Trevor Richard Guy

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision regarding his entitlement to an Income Replacement Benefit (IRB) and a special award following a motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued the LAT erred in calculating his IRB by deducting post-accident income, failing to quantify ongoing benefits, and denying a special award for unreasonable delay.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the LAT correctly applied the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule to calculate the IRB, reasonably exercised its discretion in finding the ongoing quantum issue moot, and applied the correct legal test in denying the special award.

The appellant appealed two decisions of the Licence Appeal Tribunal regarding statutory accident benefits.

In the first appeal, the appellant argued that an adjudicator reconsidering their own decision violated procedural fairness.

In the second appeal, the appellant argued that the Tribunal's withdrawal of a decision mistakenly rendered by an adjudicator who did not hear the oral evidence created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed both appeals, finding that the Tribunal's reconsideration process is procedurally fair and that correcting an administrative error by withdrawing the mistaken decision and having the correct adjudicator issue a new one cured any procedural defect without raising a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The appellant sought judicial review and appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) which found her accident benefits claim statute-barred.

The Divisional Court dismissed both, stating judicial review was only available in "exceptional circumstances" given the statutory appeal right.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the further appeal, clarifying that while judicial review is always available, it is a discretionary remedy and will only be exercised in rare cases where alternative remedies (like reconsideration and statutory appeal) are inadequate.

The Court affirmed the LAT's finding on the limitation period as reasonable and provided guidance on handling concurrent appeal and judicial review proceedings.

The plaintiff sued the Landlord Tenant Board (LTB) and the Crown for alleged breaches of her Charter rights and various torts, seeking damages.

The defendants brought motions under Rule 21 to dismiss or strike the claim.

The court granted the motions, finding that the LTB is not a suable entity and that the Crown is not vicariously liable for the actions of independent LTB tribunal members.

The statement of claim was struck in its entirety without leave to amend.

This endorsement addresses motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning the scope of judicial review when a limited statutory right of appeal exists.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave to intervene to the Advocacy Centre for Tenants Ontario (ACTO) and the Income Security Advocacy Centre (ISAC), finding they offered unique perspectives on the implications of the Divisional Court's decision for other statutory schemes.

The motion for leave to intervene by the Ontario Trial Lawyers Association (OTLA) was dismissed as its submissions were largely duplicative of the appellant's and granting a third intervener would be unfair to the respondent.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his action against a Human Rights Tribunal Vice-Chair under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action sought damages for alleged misconduct during a human rights hearing.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the respondent was immune from suit as the claim disclosed no cause of action.

The court also found no breach of fairness in dismissing the claim without submissions, given the action's inability to succeed.

The appellant filed a human rights complaint against the respondents, which was deferred pending a civil action.

The civil action was settled, with the appellant agreeing not to pursue further claims.

The appellant subsequently filed a Superior Court application against the respondents and the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario, claiming damages for the respondents' failure to respond to the complaint.

The motion judge dismissed the application as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure without requesting submissions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion to dismiss the claim without submissions.

The defendant Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario requested the dismissal of the plaintiff's application under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff sought $500,000 from the co-defendants for their alleged failure to respond to an application before the HRTO.

The court found that the notice of application lacked clarity, particularity, and a legal basis, failing to plead a cause of action against any of the defendants.

The court concluded the application was frivolous and vexatious and dismissed it.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her claim for statutory accident benefits by the Licence Appeal Tribunal.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the adjudicator erred by excluding opinion evidence from the appellant's treating family physician and by failing to properly assess the issue of causation.

The court held that the adjudicator's erroneous evidentiary ruling infected the fact-finding process and that the failure to state the proper test for causation rendered the reasons insufficient.

The decisions below were set aside and the matter was remitted to the LAT for a new hearing before a different adjudicator.

The applicant, a police officer, was found guilty of misconduct under the Police Services Act for unlawful arrest and excessive force during the G20 summit.

The Ontario Civilian Police Commission upheld the misconduct findings but reduced the penalty to a one-month demotion.

The applicant sought judicial review, arguing the Commission erred in its standard of review and treatment of the Hearing Officer's credibility findings.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the Commission's decision was reasonable and properly deferred to the Hearing Officer's factual and credibility determinations.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision denying her catastrophic impairment benefits.

