Simon Fisch

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought an application regarding the child F.R.D. The respondent father, J.C., brought a motion for access to the child, which was opposed by the Society, the mother (C.D.), and Michipicoten First Nation.

The court dismissed the father's motion for access, finding that his extensive criminal history, including sexual offenses against his own children and the mother, and his lack of insight, meant that granting access was not in the child's best interests, despite the principle of maximum contact.

The appellant father appealed a child protection order that placed his child in the extended care of the Children's Aid Society of Toronto.

He alleged that the trial judge made factual errors regarding his insight into the mother's drug abuse, his focus on the mother, the safety of his care plan, and his credibility.

The Superior Court of Justice, applying the standard of palpable and overriding error for factual findings, dismissed the appeal.

The court found no obvious error in the trial judge's assessment of the father's credibility and the viability of his care plan, emphasizing the high degree of deference owed to trial judges in child protection proceedings where the child's best interests are paramount.

The applicant filed a complaint against the children's aid society alleging it failed to hear her concerns regarding domestic abuse by her ex-husband and inappropriately provided a letter affecting her child tax benefits.

The Child and Family Services Review Board determined it lacked jurisdiction under section 120(8) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act because the abuse and custody issues had already been placed before the court in child protection proceedings.

The Board also found the applicant was not in receipt of service regarding the tax benefit letter.

The complaint was dismissed in its entirety.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a temporary care and custody motion concerning two children, H. and Z., who were previously placed with the father, S.M., under a without prejudice order.

The Society and the father sought to make this order with prejudice.

The mother, I.L., sought temporary care and custody of the children or increased access.

The court found that the mother had significant unaddressed mental health issues, was not engaging with recommended treatment, and posed a high risk of harm to the children, making supervision inadequate.

The court determined that the children could be adequately protected in the father's care, who had cooperated with the Society and provided a stable environment.

The court dismissed the mother's request and ordered that the previous temporary order placing the children with the father, subject to Society supervision, be made with prejudice.

The applicant society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of two children.

The respondent mother, who was self-represented, sought to have the children returned to her care.

The court found that the society met the two-part test for temporary care and custody, as the mother had recently been involuntarily hospitalized with psychosis and had breached a safety plan by refusing medication and leaving her mother's home.

The court concluded that the children would be at an unacceptable risk of harm if returned to the mother and that a supervision order would be inadequate.

The children were placed in the temporary care and custody of the society, with supervised access for the mother.

The appellant mother sought continued access to her two-year-old child who was placed in the extended care of the respondent children's aid society.

The trial judge granted access at the society's discretion, applying a broad best interests analysis under the new Child, Youth and Family Services Act (CYFSA).

The appeal judge overturned this decision, applying the restrictive test from the predecessor legislation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the mother's appeal and restored the trial judge's order, holding that the CYFSA fundamentally changed the access test to a holistic best interests analysis, which properly includes consideration of future benefits such as access to medical information.

R.A.R., the father of A.J.H-R., brought a motion in the Superior Court seeking to set aside an adoption order and extend the time to appeal a Crown Wardship order, which was granted without access in 2011.

This action was prompted by the Motherisk Commission's finding that hair follicle tests significantly influenced the original wardship decision.

The current motion was for directions on the proper procedural route, venue, and statutory pathway, with R.A.R. relying on sections 7 and 24 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The court adjourned the procedural motion to allow the newly retained counsel for the adoptive parents to take instructions and to encourage the parties to explore alternative dispute resolution, such as mediation, given the complex issues involved.

In this child protection status review application, the Children's Aid Society sought final orders placing two young children (ages 2 and 4) in the sole care and custody of their mother, with no access or contact for the father, and a restraining order prohibiting the father from contacting either the mother or the children.

The father did not participate in the proceedings and was noted in default.

The mother consented to all relief sought.

The court granted all orders requested, finding that the children's best interests were served by placing them in the mother's care, that the father posed a significant risk due to his history of domestic violence against the mother, and that a restraining order was necessary to protect both the mother and children.

A child protection status review application brought by the Children's Aid Society of Toronto seeking final custody of three children to the mother with restricted access to the father and a restraining order.

The court granted summary judgment on the motion, finding that the father's conduct had not changed since the previous order, that he continued to engage in harassment and threatening behaviour toward the mother and children, and that the children's best interests were served by sole custody to the mother with supervised access to the father.

The court also granted a restraining order against the father prohibiting direct or indirect contact with the mother and children except through a designated supervised access facility.

Two child protection matters raised a jurisdictional issue regarding the five‑day statutory deadline for bringing an apprehended child before the court under s. 46(1) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The respondents argued the applications were late because the societies waited until the sixth calendar day following apprehension.

The court held that the computation provisions in the Legislation Act, 2006 apply unless a contrary legislative intention appears.

Because the fifth day fell on Easter Monday when the court was closed, the statutory deadline was extended to the next business day.

The applications were therefore brought within the legally defined five‑day period and the court retained jurisdiction.

Two consolidated child protection cases raised a jurisdictional issue regarding the interpretation of the five-day time limit in subsection 46(1) of the Child and Family Services Act.

