Warren S. Rapoport

The respondent employer requested the dismissal of the human rights application under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing that the applicant's prior Ministry of Labour complaint regarding termination pay appropriately dealt with the substance of the application.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding that the Employment Standards Officer only determined the applicant's entitlement to termination pay under the Employment Standards Act, 2000, and did not address the Code-related claims of discrimination based on disability and age.

In an estate dispute, the respondent sought removal of the applicant as estate trustee, while the applicant brought a cross‑motion seeking the respondent’s removal.

The dispute arose from significant conflict between the deceased’s spouse and daughter over the administration of the estate and the disposition of the estate’s principal asset, shares in a nail salon business.

The court reviewed the governing principles for removal of trustees, emphasizing that clear evidence of necessity and risk to the proper administration of the estate is required, and that hostility alone is insufficient.

Given the contradictory affidavit evidence and the absence of clear proof that the estate’s administration was endangered, the court declined to remove either trustee.

Directions were ordered for the sale of the estate’s business interests and for related claims to proceed to trial.

The applicant sought declarations that a life insurance policy issued in 1982 should be enforced according to its original terms, including paid‑up value calculations appearing on the face of the policy.

The respondent insurer alleged that the paid‑up values in the policy were inserted in error and sought rectification to reduce them by a factor of five.

The record contained conflicting affidavit evidence and competing expert opinions regarding the intended structure of the policy and the calculation of paid‑up values.

The court held that the disputes involved material factual conflicts, credibility assessments, and complex issues relating to rectification and limitation periods.

As a result, the matter could not properly be resolved on an application record and required a trial.

The appellant sought a declaration of a prescriptive easement over a laneway on the respondent's neighbouring property.

The appellant's predecessor in title had used the laneway openly for several years.

In 1987, the predecessor asked the respondent's predecessor to sign a right-of-way agreement, which was refused.

Later, the respondent's predecessor posted 'private driveway' signs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the 1987 request for permission amounted to an acknowledgment that the use was not 'as of right', and the subsequent posting of signs constituted an overt act of protest that interrupted the 20-year prescriptive period.

The self-represented appellant failed to appear for the hearing of his appeal despite receiving notification from the court and materials from the respondents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned and awarded costs to the respondents.

Following a consent order restoring a commercial tenant to leased premises after a landlord lockout, the court determined the appropriate costs of the application.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the respondents engaged in aggressive and intimidating conduct, including unsupported allegations about the tenant’s business and delaying litigation steps.

The court held that the respondents’ conduct unnecessarily prolonged the proceeding and warranted sanction.

Applying the principles of reasonableness and proportionality under Rule 57.01 and the guidance in Boucher, the court fixed costs on a substantial indemnity basis but reduced the requested amount.

Costs of $50,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and taxes were awarded to the applicant.

The employer, Hudson's Bay Company, cross-appealed a trial judgment declaring that it was not a beneficiary of a pension plan trust fund and not entitled to surplus assets on plan termination.

The Court of Appeal applied the framework from Schmidt v. Air Products of Canada Ltd. and found that the original trust agreement created an irrevocable trust for the exclusive benefit of the plan members.

The Court distinguished the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Burke v. Hudson's Bay Co., noting that the originating documents in this case contained exclusive benefit language that precluded the employer from claiming the surplus.

The cross-appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board that struck out affidavit evidence filed in support of a motion for full indemnity costs.

The excluded evidence detailed prior business dealings between the parties, which the applicant alleged proved the respondent's appeal was brought in bad faith.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding reason to doubt the Board's conclusion that pre-proceeding conduct was irrelevant to costs.

The Court held that denying the opportunity to review conduct that occurred prior to launching the appeal could amount to a denial of natural justice.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim for common law severance damages for wrongful dismissal.

The central issue was whether the trial judge erred in limiting the appellant's entitlement to the minimum required by the Employment Standards Act based on a termination clause in his employment contract.

The Court of Appeal held that the clause was unambiguous, not void at law, and supported by consideration given the appellant's promotion and enhanced remuneration.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Racing Commission decision that upheld Woodbine Entertainment Group's (WEG) indefinite suspension of his racing privileges.

The suspension followed the discovery of Erythropoetin (EPO) in three of the applicant's horses.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission reasonably balanced WEG's private property and contractual rights with the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the horse racing industry.

Aubrey Friedman brought a motion for interim relief to require Woodbine Entertainment Group (WEG) to accept entries and nominations for his horses, after an expedited hearing could not be arranged as originally contemplated.

The Ontario Racing Commission panel found that the delay in arranging the expedited hearing constituted a significant change in circumstances that should not prejudice Friedman.

The panel ordered that Friedman's entries must be accepted by all Ontario racetracks for Ontario sired events, provided they meet qualifying standards, pending the hearing on the merits.

The applicant, a standardbred owner, sought an interim stay of a suspension imposed by Woodbine Entertainment Group (WEG) after his horses tested positive for EPO, a performance-enhancing drug.

The suspension prevented him from nominating horses for WEG stakes races.

The Ontario Racing Commission denied the interim relief, finding that while there was a serious issue to be tried, the applicant failed to establish irreparable harm, as the harm was a result of his own business decision to retain the horses despite the suspension.

The balance of convenience heavily favoured WEG's right to protect the integrity of its racing product.

In a separate matter, the Commission upheld a $1,500 fine against a standardbred licensee but reduced his suspension to 13 days.

The appellants, representing members of a salaried pension plan, appealed a decision of the Financial Services Tribunal that upheld the Superintendent's consent to merge their plan with an hourly-paid plan.

The appellants argued the merger would dilute their plan's surplus and that the surplus constituted 'other benefits' protected under s. 81(5) of the Pension Benefits Act.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the matter and that the appropriate standard of review was reasonableness simpliciter.

On the merits, the Court found that an actuarial surplus in an ongoing defined benefit plan is not an 'other benefit' under s. 81(5), and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant commercial landlord appealed a decision allowing the respondent tenant to deduct hydro payments from its gross rent.

The lease contained a general clause stating gross rent included utilities, but a specific clause required the tenant to pay hydro directly to the utility company.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, applying the principle that specific provisions qualify general ones.

The court found the specific requirement to pay hydro directly meant it was not an expense to be paid by the landlord and passed on as part of gross rent, and the tenant was not entitled to deduct these payments.