W. Danial Newton

The plaintiff, Lori Van Santvoort-Jansekovich, sued the estate of her mother's former husband, John ("Jack") Lundstrom, for unjust enrichment, seeking $469,164.05 in restitution for alleged unpaid services.

Lori claimed she provided extensive property management and business services to Jack from 1991 to 2004, based on an oral agreement that she would inherit a quarter of his estate.

The court found Lori's claims of work exaggerated and untruthful, and that she had been adequately compensated by 22 years of rent-free housing, the gifting of a house, and free accommodation and meals.

The court also concluded that no agreement to make Lori a beneficiary was proven, that the claim was statute-barred, and barred by the doctrine of laches due to significant delay and the loss of crucial witness evidence (Jack's testimony).

The action was dismissed.

The accused, Brian Kelneric, was charged with multiple drug and proceeds of crime offences.

The trial focused on establishing possession of cocaine, oxycodone, and cash found in an apartment and a rental vehicle, based on circumstantial evidence.

The court applied principles from R. v. Villaroman regarding circumstantial evidence and R. v. Morelli regarding constructive possession.

The judge found that the only rational inference from the accused's hiding from police, the proximity of drugs and paraphernalia, and his connection to a vehicle containing drugs and cash, was his knowledge and control of the items.

The accused was found guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, simple possession of oxycodone, and possession of proceeds of crime exceeding $5,000.

Richard Gurhan was charged with multiple criminal offences including careless storage of a firearm, unauthorized possession of a firearm, possession of a restricted weapon with ammunition, possession of proceeds of crime, and possession of oxycodone and cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

The charges stemmed from the execution of search warrants at a residence and a vehicle (Hyundai Kona).

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on surveillance, the discovery of drugs, a firearm, and cash in the vehicle, and the accused's possession of the vehicle keys.

The court found the accused guilty on all counts, concluding that the only rational inference from the circumstantial evidence was that the accused had knowledge and control of the illicit items.

The accused was charged with aggravated assault and two counts of breach of probation after the victim was found with severe head injuries.

The Crown relied on surveillance videos and the accused's statement to police.

The court found the video evidence insufficient to prove the accused caused the severe injuries, as another unidentified individual was seen assaulting the victim.

However, the court found the accused guilty of a separate, lesser included offence of common assault captured on video, and consequently guilty of breaching his probation orders.

The appellant appealed her conviction for assault causing bodily harm and breach of probation, arguing the trial judge erred in permitting the Crown to call reply evidence.

The appellant contended this constituted an improper splitting of the Crown's case, related to a collateral issue, and was used improperly to assess credibility.

The reply evidence concerned an officer's attempt to contact the appellant at her apartment, which countered the appellant's alibi defence.

The court dismissed the appeal, finding the reply evidence was properly admitted as it directly responded to the alibi defence and was not an improper splitting of the Crown's case or related to a collateral issue.

The accused, Brian Kelneric, brought an application seeking permission to attend his trial remotely due to asserted financial hardship.

The Crown opposed the application.

The court dismissed the application, primarily on the basis that section 715.233 of the Criminal Code requires the consent of both the prosecutor and the accused for an accused to appear by videoconference at a trial for an indictable offence, and the Crown had withheld consent.

Alternatively, the court found that even if it had discretion, the evidence provided regarding the accused's financial hardship was insufficient, lacking specific details and corroboration beyond a lawyer's general assertion.

The court emphasized the seriousness of the charges and the accused's long-standing knowledge of the trial date.

The Estate of Hermina Fletcher sought punitive damages against Lindsey Coyle, who had previously been found liable for $130,000 in compensatory damages and sentenced to two years imprisonment for criminal negligence causing death.

The court considered the objectives of retribution, deterrence, and denunciation, and the fact that Coyle had already received a significant criminal sentence and lost her profession.

The motion for punitive damages was dismissed, with no order as to costs, as the combination of compensatory damages and the prison sentence was deemed sufficient to achieve the objectives.

Fatah Kulmiye, jointly charged with drug trafficking and firearm offences, brought an application for standing to challenge a CDSA search warrant executed at a third-party residence.

Kulmiye was found in the residence during the search, along with drugs and cash, but was a Toronto resident with no personal belongings at the property and no authority to regulate access.

The court applied the factors for determining a reasonable expectation of privacy under section 8 of the Charter, as outlined in R. v. Edwards and R. v. El-Azrak.

The court found that Kulmiye, as a transient guest, did not establish a subjective or objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the searched premises, distinguishing his situation from cases involving a direct interest in a property used for a joint enterprise.

Consequently, the application for standing was dismissed.

The accused pleaded guilty to second-degree murder for his role in the prolonged assault and torture of a vulnerable victim in the context of the drug trade.

The Crown sought an 18-year period of parole ineligibility, while the accused sought 12 years.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the victim's vulnerability and the brutal nature of the murder.

The accused was sentenced to life imprisonment with no eligibility for parole for 16 years.

The plaintiff sued the defendant estate trustee claiming an interest in the deceased's estate based on compensation for services or a constructive trust.

The defendant moved to dismiss the action for delay and on summary judgment.

The plaintiff failed to advance the litigation for three years, did not respond to the motion, and failed to attend the hearing.

The court found no evidence to support the plaintiff's claims or corroborate any alleged oral agreement with the deceased as required by s. 13 of the Evidence Act.

The action was dismissed.