After the decision, the applicant received an anonymous letter alleging the LAT's executive chair had changed the adjudicator's decision.

Evidence revealed the LAT had an unwritten peer review process where the executive chair reviewed draft decisions.

The Divisional Court held that this process breached the rules of adjudicative independence because consultation was imposed by a superior level of authority rather than requested by the adjudicator.

The decision was set aside and remitted for a new hearing.

The plaintiffs, representing a class of Barbados participating policyholders, brought an action against Manulife following the transfer of their policies to Life of Barbados (LOB) in 1996 and Manulife's subsequent demutualization in 1999.

The plaintiffs claimed that Manulife owed them a duty of care and a fiduciary duty to protect their rights to participate in the demutualization.

The court found that while it was reasonably foreseeable that Manulife would demutualize, no duty of care or fiduciary duty was owed to the plaintiffs because their rights as policyholders were lawfully extinguished by the transfer agreement, which was approved by regulators in Barbados and Canada.

The action was dismissed.

The appellant union appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an arbitrator's dismissal of a grievance regarding an employee's termination.

The employee, who had a 20-year unblemished record, was terminated for failing to provide requested medical information by a specific deadline while on short-term disability leave.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the arbitrator failed to properly apply the principle of proportionality from McKinley v. BC Tel and improperly relied on the employee's lack of candour during the arbitration process to justify the employer's prior termination decision.

The matter was remitted to a different arbitrator for reconsideration of the appropriate sanction.

The appellants appealed two decisions of the Ontario Securities Commission regarding their involvement in a collapsed investment structure.

The first appeal argued that televised comments by the Commission's Chair created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Divisional Court dismissed this appeal, finding that the Chair was acting within his statutory authority and that the Commission's structure adequately separated investigative and adjudicative functions.

The second appeal challenged the Commission's findings on the merits, alleging breaches of procedural fairness, misapplication of rules, and errors in finding the appellants were the directing minds who misled staff.

The court dismissed the second appeal, finding the procedures fair and the factual conclusions reasonable.

The applicant, a former Justice of the Peace, applied for judicial review of a Commissioner's report and an Order in Council removing him from office for judicial misconduct.

The misconduct involved inappropriate in-court treatment of an unrepresented litigant and out-of-court attempts to improperly influence an investigation into his conduct.

The Divisional Court found the Commissioner's recommendation for removal was reasonable given the severity of the misconduct and the need to restore public confidence in the administration of justice.

The application was dismissed, and fresh evidence of the applicant's improved health and character did not alter the outcome.

The Criminal Lawyers' Association sought access to a police report and legal advice regarding an investigation into alleged police misconduct in a murder case.

The Minister refused disclosure under the law enforcement and solicitor-client privilege exemptions of the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The CLA argued that the Act's failure to apply a public interest override to these exemptions violated freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 2(b) does not guarantee access to all government documents, but only where access is necessary for meaningful public discussion and does not encroach on protected privileges.

The Court found no Charter violation, as the exemptions themselves already incorporate public interest considerations.

The matter regarding the law enforcement exemption was remitted to the Commissioner for reconsideration of the Minister's exercise of discretion.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant's costs fixed at $5,000, inclusive of GST and disbursements.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent damages for breach of a contract to operate an off-track betting facility.

The trial judge had found the agreement was perpetual and awarded damages for an 11-year period without deducting the cost of sales from the loss of profits calculation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in her analysis of whether the contract was perpetual and in her calculation of damages.

A new trial was ordered to determine the appropriate notice period and recalculate damages.

The appellants sought costs for their unsuccessful appeal against the dismissal of a summary judgment motion, arguing the appeal was necessary to establish that the motion judge's observations were obiter.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, noting the law was already well-established, and awarded costs to the respondents.

The respondents claimed $120,000, but the court fixed costs at $75,000 inclusive of disbursements and GST, finding the claimed amount excessive for a one-day appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his defamation claim against his former employer.

The claim was based on the employer submitting a statutory form to employment insurance authorities stating the appellant had been 'dismissed' and a follow-up statement that the dismissal was for breach of policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error by the motion judge.

The court held that the statements were protected by qualified privilege and there was no evidence of malice to overcome that privilege.