Warren S. Rapoport

The appellant sought a declaration of a prescriptive easement over a laneway on the respondent's neighbouring property.

The appellant's predecessor in title had used the laneway openly for several years.

In 1987, the predecessor asked the respondent's predecessor to sign a right-of-way agreement, which was refused.

Later, the respondent's predecessor posted 'private driveway' signs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the 1987 request for permission amounted to an acknowledgment that the use was not 'as of right', and the subsequent posting of signs constituted an overt act of protest that interrupted the 20-year prescriptive period.

The self-represented appellant failed to appear for the hearing of his appeal despite receiving notification from the court and materials from the respondents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned and awarded costs to the respondents.

Following a consent order restoring a commercial tenant to leased premises after a landlord lockout, the court determined the appropriate costs of the application.

The applicant sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing the respondents engaged in aggressive and intimidating conduct, including unsupported allegations about the tenant’s business and delaying litigation steps.

The court held that the respondents’ conduct unnecessarily prolonged the proceeding and warranted sanction.

Applying the principles of reasonableness and proportionality under Rule 57.01 and the guidance in Boucher, the court fixed costs on a substantial indemnity basis but reduced the requested amount.

Costs of $50,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and taxes were awarded to the applicant.

The employer, Hudson's Bay Company, cross-appealed a trial judgment declaring that it was not a beneficiary of a pension plan trust fund and not entitled to surplus assets on plan termination.

The Court of Appeal applied the framework from Schmidt v. Air Products of Canada Ltd. and found that the original trust agreement created an irrevocable trust for the exclusive benefit of the plan members.

The Court distinguished the recent Supreme Court of Canada decision in Burke v. Hudson's Bay Co., noting that the originating documents in this case contained exclusive benefit language that precluded the employer from claiming the surplus.

The cross-appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Ontario Municipal Board that struck out affidavit evidence filed in support of a motion for full indemnity costs.

The excluded evidence detailed prior business dealings between the parties, which the applicant alleged proved the respondent's appeal was brought in bad faith.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding reason to doubt the Board's conclusion that pre-proceeding conduct was irrelevant to costs.

The Court held that denying the opportunity to review conduct that occurred prior to launching the appeal could amount to a denial of natural justice.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his claim for common law severance damages for wrongful dismissal.

The central issue was whether the trial judge erred in limiting the appellant's entitlement to the minimum required by the Employment Standards Act based on a termination clause in his employment contract.

The Court of Appeal held that the clause was unambiguous, not void at law, and supported by consideration given the appellant's promotion and enhanced remuneration.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought judicial review of an Ontario Racing Commission decision that upheld Woodbine Entertainment Group's (WEG) indefinite suspension of his racing privileges.

The suspension followed the discovery of Erythropoetin (EPO) in three of the applicant's horses.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Commission reasonably balanced WEG's private property and contractual rights with the public interest in maintaining the integrity of the horse racing industry.

The appellants, representing members of a salaried pension plan, appealed a decision of the Financial Services Tribunal that upheld the Superintendent's consent to merge their plan with an hourly-paid plan.

The appellants argued the merger would dilute their plan's surplus and that the surplus constituted 'other benefits' protected under s. 81(5) of the Pension Benefits Act.

The Divisional Court held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to hear the matter and that the appropriate standard of review was reasonableness simpliciter.

On the merits, the Court found that an actuarial surplus in an ongoing defined benefit plan is not an 'other benefit' under s. 81(5), and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant commercial landlord appealed a decision allowing the respondent tenant to deduct hydro payments from its gross rent.

The lease contained a general clause stating gross rent included utilities, but a specific clause required the tenant to pay hydro directly to the utility company.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, applying the principle that specific provisions qualify general ones.

The court found the specific requirement to pay hydro directly meant it was not an expense to be paid by the landlord and passed on as part of gross rent, and the tenant was not entitled to deduct these payments.