T. Ducharme

The offender was convicted of possessing a loaded prohibited firearm, overcapacity magazines, and crack cocaine.

At sentencing, the defence introduced a social history report detailing the offender's experiences with systemic anti-Black racism, poverty, and trauma, including the murder of his brother.

The court accepted that these systemic factors and the offender's likely PTSD reduced his moral culpability.

However, emphasizing the paramount principles of denunciation and deterrence for firearms offences, the court declined to impose a conditional sentence.

The offender was sentenced to 24 months' incarceration, reduced by credit for pre-trial custody and strict house arrest bail, resulting in a net sentence of 10 months and 18 days.

The applicant laid a private information against a transit driver for assault.

The Crown intervened, assumed carriage of the prosecution, and resolved the matter with a guilty plea and absolute discharge.

The applicant sought judicial review to quash the conviction and sentence.

The court dismissed the application, holding that once the Crown assumes carriage of a private prosecution, the private informant becomes merely a witness and lacks standing to challenge the Crown's conduct of the case.

The Crown appealed the imposition of a curative discharge for impaired driving offences, arguing the sentencing judge erred in finding a breach of s. 15 of the Charter because the respondent failed to file a proper Notice of Constitutional Question challenging the Criminal Law Amendment Act.

The Superior Court of Justice agreed that the failure to file an appropriate Notice rendered the constitutional finding a nullity.

The appeal was allowed, and a new sentencing hearing was ordered with directions for the respondent to file a proper Notice of Constitutional Question.

The accused pleaded guilty to three counts of trafficking heroin in a commercial dial-a-dope operation.

The court weighed aggravating factors, including the nature of the drug and the commercial enterprise, against mitigating factors such as the accused's lack of a relevant criminal record, remorse, and community support.

The court imposed a sentence of 3.5 years, reduced to 2.5 years after granting 1 year of credit for time spent on strict house arrest bail.

The appellant was convicted of careless storage and transportation of a firearm after the trial judge permitted the Crown to amend the Information.

The appellant appealed, arguing the amendments created new offences outside the six-month limitation period for summary conviction offences under s. 786(2) of the Criminal Code.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that while the amendments did not prejudice the appellant, they did create new charges that were statute-barred.

The convictions were quashed and acquittals entered.

The applicant brought a motion under s. 11(b) of the Charter alleging a violation of his right to be tried within a reasonable time.

The total delay from charge to the anticipated end of trial was 34 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

After deducting 56 days of defence delay, the net delay remained above the ceiling.

The Crown argued that the adjournment of the preliminary inquiry due to a co-accused's retainer issues constituted an exceptional circumstance.

The court rejected this argument, finding the Crown could have remedied the delay by severing the accused.

The court found a violation of s. 11(b) and stayed the charges.

The applicants, charged with drug trafficking and importation offences along with seven co-accused, brought an application for a stay of proceedings alleging a violation of their right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was approximately 32.5 months.

The court calculated the actionable delay to be 8 months and 11 days, well within the Morin guidelines, particularly given the complexity of the case and the need to accommodate counsel for multiple co-accused.

The court also found that the applicants failed to establish any specific prejudice resulting from the delay.

The application was dismissed.

The accused was sentenced following convictions after a judge-alone trial for multiple violent offences arising from a home invasion, including sexual assault with a weapon, robbery with a weapon, unlawful confinement, break and enter, and possession of property obtained by crime.

The offences involved a home invasion targeting two occupants, during which the accused used a knife, sexually assaulted both victims, and robbed them.

The court considered extensive aggravating factors including the home invasion context, use of a weapon, severe sexual violence, and significant psychological harm to the victims.

Mitigating factors included the accused’s youth, lack of criminal record, supportive family background, and limited expressions of remorse.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence while recognizing the offender’s status as a youthful first offender, the court imposed a global sentence of nine years’ imprisonment with credit for pre‑sentence custody and strict bail conditions.

Three Mexican seasonal agricultural workers were terminated by their employer and repatriated to Mexico.

They sued for wrongful dismissal and alleged violations of their rights under ss. 7 and 15 of the Charter and the Canadian Bill of Rights, claiming they were 'privately deported' without procedural fairness.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the constitutional and Bill of Rights claims.

The court struck the Charter and Bill of Rights claims, finding that the pleadings did not contain sufficient material facts to support a deprivation of liberty or security of the person under s. 7, nor discrimination under s. 15.

The court also struck the contractual claims against Canada and F.A.R.M.S. as they were not parties to the employment contract.

The plaintiffs were granted leave to amend their Charter claims.

The applicants, who had been found unfit to stand trial, sought habeas corpus with mandamus compelling their transfer from jail to a psychiatric hospital pursuant to orders made under s. 672.46(2) of the Criminal Code.

They argued that continued detention in jail while awaiting a hospital bed violated ss. 7 and 9 of the Charter and that the responsible authorities had failed to comply with the underlying court orders.

The court held that the detention was lawful because the original orders expressly authorized custody in jail until a hospital bed became reasonably available.

The applicants had also been returned to court as required when no bed was available, meaning the orders had largely been complied with.

As a result, neither habeas corpus nor mandamus was available, and the Charter claims were rejected.

The accused, charged with second degree murder, conspiracy to commit arson, arson causing bodily harm, and arson with intent to defraud in relation to a fatal business fire, challenged the Crown’s attempt to introduce numerous out‑of‑court statements under the co‑conspirators’ exception to the hearsay rule.

The court reviewed the Carter three‑stage test governing admissibility and considered whether a pre‑trial voir dire was required to assess whether the statements were capable of falling within the exception and whether they satisfied the principled approach to hearsay, including necessity and reliability.

The judge held that a voir dire was appropriate where the defence raised credible concerns about whether statements were made in furtherance of a conspiracy or where the availability of declarants raised necessity issues.

Several statements were admitted as capable of meeting the Carter requirements, particularly where declarants were deceased or unavailable and the statements furthered either the alleged arson conspiracy or a post‑offence cover‑up.

Statements attributed to an available witness with significant credibility concerns were excluded because the necessity and reliability requirements of the principled approach were not met.

The Crown brought an application to admit evidence of three prior incidents of discreditable conduct by the accused at his trial for arson.

The Crown argued the evidence was admissible to rebut innocent association, counter third-party propensity, corroborate an unsavoury witness, show a pattern of behaviour, and complete the narrative.

The court applied the principled approach from Handy and found that the probative value of the evidence was limited, partly due to collusion between witnesses, and was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The application was dismissed.

The Crown brought a K.G.B. application seeking to admit two prior out‑of‑court statements made by an alleged accomplice who recanted at trial.

The statements included an audio‑recorded confession describing multiple robberies and a subsequent identification of the accused as a participant.

The court applied the principled approach to hearsay, considering necessity and threshold reliability under the framework articulated in Khelawon and related authorities.

Although the statements were unsworn and not fully video‑recorded, the declarant testified and was available for cross‑examination, and comparator evidence allowed the trier of fact to assess accuracy.

The court held that these factors sufficiently addressed the hearsay dangers and granted the Crown’s application to admit both statements for the truth of their contents.