Aaron Myer Franks

The appellant appealed an arbitrator's decision that used final offer selection to determine child support, spousal support, and equalization of net family property.

The appellant argued that the process was contrary to law because it was ill-suited for multiple issues, lacked sworn testimony and cross-examination, and the arbitrator's reasons were inadequate.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding that family law arbitrations are not required to mirror court processes, the parties were treated equally and fairly, and the arbitrator's reasons were sufficient.

The respondent husband moved to stay a divorce proceeding and set aside an ex parte Mareva injunction on the basis that the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction under s. 3(1) of the Divorce Act.

The court found that the applicant spouse had not been ordinarily resident in Ontario for the required one‑year period preceding the application and had instead been living with the family in China.

The court also concluded there was no real and substantial connection to Ontario sufficient to ground corollary relief under the Family Law Act.

In related proceedings concerning the parties’ children, the court declined to order their return to China despite concerns regarding their removal, emphasizing the need for a full evidentiary record before determining custody issues.

Following the dismissal of a family law motion seeking certificates of pending litigation over properties and the addition of the respondent’s parents as parties, the court determined the appropriate costs awards.

The court found the motion against the parents to have been recklessly pursued because the issues had already been litigated and no material change justified revisiting them.

Substantial costs were awarded to the parents due to their complete success and the unreasonable conduct of the moving party.

The respondent spouse, who largely took no position on the motion, received a reduced costs award reflecting limited participation and proportionality principles.

The respondent in a family law appeal brought a motion for security for costs and an adjournment.

The appellant, who had been denied joint custody at trial, appealed primarily on the basis that the trial judge failed to properly consider his section 23 Charter rights regarding French language education for the children.

The appellant had declared bankruptcy shortly after the trial, avoiding a significant costs award.

The Court of Appeal found that while the appeal was not frivolous, it had a very low prospect of success.

Given the appellant's conduct, bankruptcy, and the low prospect of success, the court ordered the appellant to post $15,000 in security for costs and granted a short adjournment of the appeal.

The mother applied to relocate with the parties' child from Toronto to Kingston.

The trial judge granted the application, focusing heavily on the mother's reasons for moving and her relationship with the paternal family.

The father appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in applying the Gordon v. Goertz factors.

Specifically, the trial judge failed to give sufficient weight to the maximum contact principle and inappropriately treated the mother's reasons for moving as the primary factor, despite this not being an exceptional case where such reasons were relevant to her ability to meet the child's needs.

The order allowing the relocation was set aside.

The appellant father appealed an order under the Hague Convention requiring the return of his 13-year-old daughter to Mexico.

The child had previously been granted Convention refugee status in Canada based on abuse by the respondent mother.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding no conflict between the Hague Convention and the principle of non-refoulement in the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The court held that a refugee child's s. 7 Charter rights are engaged in a Hague application, requiring a risk assessment and procedural fairness, including notice and an opportunity to be heard.

A new hearing was ordered.

The mother brought an application under the Hague Convention for the return of her 13-year-old child to Mexico.

The child had previously made a successful refugee claim in Canada based on allegations of abuse by the mother.

The motion judge ordered the child's return.

The father appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by failing to conduct a meaningful risk assessment regarding the return of a recognized refugee.

The court set aside the return order and directed a new hearing.

The moving parties brought motions within an ongoing family law appeal.

The Court of Appeal granted an order directing the Office of the Children's Lawyer to represent the child on the appeal.

The court set strict timelines for the filing of fresh evidence and factums to ensure the appeal could proceed on its scheduled dates, emphasizing the best interests of the child.

The respondent mother was ordered to permit the OCL reasonable access to the child.

Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal, the Divisional Court issued a supplementary endorsement regarding costs.

The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal, fixed at $5,000 inclusive of disbursements plus HST.

The costs were directed to be paid to Legal Aid Ontario.

The appellant father appealed the dismissal of his application to vary a consent custody order to seek joint custody and an equal parenting schedule.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the application judge's conclusion that there was no material change in circumstances.

