Susan G. Himel

The tenants appealed an order of the Landlord and Tenant Board to the Divisional Court.

The court found that the appeal raised no question of law, as required by section 210 of the Residential Tenancies Act, 2006, and that the tenants were merely seeking to re-try the case.

The court also dismissed the tenants' allegation of bias, noting that disagreement with the Tribunal's factual findings does not constitute bias.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $4,000.

The Registrar, Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002, moved for leave to adduce fresh evidence on an appeal from a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision.

The Tribunal had ordered the Registrar to register the respondent as a salesperson.

The fresh evidence consisted of court records and Canada Revenue Agency documents concerning tax proceedings and charges against the respondent for failing to file corporate returns.

The Divisional Court applied the Palmer test and admitted the fresh evidence, finding it was credible, relevant to a potentially decisive issue, and could reasonably have affected the result.

The moving party husband sought leave to appeal an interlocutory order that dismissed his jurisdictional challenge, struck his materials, and ordered him to pay temporary lump sum spousal support and costs.

He also sought a stay pending appeal.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no conflicting decisions and no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision, which properly found jurisdiction to order support under the Family Law Act despite a contested foreign annulment.

The motion for a stay was also dismissed as the RJR-MacDonald criteria were not met.

The tenant appealed an eviction order from the Landlord and Tenant Board, arguing he was denied procedural fairness because he was given only thirteen days over the Christmas holidays to pay rent arrears.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, noting the tenant failed to attend the original hearing, took no steps to pay the arrears after receiving notice, and continued to reside in the property rent-free for ten months.

The appellant appealed a Superior Court decision dismissing his application for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding property tax arrears.

The respondent City of Toronto brought a cross-motion to quash the appeal, arguing it was brought in the wrong court.

The Divisional Court agreed, finding that under the Courts of Justice Act, an appeal from a final order of a Superior Court judge seeking such relief lies to the Court of Appeal.

The appeal was quashed and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The appellant real estate brokerage appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing its claim for $17,850 in unpaid commission.

The trial judge had found the evidence of both parties lacked credibility and concluded that a side deal existed between the appellant's agent and the respondent, leading to the dismissal of the claim.

The Divisional Court applied the standard of review for findings of fact and credibility, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's decision.

The appeal was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The defendants moved for leave to appeal an interlocutory order that fixed costs at $5,000 and set aside stays of the action.

The defendants argued the motion was never argued and costs should not have been awarded.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the award of costs is discretionary and there was no good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision.

Furthermore, the court held that the matter was not of sufficient importance to warrant an appeal to the Divisional Court.

The moving party municipality sought leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) decision that ordered the return of $397,941 in disputed development charges to the respondent developer.

The developer had paid the development charges for two condominium towers based on the municipality's calculations before the building permits were issued, but the municipality later demanded additional charges for the second tower due to a phased rate increase.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that the OMB's interpretation of the Development Charges Bylaw was reasonable and not open to substantial doubt, and that the case did not raise a point of law of sufficient general importance to warrant the court's attention.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision dismissing his action for a share of corporate cash receipts following a successful motion for non-suit by the respondent.

The trial judge found that the appellant had not pleaded the agreement, had released the respondent in a prior Superior Court action, and that any claim belonged to the corporation.

The Divisional Court found no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's decision and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant commercial tenant appealed a Small Claims Court judgment awarding the respondent landlord damages for breach of a lease.

The trial judge found the tenant failed to leave the premises in a good state of repair, including failing to replace a broken HVAC unit and remove a mirror.

The Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's factual findings, finding no palpable and overriding error.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, deducting a 15% administrative fee that was not authorized by the lease for non-structural repairs.

The applicant union sought judicial review of an arbitrator's award upholding the respondent hospital's method for calculating Early Retirement Allowances and Voluntary Exit options for part-time employees.

The union argued the hospital's approach, which prorated both years of service and salary, produced absurd results and penalized part-time employees compared to full-time employees.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement was reasonable and within the range of acceptable outcomes, as the arbitrator was not required to assume part-time employees must be treated identically to full-time employees under a different agreement.

The appellant brought a motion under s. 21(5) of the Courts of Justice Act to set aside an order dismissing its appeal for delay.

The underlying case involved a Small Claims Court award for wrongful dismissal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding it was brought out of time without a motion to extend, lacked evidentiary support explaining the delay, and showed no apparent merit to the appeal.