The respondent A.H. argued that the court lacked jurisdiction because the Children's Aid Society failed to bring the matter before the court within five calendar days of the child's apprehension, as the fifth day fell on Easter Monday, a statutory holiday.

The court held that the provisions of the Legislation Act, 2006 apply to the time limit, extending it to the next day that is not a holiday when the deadline falls on a holiday or when the court office is closed.

The court found it had jurisdiction to hear both cases.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought a motion for summary judgment seeking an order that two children be found in need of protection pursuant to clauses 37(2)(b) and (g) of the Child and Family Services Act and be made Crown wards with access to their mother.

The mother opposed the motion and sought the return of the children to her care.

The court found that the children were in need of protection based on uncontested evidence of the mother's inability to provide stable housing, her use of the children to sell chocolates to supplement income, the children's excessive school absences, and the mother's failure to cooperate with the society or maintain consistent contact with the children during their time in care.

The court granted the society's motion and made the children Crown wards, with the issue of access to be determined at a further hearing.

The appellant mother appealed a trial judge's order making her child a Crown Ward with no access for the purpose of adoption.

The mother argued the trial judge erred in assessing her mental health, housing efforts, and the quality of access visits.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that the mother's ongoing mental health challenges, including auditory hallucinations, and instability posed an overwhelming risk.

Fresh evidence regarding the mother's new housing and medication was admitted but found insufficient to alter the trial judge's findings.

The Children's Aid Society of Toronto brought two motions within a child protection application: (1) a motion for summary judgment to find that a 15-year-old child was in need of protection under clause 37(2)(i) of the Child and Family Services Act, and (2) a motion to transfer the case to the Ontario Court of Justice in Brampton.

The child had been apprehended after disclosing physical abuse by the father.

The father was charged with assault and threatening death, with criminal release conditions prohibiting contact with the child.

The father opposed both motions and sought dismissal of the protection application.

The court granted the summary judgment motion, finding the child in need of protection, as the father was unavailable to exercise custodial rights due to criminal conditions and the damaged relationship with the child.

The court dismissed the transfer motion, finding that the preponderance of convenience did not support transferring the case to Brampton at that time, as the Toronto office had established relationships and could manage the case more efficiently.

A child protection appeal concerning whether a trial was required on the issue of parental access after the children were made Crown wards.

The motion judge had granted summary judgment making the children Crown wards but found a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding access.

The appellate court held the motion judge erred in law by importing post-adoption openness considerations into the statutory test under s. 59(2.1) of the Child and Family Services Act and by failing to follow the statutory pathway requiring proof that the relationship was beneficial and meaningful to the children.

The evidence did not establish a genuine issue requiring a trial on that issue.

The court substituted an order providing that there be no access.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion to suspend the mother's access to two children (ages 6 and 4) in a child protection proceeding.

The mother opposed the motion and brought a cross-motion to dismiss the protection application.

The court had previously imposed four conditions on the mother's access following an earlier motion on July 14, 2015.

The court found that the mother had breached these conditions by inappropriately interrogating the children about the foster home, discussing the father, and raising issues central to the court case.

The mother's behaviour caused emotional harm to the children, particularly the older child who exhibited anxiety and distress.

The court suspended the mother's access, finding that the risk of emotional harm outweighed the benefits of continued contact.

The mother's motion to dismiss was dismissed.

A summary judgment motion under the Family Law Rules in a child protection proceeding.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order placing the child in the care of the father subject to Society supervision for six months.

The father and child's counsel supported the order; the mother opposed it, arguing there was a genuine issue requiring trial regarding the credibility of the parties regarding a crack cocaine incident and the issue of access.

The court found no genuine issue requiring trial and granted the summary judgment motion, placing the child in the father's care with access to the mother at the Society's discretion.

A child protection trial concerning a child born in 2011 who was apprehended shortly after birth due to serious concerns about the mother's parenting capacity (ADHD, FASD, prior Crown wardship of first child), the father's significant cognitive disabilities and criminal history (charged with aggravated assault on a baby he was babysitting), and the paternal grandmother's extensive child protection history involving abuse and neglect.

The court found the child to be in need of protection under section 37(2)(b)(i) of the Child and Family Services Act due to risk of physical harm.

The father and paternal grandmother sought placement of the child in their care under Society supervision, but the court rejected both plans as inadequate.

The child was made a Crown ward without access to facilitate adoption, as this was found to be the least intrusive option meeting the child's best interests.

A mother sought to transfer a child protection proceeding from Toronto to St. Lambert, Quebec, and alternatively to Cornwall or Ottawa, Ontario.

She also sought increased access to her child who was in the care of the Children's Aid Society.

The court found that it lacked jurisdiction to transfer the proceeding outside Ontario and that the mother failed to establish a preponderance of convenience for transfer within Ontario.

The court granted the mother increased access from two hours to three hours per week, with one hour potentially supervised by an approved third party, conditional on negative drug test results.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that a child was in need of protection under clause 37(2)(b) of the Child and Family Services Act based on the mother's mental health issues, substance abuse, and domestic violence.

The father supported the motion while the mother opposed it.

The court granted the motion and found the child in need of protection, determining that the mother's combination of untreated mental health conditions, ongoing drug use during pregnancy and post-birth, and inability to protect herself from domestic violence created a real and likely risk of physical harm to the child.