Sidney N. Lederman

The moving party sought costs of her successful motion to intervene as a party in an appeal.

The respondent argued that no costs should be awarded or that costs should be determined by the panel hearing the appeal, alleging that the moving party violated the scope of the permitted intervention by filing prohibited evidence.

The court ordered that the costs of the motion to intervene be determined by the panel hearing the appeal, as they were best positioned to assess compliance with the intervention conditions.

Three parties brought motions to intervene in appeals from a judgment declaring two municipal elections invalid.

The successful candidate in one ward sought to be added as a party, a voter whose vote was discounted sought to intervene as a friend of the court, and a neighbouring municipality sought to intervene as a friend of the court.

The court granted all three motions, finding that the successful candidate had a direct interest, the voter offered a unique perspective on the voting process, and the neighbouring municipality could provide useful context on the impact of the lower court's decision on municipal elections generally.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order appointing an investigative receiver over it.

The moving party argued the motion judge erred by not first finding evidence of fraud or dissipation of assets.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the motion judge applied the correct test under s. 101 of the Courts of Justice Act and that the appointment was just and convenient given the interconnectedness of the moving party with bankrupt companies and the flow of funds between them.

The test for leave to appeal was not met.

The defendants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside a default judgment.

The Master had found that the defendants failed to provide a plausible explanation for the default and did not have an arguable defence on the merits.

The defendants argued the Master erred in interpreting an option agreement as not being a demand obligation, which affected when the limitation period commenced.

The Divisional Court upheld the Master's decision, agreeing that the cause of action did not arise until 45 days after the option was exercised, meaning the action was commenced within the limitation period.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal an order denying a temporary stay of their class proceeding and requiring them to deliver a certification record by a specified date or face a permanent stay.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the case management judge's order.

The court noted that commencing class proceedings merely to toll the limitation period without the resources or willingness to proceed in Ontario constitutes an abuse of process.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order continuing a Mareva injunction on the condition that it post $50,000 as security for costs.

The plaintiff argued that the judge erred by using section 101 of the Courts of Justice Act to order security for costs instead of the specific regime under Rule 56.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding the judge had jurisdiction to impose the term under section 101 to do justice between the parties, especially given the plaintiff was an insolvent foreign resident whose undertaking as to damages was worthless.

The plaintiff brought motions for leave to appeal two orders of a motion judge: one adding a competing car dealership as a party defendant, and another dissolving an interim interlocutory injunction that had restrained the defendant manufacturer from appointing an additional dealer in the plaintiff's market area.

The Divisional Court dismissed both motions for leave to appeal, finding no good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decisions and no issues of general importance to the administration of justice.

The applicant employer sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal decision finding it discriminated against a black employee by requiring him to attend anger management counselling after a workplace dispute.

The employer argued the Tribunal breached procedural fairness by relying on a prior decision about anti-black racism without notice, and that the discrimination finding was unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the Tribunal could take notice of accepted social facts about racism without breaching procedural fairness.

The majority further held that the Tribunal's inference of racial stereotyping was rationally supported by the evidence, given the employer's rare and highly discretionary use of anger management referrals.

The appellant, a former employee of a Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) member, appealed a decision of the Ontario Securities Commission (OSC) which upheld a ruling by Market Regulation Services Inc. (RS).

The OSC found that the Universal Market Integrity Rules (UMIR) were enforceable against the appellant for conduct that occurred during his employment, despite his subsequent resignation.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it reasonable for the OSC to conclude that the TSE validly adopted the UMIR and that RS had jurisdiction to discipline former employees for misconduct committed while they were employed by a TSE member.

The appellant was successful on appeal, which resulted in an order for a new trial due to the trial judge's inadequate reasons.

The appellant sought costs for both the appeal and the first trial.

The Divisional Court awarded the appellant $15,000 in costs for the appeal, noting the issues were not complex.

However, because the need for a new trial was not the respondents' fault, the court ordered that the appeal costs not be payable until the completion of the second trial, and that the costs of the first trial be in the cause.

The defendant moved to extend the time to appeal a Small Claims Court judgment after a nine-month delay.

The court granted the extension, finding that the defendant's depression impaired his ability to deal with the appeal, there was no evidence of prejudice to the plaintiff who did not appear, and there was an arguable question of law involving the Fire Protection and Prevention Act.