The estate trustee sought directions regarding the administration of an estate and the sale of a property bequeathed to a common-law spouse.

The central issue was whether a clause in the will, stating "It is my wishes that when KELLY CHRISTIANSEN HASSETT sells/otherwise dispose of the Home, twenty (20%) percent of the proceeds shall form part of the residue of my estate" created a legally binding trust or merely a moral obligation.

The court applied the "armchair rule" for will interpretation and found that the language used was precatory, creating only a moral obligation, not a trust.

Consequently, the estate trustee could not compel the sale of the property based on this clause.

The court ordered costs for both parties to be borne by the estate due to the ambiguity in the will.

This was a pretrial application by the accused, Brian Kelneric, to exclude evidence obtained during his arrest and subsequent searches, alleging violations of his Charter rights under sections 8, 10(a), and 10(b).

Kelneric was charged with five offences, including unlawful dwelling and drug trafficking.

The court found that Kelneric did not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the apartment where he was found hiding, thus the searches of his person and the apartment were lawful, including a plain view search and a search conducted with the tenant's consent.

The court also determined that even if some evidence were excised, sufficient grounds remained for the search warrant of his rental vehicle.

While a technical breach of his section 10(b) right to counsel occurred when an officer questioned him after he requested a lawyer, no information was obtained, and the delay in facilitating counsel was primarily due to Kelneric's request for medical attention.

Applying the Grant factors, the court dismissed the application to exclude the evidence, finding that society's interest in the adjudication on the merits outweighed any negligible impact on the accused's Charter rights.

This decision addresses the applicant's request for costs following a successful application.

The applicant sought substantial or partial indemnity costs, while the respondent failed to submit responding cost submissions.

The court reviewed the bill of costs, noting the litigation's seven-year duration, over 10 court appearances, and the respondent's deliberate delays, disobedience of court orders, and frivolous allegations, which complicated the proceedings and led to duplication of effort by counsel.

Despite the respondent likely being judgment proof, the court fixed the applicant's costs at $50,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST, considering the circumstances and the respondent's conduct.

This decision addresses the remaining issues of spousal support between Warren Muir and Lucille Schaaf, following a prior determination that they were spouses.

The court considered the commencement, duration, and amount of spousal support.

Ms. Schaaf, aged 65 with health issues and limited employability, sought indefinite support of $1,500 monthly from July 2022.

Mr. Muir, a high-income millwright, proposed $800 monthly for three years from August 2023.

The court ordered indefinite spousal support of $1,000 per month, commencing July 1, 2022, granting Mr. Muir credit for payments already made.

No orders were made for medical/dental benefits or life insurance.

The accused, charged with second-degree murder, brought an application to admit three videos and the victim's criminal record to support a self-defence claim.

The defence argued this evidence would demonstrate the victim's violent disposition and the reasonableness of the accused's apprehension of violence.

The Crown conceded the admissibility of two videos but opposed the third and the criminal record.

The court granted the application, finding the evidence highly probative of the victim's propensity for violence and the risk of harm perceived by the accused, concluding that its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

This trial addressed two outstanding issues from a prior settlement: whether the payor spouse's spousal support obligation should bind his estate, and if so, whether it should be secured.

The court found that the recipient spouse was in need and that the payor's death was not unanticipated given his age and declining health.

Applying principles from Katz v. Katz, the court ordered a limited spousal support obligation of $25,000 to bind the payor's estate, but declined to order security for this obligation, citing the payor's uninsurability and potential complications for future asset sales.

The plaintiffs sought a determination of rights under their insurance contract following damage to their property's water supply line and sewer pipe due to corrosion, which was exacerbated by the City of Thunder Bay's water treatment.

The insurer denied coverage, citing exclusions for corrosion and water damage.

The court, applying principles from *MDS Inc. v. Factory Mutual Insurance Company*, found the term "corrosion" in the policy unambiguous, applying regardless of its cause.

It also determined that the water damage did not fall within the policy's exceptions.

Consequently, the application for coverage was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions and sentences for two counts of sexual assault and two counts of assault with a weapon against his former spouse.

He argued the trial judge misapplied the W. (D.) framework, provided inadequate reasons, and erred in sentencing.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal for the assault with a weapon counts and one sexual assault count, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and reasons sufficient.

However, the court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial for the second sexual assault count, finding the trial judge erred by concluding the appellant offered no evidence on consent when he had explicitly denied forcing himself on the complainant.

The sentence for the remaining sexual assault conviction was reduced from 10 months to 8 months.

P.B. appealed convictions for two counts of sexual assault and two counts of assault with a weapon.

The appeal court found the trial judge erred in concluding the accused offered no evidence regarding consent for one sexual assault count (anal sex), leading to that conviction being set aside and a new trial ordered.

The court upheld the convictions for the other sexual assault and the two assault with a weapon charges, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's application of the R. v. W.(D.) framework or assessment of credibility.

The sentence for the remaining sexual assault conviction was reduced from 10 to 8 months due to the removal of an aggravating factor.

Cat Lake First Nation brought an urgent motion for an interim interim stay of the Ministry of Natural Resources and Forestry's authorization allowing First Mining Gold Corporation to construct an 18 km winter road.

The First Nation argued the authorization was granted without adequate consultation and would irreparably harm their Aboriginal rights.

The court found a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm to constitutional rights, and that the balance of convenience favoured the First Nation.

The court granted the interim interim stay pending the full hearing of the motion and waived the requirement for an undertaking as to damages.