The applicant hospital sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision regarding the calculation of an employee's long-term disability benefits under a collective agreement.

The hospital argued that the employee's benefits should be reduced by the amount of a disability pension she could have received had she terminated her employment.

The arbitrator found that the pension was not 'available' because electing it would require the employee to terminate her employment and forfeit significant health care benefits.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement was reasonable and entitled to deference.

The Municipality of North Middlesex appealed two decisions of the Environmental Review Tribunal regarding a Renewable Energy Approval under the Environmental Protection Act.

The Tribunal had struck the Municipality's Notice of Constitutional Question and refused to grant it public interest standing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Tribunal correctly applied the law, did not err in principle, and provided compelling reasons.

The applicants sought judicial review of an interlocutory decision by the Licence Appeal Tribunal, which refused to allow them to carry on their motor vehicle sales business pending a fresh licence application.

The applicants had negligently failed to renew their licences before expiry.

The Divisional Court held that the Vice Chair's decision was reasonable and that the Registrar had no obligation to permit them to operate while unlicensed.

Furthermore, the court found the judicial review application to be premature as it did not meet the test for reviewing interlocutory tribunal decisions.

The application was dismissed with costs.

The accused was convicted following trial of sexual assault against a complainant under the age of 18 and sexual interference, with the latter conviction stayed pursuant to the Kienapple principle.

The sentencing court considered the principles of sentencing under ss. 718 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences involving vulnerable youth.

Aggravating factors included the complainant’s age and vulnerability, while mitigating factors included the offender’s lack of prior criminal record and relative youth.

After reviewing comparable jurisprudence and legislative amendments affecting sexual offences, the court imposed a custodial sentence within the lower range for such offences.

Ancillary orders including DNA, a lifetime weapons prohibition, a sex offender registry order, and a s. 161 prohibition were also imposed.

Following convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference, the accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings prior to sentencing, alleging breaches of his rights under s. 14 and s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The accused claimed he required an interpreter in a specific dialect and that the failure to provide one caused unreasonable delay.

The court dismissed the application, finding the accused had sufficient proficiency in English and general Yoruba to understand the proceedings, and that the request for a specific dialect interpreter was a delay tactic.

The court concluded the delay was not unreasonable and was largely attributable to the accused's own actions.

The accused was sentenced following convictions for refusing to provide a breath sample causing death and bodily harm, two counts of failing to remain at the scene of an accident causing bodily harm, and driving while disqualified after a fatal collision.

The incident resulted in the death of a passenger and serious injuries to a child.

The court reviewed sentencing principles for alcohol‑related driving offences and emphasized denunciation and general deterrence, while also considering the offender’s driving history, criminal record, and conduct in attempting to leave the scene.

A global sentence of six years’ imprisonment was imposed.

The court granted enhanced credit of 1.5:1 for pre‑sentence custody based on the conditions of remand and loss of remission eligibility.

The insurer defendant brought a motion seeking relief from the implied undertaking rule to compel production of a transcript from a witness’s examination for discovery taken in a separate but related action arising from the same motor vehicle accident.

The responding party argued that the transcript was protected by the deemed undertaking under rule 30.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and that privacy interests should prevail.

The court held that where the actions arise from the same incident and involve similar parties and issues, the prejudice associated with disclosure is minimal.

The evidence of the witness was central to the liability issue and access to prior sworn testimony was necessary for effective cross-examination.

The court concluded that the public interest and interests of justice outweighed privacy concerns and ordered disclosure, limiting the transcript’s use to impeachment purposes.

The applicants sought a declaration that provisions of a site‑specific zoning by‑law prohibiting “adult entertainment establishments as defined by the Municipal Act, 2001” were vague, void for uncertainty, and discriminatory.

The court considered whether the by‑law provided a sufficiently clear delineation of prohibited conduct and whether citizens could reasonably determine when they were in breach.

The court held that the by‑law failed to define key terms such as “goods” and “designed to appeal to erotic or sexual appetites or inclinations,” leaving merchants unable to determine compliance and granting excessive enforcement discretion.

The court further found that the by‑law could produce discriminatory outcomes by permitting identical goods in some retail settings but prohibiting them in others.

The impugned provisions were therefore declared void for uncertainty and the application for declaratory relief was granted.