The respondent appealed a motion judge's ruling that leave was required to appeal a temporary spousal support order made under the Divorce Act.

The respondent argued that the Divorce Act provided an unfettered right of appeal that superseded the leave requirements of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the Divorce Act's appeal provisions must be read in conjunction with provincial procedural rules, meaning leave to appeal an interlocutory order is still required.

The applicant sought costs of $162,537.44 on a partial indemnity basis following a successful application for judicial review of a professional discipline decision.

The respondent argued the quantum should be $40,000.

The court applied the principle of proportionality and the factors in Rule 57.01, noting the applicant's counsel was already familiar with the case from prior proceedings.

Costs were fixed at $75,000 inclusive of GST and disbursements.

The plaintiff appealed a motion judge's decision awarding $20,000 in costs to a self-represented defendant following the discontinuance of an action.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that under the Court of Appeal's decision in Fong v. Chan, a self-represented litigant must demonstrate an opportunity cost by foregoing remunerative activity to receive costs for work ordinarily done by a lawyer.

As there was no evidence that the defendant incurred an opportunity cost, the motion judge erred in principle.

The $20,000 costs award was set aside, and the defendant was limited to recovering his disbursements.

The representative plaintiffs in two certified class proceedings regarding allegedly defective implantable defibrillators appealed orders of the motion judge.

The motion judge had ordered the bifurcation of discovery and trial of common issues relating to the quantification of compensation for waiver of tort from the liability issues.

In one of the actions, the motion judge also refused to certify punitive damages as a common issue.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeals, finding no error in principle in the motion judge's exercise of discretion to bifurcate the proceedings to ensure a fair and expeditious determination.

The Court also upheld the refusal to certify punitive damages as a common issue, agreeing that entitlement to punitive damages could not be rationally determined without first determining individual issues of causation and compensatory damages.

The applicant, a doctoral student, sought judicial review of a university tribunal's decision finding he violated the student code of conduct due to disruptive behaviour towards his supervisor.

The tribunal imposed restrictions on his contact with the supervisor and access to the laboratory.

The applicant also sought an order of mandamus to compel the university to provide him with a new supervisor.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the tribunal accorded the applicant procedural fairness and that the restrictions were within the adjudicator's authority.

The court also declined to issue mandamus, as the applicant had no clear legal right to be provided with a supervisor against a professor's will.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal denying benefits for carpal tunnel syndrome.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review, noting the Tribunal's strong privative clause.

The court found that the Tribunal reasonably relied on the lack of temporal linkage between the applicant's employment and his diagnosis, as well as credibility findings and medical evidence.

The application for judicial review was dismissed with no order as to costs.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Board of the Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario suspending its liquor licence for six days for permitting drunkenness and serving an intoxicated patron.

The appellant argued it was denied procedural fairness when the Board restricted cross-examination regarding an adjacent establishment, that the Board failed to articulate a legal test for intoxication, and that the penalty was excessive.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no denial of procedural fairness, no error of law in applying the plain meaning of intoxication, and that the penalty was reasonable.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her libel action against the respondents regarding an allegedly defamatory article published in a newspaper.

The trial judge had dismissed the action, finding the statements were substantially true and constituted fair comment, largely based on an adverse credibility finding against the appellant.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge failed to provide adequate reasons for his credibility findings and failed to analyze conflicting or corroborating evidence, rendering the reasons insufficient for proper appellate review.

The appellant, an Evangelical Christian organization operating community living residences, appealed a Human Rights Tribunal decision finding it discriminated against a support worker on the basis of sexual orientation.

The Tribunal had held the organization could not rely on the religious exemption in s. 24(1)(a) of the Human Rights Code because it served the broader public rather than primarily serving its own religious group.

The Divisional Court found the Tribunal erred in its interpretation of s. 24(1)(a) by failing to consider the organization's subjective religious purpose in providing charitable services.

However, the Court upheld the Tribunal's conclusion that the prohibition on same-sex relationships was not a bona fide occupational qualification for a support worker, as the role did not involve religious proselytization.

The Court also upheld the finding of a poisoned work environment but narrowed the systemic remedies ordered by the Tribunal.