The court also upheld the application judge's decision to increase the father's weekday contact rather than imposing an equal parenting schedule, noting the judge properly considered the relevant factors including enhancing contact between the child and the father's new family.

The appellant appealed an order regarding child support for her daughter.

She argued the application judge erred in characterizing an $8.6 million payment to the respondent as a retiring allowance rather than severance, in treating stock option payments, in failing to impute income for property transfers to the respondent's wife, in failing to gross up income for UK tax rates, and in denying private school expenses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the application judge's factual findings and application of the Child Support Guidelines.

The moving party, who acted as the appellant's trial counsel, sought leave to intervene in the appeal.

The trial judge had been highly critical of the moving party's conduct, finding he deliberately suppressed information.

The moving party argued this misapprehended the evidence and harmed his professional reputation.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the protection of a proposed intervenor's integrity is a sufficient interest to engage Rule 13.01(1)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, especially when no other remedies are practically available.

The wife appealed a trial judge's decision staying her Ontario application for equalization of net family property and spousal support on the basis that Greece was the more appropriate forum.

On appeal, the wife sought to introduce fresh evidence consisting of an application the husband filed in Greece after the Ontario trial, which contradicted his previous evidence regarding the parties' assets.

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence under the Palmer test, finding it radically changed the parameters of the property issues.

The court allowed the appeal, set aside the stay, and ordered the proceedings to continue in Ontario.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay substantial spousal and child support, equalization, and costs.

He challenged the trial judge's orders that pierced the corporate veil of his solely-owned companies to secure the amounts owed, and that made the costs and pre-judgment interest enforceable as spousal support.

The Court of Appeal upheld the piercing of the corporate veil, finding it appropriate in family law cases where a spouse completely dominates a corporation and uses it to shield assets from support obligations.

The Court also upheld the enforcement of costs as spousal support under the Family Responsibility and Support Enforcement Act, but allowed the appeal in part to remove pre-judgment interest on the equalization payment from being enforceable as support.

Following the dismissal of the wife's application for leave to appeal a summary judgment decision regarding the partition and sale of a jointly owned family cottage, the court determined the quantum of costs payable to the successful husband.

The court applied the principles of proportionality and reasonableness, noting that the husband's claimed costs of over $16,000 for a leave to appeal motion were excessive.

Costs were fixed on a partial indemnity scale at $8,487.09.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action for solicitor's negligence.

The appellant had retained the respondent solicitor to obtain a speedy divorce so he could remarry.

Against the advice of the solicitor and his accountant, the appellant signed a separation agreement prepared by his wife's lawyer because he did not want to risk upsetting his wife and delaying the divorce.

The trial judge found the solicitor met the standard of care and the appellant failed to prove damages.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's findings and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their action.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the motion judge's appreciation of the previous Court of Appeal order and upheld the decision to dismiss the action against all defendants, including one who had not formally moved for dismissal, as it was the intent of the motion brought by the other defendants.

The parties separated after 14 years of marriage and executed a comprehensive separation agreement that included a full and final release of spousal support.

The wife later applied for spousal support under s. 15.2 of the Divorce Act.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the strict threshold from the Pelech trilogy no longer applies under the 1985 Divorce Act.

Instead, courts must apply a two-stage test, examining the circumstances of the agreement's formation and whether it still reflects the parties' intentions and substantially complies with the Act's objectives at the time of the application.

Applying this framework, the Court upheld the separation agreement and dismissed the wife's claim for spousal support.

The parties were not married or living together when their child was born.

The mother registered the child's birth using her surname and did not acknowledge the father on the Statement of Live Birth, pursuant to s. 10(3)4 of the Vital Statistics Act.

The father applied for an order requiring the mother to execute a joint election form to change the child's name to a hyphenated surname.

The application was dismissed.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that the Act allows a mother to know the identity of the father but choose not to acknowledge him for the purpose of birth registration, thereby giving the child her surname.