Aaron Myer Franks

This endorsement addresses costs arising from a motion for temporary spousal support where the Applicant was largely successful.

The Applicant sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis, while the Respondent sought full recovery costs, arguing the Applicant's unreasonable conduct in bringing the motion on short notice should disentitle her to costs.

The court found the Applicant's conduct unreasonable, partly due to her fragile medical condition, but also noted the Respondent's prior failure to provide financial disclosure.

The court determined that the Applicant's unreasonable conduct warranted a reduction in her costs award, but not a denial, and dismissed the Respondent's claim for costs, finding that many of his incurred costs related to overdue financial disclosure.

The Applicant was awarded approximately 50% of her substantial indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her motion to change spousal support.

The parties had been married for 21 years and reached a consent order in 2012 providing for $12,000 per month in spousal support plus 27% of incentive employment income.

The motion judge dismissed the motion to change, finding that while the respondent's income had increased, no additional compensatory support was warranted.

The appellant argued the motion judge misunderstood the principles of compensatory support under Moge v. Moge.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding no legal error, error in principle, or significant misapprehension of evidence.

The applicant brought a motion for temporary spousal support following the parties' separation.

The applicant, who recently underwent a double lung transplant, sought $200,000 per month based on the respondent's high income and their lavish lifestyle during the marriage.

The respondent, a wealthy individual with complex financial affairs, proposed $40,000 per month plus medical expenses.

The court conducted a budget analysis and ordered the respondent to pay temporary spousal support of $54,000 per month, plus up to $28,000 per month for a personal care assistant, pending further financial disclosure and a final determination.

In supplementary reasons following an appeal regarding property ownership, the Court of Appeal addressed outstanding financial issues between former spouses.

The court ordered the respondent to reimburse the appellant for mortgage and property tax payments she made on his half-interest in a jointly owned property, finding he would otherwise be unjustly enriched.

The court also awarded the appellant additional occupation rent for the post-trial period.

Given divided success on the main appeal issues, the court ordered the parties to bear their own costs for both the trial and the appeal.

Appeal from trial judgment in matrimonial proceedings concerning ownership of property.

The trial judge found that the appellant's 50% interest in Knapton Farms Ltd. (a corporation holding farm property) and 100% interest in lot 8 (adjoining land) were beneficially owned by the respondent through resulting trust.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the trial judge correctly applied resulting trust principles to the Knapton shares but erred regarding lot 8.

The court held that the initial 1994 transfer of lot 8 to the parties as joint owners created a presumption of joint beneficial ownership under the Family Law Act, which the respondent failed to rebut.

However, the court upheld the resulting trust finding regarding the 1996 transfer of the respondent's half-interest to the appellant.

The court also corrected the valuation of farm real estate and addressed equalization, occupation rent, and pre-judgment interest issues.

On appeal from a trial decision in a family law matter involving equalization, spousal support, and costs following a 27-year marriage.

The trial judge had ordered an equalization payment, spousal support at the low end of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, and full indemnity costs against the wife.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the equalization payment but found errors in the spousal support calculation and costs award, returning both issues to the trial judge for reconsideration.

On the second appeal, the Court of Appeal corrected the wife's income calculation to account for tax implications and eliminated double-counting, resulting in a higher spousal support award.

The costs award was upheld as reasonable given the wife's conduct.

In an addendum to a previous summary judgment decision, the plaintiff sought clarification on whether its professional negligence claim against the defendant lawyer and law firm was dismissed, and whether it was entitled to a $60,000 purchase price.

The court confirmed that the professional negligence claim was dismissed because it was pleaded as equivalent to the failed breach of fiduciary duty claim.

The court also held that the plaintiff was not entitled to the purchase price because the underlying contract had been abandoned and repudiated by both parties.

The plaintiff, Flirty Girl Fitness Inc. (FGF), brought a summary judgment motion alleging breach of fiduciary duty, conspiracy, conversion, and professional negligence against the defendants, including a co-founder sister, former corporate lawyers, and a new fitness company.

FGF claimed damages of $180,440.15 plus punitive damages.

The defendants sought summary judgment to dismiss all claims.

The court found that the co-founder sister, Krista Knee, acted in FGF's best interests to salvage the business by transferring assets to Hottie Body Boutique Inc. (HBB), which assumed FGF's significant debts and prepaid customer contracts.

The transaction was deemed fair and beneficial to FGF, despite some corporate governance irregularities and a minor breach of fiduciary duty by the sisters for not fully disclosing future personal ownership plans to passive shareholders, which caused no damage to FGF.

The court also found no breach of fiduciary duty or professional negligence by the corporate lawyer, David Epstein.

Consequently, the court dismissed FGF's action in its entirety, concluding there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The applicant wife sought to set aside a marriage contract and requested interim spousal support of $50,000 per month, alleging duress, undue influence, unconscionability, and inadequate financial disclosure.

The respondent husband opposed the motion, arguing the contract was valid and that the applicant's refusal to produce her former counsel's file warranted an adverse inference.

The court dismissed the applicant's motion, finding no serious issue to be tried regarding the contract's validity under the two-stage Miglin test.

The court upheld the contractual spousal support of $12,000 per month and ordered the applicant to pay costs to the respondent.

The deceased was subject to court orders requiring him to pay spousal and child support and to maintain his wife as the irrevocable beneficiary of his life insurance policy.

After separation, the deceased entered into a relationship with another woman whose child was born three months after his death.

The deceased left an insolvent estate.

