, with the father's parenting time to be supervised, finding reasonable grounds to believe the child would be at risk of harm if returned to a shared parenting schedule.

The Respondent Mother brought an urgent motion seeking clarification on access arrangements after the Durham Children's Aid Society suspended all face-to-face access due to COVID-19.

The court clarified its previous endorsement, stating that parties should consider all options for meaningful contact, including in-person visits, while prioritizing child safety and adhering to the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The endorsement reiterated principles from Ribeiro v. Wright regarding parenting arrangements during the pandemic.

The Respondent Mother brought an urgent motion in response to the Durham Children’s Aid Society's decision to suspend all face-to-face access at its Supervised Access Centre due to the COVID-19 crisis.

The court found the matter urgent, emphasizing the need to balance child protection with maintaining parental relationships during the pandemic, and ordered a teleconference to establish an appropriate access regimen.

The Durham Children's Aid Society brought a motion within a status review application to place three children in its temporary care and custody.

The children had previously been found in need of protection and placed under a supervision order with their parents, which was subsequently breached due to the mother's mental health crisis and the parents' and maternal grandfather's failure to report changes or comply with conditions.

The court considered the children's best interests under subsection 64(8) and 37(3) of the Child and Family Services Act, finding that the existing supervision order was insufficient and there was a continuing risk of harm if the children returned to parental care.

The court explicitly disagreed with the necessity of proving a material change in circumstances for temporary orders in child protection proceedings, emphasizing the fluid nature of such cases.

The motion was granted, placing the children in the Society's temporary care.

The child protection agency brought a summary judgment motion seeking Crown wardship of a young child without access.

The parents opposed the motion and sought the child’s return to their care under supervision, arguing that factual disputes required a full trial.

The court held that there was no genuine issue requiring a trial, emphasizing the child’s serious prior neglect, extensive parental history of child protection involvement, missed access visits, and inability to address the child’s special needs.

Applying the best‑interests factors under the Child and Family Services Act, the court concluded that permanency planning was required and that Crown wardship was appropriate.

The court further held that the parents failed to establish that access would be meaningful and beneficial to the child or that it would not impair adoption prospects.