67 total
Leave to appeal denied; order compelling witness examinations on a motion to strike upheld.
The defendants sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that dismissed their motions to strike summonses to witnesses and a notice of examination.
The underlying motion was to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim.
The defendants argued the proposed examinations were too broad and amounted to a fishing expedition.
The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions, no good reason to doubt the correctness of the order, and no matters of public importance, as the scope of examination was properly tied to the broad issues raised in the motion to strike.
Application for judicial review dismissed as Commissioner reasonably found no expectation of competitive harm from disclosure.
The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner ordering the disclosure of specific information in a record.
The applicant argued that disclosure would cause competitive harm and reduce incentives to submit comprehensive proposals in future tenders.
The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Commissioner's conclusions reasonable, as there was an absence of detailed and convincing evidence to support the allegations of competitive harm.
Appeal of lost profit calculation dismissed; trial judge entitled to accept plaintiff's expert evidence.
The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding damages for lost profits arising from a breach of contract.
The appellant argued the trial judge erred in accepting the plaintiff's expert's historical approach to calculating lost profits and failed to consider whether lost advertisements were transferred to other accounts.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was entitled to accept the plaintiff's expert evidence and that the argument regarding transferred advertisements was not sufficiently developed in the evidence.
Appeal dismissed; trial judge did not err in awarding 33% of SRED tax credit figure.
The appellants appealed a trial judgment that allowed the respondent's claim for $164,444.27, representing 33 per cent of a tax credit figure in a SRED submission prepared by the respondent.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's reasons given the absence of contrary evidence from the appellants.
Future litigation costs are not 'expenses incident to the sale' under s. 27 of the Mortgages Act.
The appellant appealed a decision regarding the distribution of proceeds from a mortgage sale.
The appellant sought to include future litigation costs related to claims of improvident sale or slander of title as 'expenses incident to the sale' under s. 27 of the Mortgages Act.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that future costs are not 'then due' and therefore do not fall within s. 27.
The court also found no declaration in the mortgage permitting the parties to contract out of the Act under s. 30.
Appeal allowed and matter remitted as tribunal applied an overly narrow definition of unreasonable capital expenditures.
The appellants appealed a tribunal decision allowing a rent increase based on capital expenditures.
The tribunal had found the expenditures were not 'unreasonable' under s. 138(7) of the Act.
The Divisional Court held that the tribunal applied a legally flawed and overly narrow definition of 'unreasonable' by limiting it to non-arm's length transactions or frivolous expenditures.
The court also found the tribunal erred by ignoring the landlord's potential double recovery from coin-operated laundry machines.
The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to a differently constituted tribunal for a re-hearing.
Appeal dismissed; silence in a financing agreement regarding non-residential development charges does not conflict with a municipal by-law.
The appellant appealed a decision finding no conflict between a municipal by-law imposing development charges on commercial/industrial developments and a prior financing agreement.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the agreement's silence regarding non-residential development charges did not create a conflict with the by-law under section 14(4) of the Development Charges Act.
The court affirmed that the by-law and the agreement could stand together.