The other woman brought an application for dependants' relief seeking to claw back the life insurance proceeds into the estate under section 72(1)(f) of the Succession Law Reform Act.

The wife sought a declaration that the policy did not form part of the estate or that she was a creditor whose rights were protected under section 72(7) of the Act.

The trial judge and Divisional Court held the policy formed part of the estate.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 72(7) excludes from the claw back the amount of proceeds required to satisfy the deceased's court-ordered spousal and child support obligations where the support recipient was designated as the irrevocable beneficiary.

Maria Anna Koundouros brought a motion to strike the claim of her former mother-in-law, Stavroulla Koundouros, who sought repayment of $1,598,000 advanced to Maria and her son during their marriage.

Maria argued that a promissory note for the funds was solely between Stavroulla and her son, Nicolaos, and therefore no cause of action existed against her.

The court dismissed Maria's motion, finding that Stavroulla's claim, which included allegations of unjust enrichment and trust claims based on joint benefit and Maria's access to funds, disclosed a reasonable cause of action.

The court emphasized that the Family Law Rules, not the Rules of Civil Procedure, primarily govern such family disputes and that the promissory note was not dispositive at this early stage.

Following the dismissal of a motion to remove the respondent's counsel in a family law proceeding, the respondent sought costs of $88,729.26 on a substantial indemnity basis.

The moving parties argued the quantum was unreasonable and sought to have costs fixed at $30,000 payable in the cause.

The court found the respondent's counsel's hours and rates to be somewhat excessive compared to the moving parties' counsel, but acknowledged the importance of the motion.

The court fixed costs at $50,000, payable forthwith, rejecting the moving parties' argument that payment should be deferred until the equalization payment was determined.

The applicant wife sought to serve the respondent husband in China with a family law application.

She obtained an ex parte order validating service without complying with the Hague Service Convention, arguing the Family Law Rules provided a complete code for service.

The husband appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that the Family Law Rules do not adequately cover international service and do not clearly rebut the presumption of conformity with international law.

Therefore, Rule 17.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure applies, making compliance with the Hague Service Convention mandatory for family law proceedings.

The wife and her boyfriend brought a motion to remove the husband's lawyer due to an alleged conflict of interest.

The boyfriend had a brief consultation with the lawyer for his own matrimonial matter, and the husband's answer in the current litigation alleged an affair between the wife and boyfriend and extravagant spending.

The moving parties claimed the lawyer breached duties of confidence, loyalty, and candour, and faced a potential conflict in cross-examining the boyfriend as a witness.

The court dismissed the motion, finding no confidential information was disclosed, the relationship between the wife and boyfriend was not confidential, and the two matrimonial litigations were not sufficiently related to create a presumption of conflict.

The court also found no breach of a limited duty of loyalty or candour, and no impediment to cross-examination.

The appellants appealed a trial decision finding that a $1 million life insurance policy was part of the deceased's estate and available for dependant support claims under the Succession Law Reform Act (SLRA).

The deceased had been ordered on consent to maintain his former spouse as the irrevocable beneficiary of the policy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the deceased still 'owned' the policy under s. 72(1)(f) of the SLRA despite the irrevocable designation.

The Court further held that the former spouse did not have 'creditor rights' under s. 72(7) because the designation did not create a security interest, and she was not entitled to damages for breach of contract.

The parties settled a motion for contempt and a cross-motion, leaving the issue of costs to be determined by the court.

Both parties sought costs of approximately $40,000.

The court found that the respondent's original motion was necessary to enforce compliance with a final order regarding travel consent and life insurance, whereas the applicant's cross-motion was unnecessary.

The court awarded costs to the respondent, noting the applicant's unreasonable behaviour, including advancing a significant bill of costs for services rendered by his fiancée, who was not his solicitor of record.

The applicant was ordered to pay $27,454 in costs.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order requiring him to pay $100,000 in interim disbursements to the responding party in a family law proceeding.

He argued a denial of natural justice and that the motions judge lacked jurisdiction due to a prior order.

The Divisional Court found no good reason to doubt the correctness of the order, noting the moving party had notice and the prior order was not issued or entered.

The court also found the proposed appeal did not raise questions of general importance.

The motion for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the responding party.

Following a judgment allowing appeals and cross-appeals in part, the parties were unable to agree on costs.

The Court of Appeal awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale, ordering Charles Sr. to pay Diana $50,000, Charles Jr. to pay Diana $15,000, Lisa to pay Charles Jr. $15,000, and Ford to pay Lisa $15,000.

All additional requests for costs were dismissed.

The appellant was previously granted an extension of time to perfect his appeal on the condition that he pay $29,275 in outstanding costs to the respondent.

The order provided that if payment was not made within 60 days, the respondent could move to dismiss the appeal.

The appellant failed to make the payment, arguing that an agreement with the Family Responsibility Office or the appeal itself operated as a stay.

The Court of Appeal rejected these arguments and dismissed the appeal, awarding $2,000 in costs to the respondent.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment that awarded his bankrupt wife an equalization payment, lump sum spousal support, and costs.

The wife's former lawyers also appealed an order requiring the assessment of their accounts and a personal costs award against them.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, setting aside the equalization payment because the wife lacked capacity to assert the claim after her bankruptcy, and setting aside the assessment of the lawyers' accounts.

However, the Court upheld the lump sum spousal support award and the costs awards, including the personal costs award against the wife's former lawyer for acting in bad faith and running up costs without reasonable cause.