Alan John Lenczner

The appellants sought to claim a federal sales tax refund belonging to a bankrupt company, relying on assignments made prior to and during the bankruptcy.

The trustee in bankruptcy held the refund and argued the assignments were invalid.

The Court of Appeal held that the tax refund was a 'Crown debt' under the Financial Administration Act, which prohibits the assignment of such debts.

The court also found that the general power of a trustee to sell assets under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act does not override this specific prohibition.

The appeal was dismissed.

The purchasers (respondents) entered into an agreement to buy a residential property from the vendor (appellant), conditional upon a satisfactory home inspection in the purchasers' sole and absolute discretion.

After receiving an inspection report identifying several deficiencies, the purchasers decided not to waive the condition and requested the return of their deposit.

The vendor refused, arguing the purchasers did not act reasonably or in good faith.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision ordering the return of the deposit, finding that the inspection condition imported both objective and subjective elements, and that the purchasers exercised their discretion honestly, in good faith, and reasonably based on the inspection report.

Following the dismissal of their appeal, the appellants made written submissions regarding costs.

They argued that costs should not be awarded on a joint and several basis, and that four appellants whose judgments were satisfied while the case was under reserve should not bear any costs.

The Court of Appeal agreed, ordering costs against the remaining appellants on a several, pro rata basis rather than jointly and severally, noting that a joint and several order would be unusually onerous.

The appellants, Canadian 'Names' in the Lloyd's insurance market, appealed a decision allowing the registration and enforcement of U.K. judgments against them for unpaid reinsurance premiums.

They argued that the U.K. proceedings denied them natural justice by preventing them from litigating fraud claims before judgment, and that enforcing the judgments would be contrary to Ontario public policy because Lloyd's had breached the prospectus requirements of the Ontario Securities Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of natural justice because the U.K. courts assumed the fraud allegations were true but found they did not provide a legal defence.

The Court also held that enforcing the judgments was not contrary to public policy, emphasizing international comity and the fact that Ontario courts had previously determined England was the proper forum for the dispute.

The appellant, a Canadian citizen, was nominated for a British peerage.

The Prime Minister of Canada intervened and advised the Queen not to confer the honour, citing Canadian policy against titular honours.

The appellant sued the Prime Minister for abuse of power and negligence.

The Court of Appeal held that the Prime Minister was exercising the Crown prerogative relating to honours, which is not justiciable and therefore beyond the review of the courts.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged a trial judgment arising from a scam in which the plaintiff and an insurer both suffered loss, arguing the award against him should be set aside or reduced.

The court held that, despite some uncertainty about the trial judge's appreciation of the chronology, the findings concerning the appellant's knowledge of the fraudster's failures and his failure to communicate that information supported liability for the plaintiff's loss.

The court also rejected the argument that findings of reasonable reliance and contributory negligence were incompatible on the facts.

Leave to appeal costs was granted to the insurer, and the insurer obtained an order requiring the appellant to indemnify it for its costs of defending the main action and pursuing its cross-claim.

In a securities-related class proceeding arising from alleged fraudulent statements about Indonesian gold reserves, the appellants challenged the refusal to certify negligent misrepresentation while conspiracy, fraudulent misrepresentation, and Competition Act claims had been certified.

The court held that there was no principled basis to distinguish fraudulent from negligent misrepresentation at the certification stage, given the overlap in common factual and legal issues and the low threshold for common issues under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court further held that, where three related claims were already proceeding as a class action, it was sensible and efficient to include negligent misrepresentation on the same litigation track.

The appeal was allowed and the certification order amended accordingly.

Commercial appeal arising from a terminated joint venture funding agreement for the acquisition of Greek mines.

The Court of Appeal held that no fiduciary duty survived termination of the parties' arm's-length commercial agreement, but upheld findings that the respondent group provided confidential information, that the appellant misused that information in acquiring the property, and that the confidentiality agreement and common law duty of confidence were enforceable.

The court refused to admit fresh evidence under the Palmer test and dismissed a non-party motion to set aside the judgment based on alleged ownership of the information.

The remedy awarding a 12 per cent carried interest plus a further 12 per cent participating interest was upheld, while both the main appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.

The appellant challenged a partial summary judgment arising from a dispute over whether an oral agreement had been made in the spring of 1997 and whether its terms were breached.

The majority held that the existence and terms of the alleged oral agreement raised a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court concluded that only after those factual issues were resolved could the legal enforceability of the agreement be determined.

The appeal was allowed, the partial summary judgment was set aside, and the respondent's summary judgment motion was dismissed with costs to the appellant.

The applicant sought a stay of an Ontario Court of Appeal order pending an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada.

The application was made directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to s. 65.1 of the Supreme Court Act.

The Court dismissed the application for a stay, noting that under recent amendments, such applications should generally be made first to the court appealed from unless there are special circumstances.

The dismissal was without prejudice to the applicant renewing the stay application before the Court of Appeal.

The respondents were senior managers of Prime and Calpine, two reporting issuers involved in mineral exploration.

The British Columbia Securities Commission found that the respondents breached the timely disclosure provisions of the Securities Act by failing to disclose material changes, including drilling results, a private placement, and a contractual dispute, before engaging in securities transactions.

The Court of Appeal set aside the Commission's orders, finding errors of law in the interpretation of "material change".

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that considerable deference is owed to specialized tribunals like the Securities Commission, even where there is a statutory right of appeal and no privative clause.

The Court restored the Commission's findings and orders, confirming that drilling results can constitute a material change and that senior management has a duty to inquire about material changes before causing an issuer to engage in securities transactions.

The appellant sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Minister to issue supplementary import permits for live chickens under the Export and Import Permits Act.

The Minister had refused the permits based on the availability of eviscerated chicken in Canada, despite policy guidelines suggesting permits would normally be issued if Canadian product was not offered at market price.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that section 8 of the Act confers a discretionary authority on the Minister.

The Court found that while the Minister may formulate general policy guidelines, these do not fetter his statutory discretion, which was properly exercised based on relevant considerations regarding market requirements.

The appellant vendor and respondent purchaser were negotiating a real estate transaction.

The purchaser made a counter offer and requested the vendor to initial the changes and return the agreement 'as soon as possible'.

The vendor initialled the changes within the time limit but the mailed acceptance was received after the deadline.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the closing words of the purchaser's letter indicated that prompt return of the initialled document would satisfy any formal provision for acceptance.

The appeal was allowed and the trial judgment finding a valid contract was restored.