Scott C. Hutchison

The appellant appealed both conviction and sentence arising from a criminal matter in which he asserted self-defence.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge was entitled to find that the rock throwing was a separate act of punishment rather than an act necessitated by self-defence, and that the law of self-defence under s. 34 was properly applied.

The court rejected the submission that the trial judge failed to consider the subjective elements of self-defence.

The court also upheld sentence, finding this was not a proper case for a conditional sentence.

The police received a disconnected 911 call from the appellant's apartment.

Upon arrival, the appellant answered the door, stated there was no problem, and attempted to close the door.

The police forced entry to investigate the call and found the appellant's wife crying with a swollen eye, stating the appellant had hit her.

The appellant was arrested and charged with assaulting a police officer with intent to resist arrest after a struggle ensued.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the police have a common law duty to protect life and safety, which justifies a forced entry into a dwelling to ascertain the health and safety of a 911 caller when the call is disconnected.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed as of right from a judgment of the Ontario Court of Appeal dismissing his appeal from a conviction for first degree murder.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, finding that the trial judge adequately explained the defence position to the jury.

The appellant, who had suffered years of severe abuse from her common law husband, shot and killed him.

At trial, she relied primarily on self-defence and led expert evidence that she suffered from battered woman syndrome.

She was convicted of second degree murder.

On appeal, she argued that the trial judge failed to adequately instruct the jury on how the expert evidence related to the law of self-defence.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding that while the jury charge was not perfect, it adequately conveyed the principles from R. v. Lavallee and left the jury with a sufficient understanding of how the battered woman syndrome evidence applied to the elements of self-defence.

The appellants appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada as of right after the Court of Appeal set aside a trial judge's order quashing their indictment.

The Supreme Court held that the trial judgment quashing the indictment was not tantamount to an acquittal.

Consequently, the Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal, and the appeal was quashed.

The appellant appealed from a decision of the Court of Appeal setting aside a stay of proceedings.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the Court of Appeal that while there was a breach of the appellant's right to make full answer and defence, an adjournment was the appropriate remedy rather than a stay of proceedings.

The Court also noted that the test for determining the degree of relevance required for Crown production is set out in Stinchcombe and O'Connor, and the phrase 'an air of reality' should be avoided.

The appellants, members of the Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Nations, were convicted of gambling-related offences under the Criminal Code for conducting high stakes bingo and other gambling activities on their reserves.

They appealed, arguing that their activities were protected by an inherent aboriginal right to self-government under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, which included the right to regulate gambling.

The Supreme Court of Canada applied the Van der Peet test and held that the claimed right must be characterized as the right to participate in and regulate gambling activities.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding no evidence that gambling or its regulation was an integral part of the distinctive cultures of the First Nations at the time of contact.

The appellant appealed against conviction and sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge erred in sentencing on the most aggravating factual basis when the jury's verdict was supportable on any one of three factual bases and was not particularized.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, finding no reason to depart from the established law regarding sentencing.

The appeal concerned whether a separately charged co-accused could be compelled to testify at the criminal trial of another accused arising from the same incident, and whether s. 5 of the Canada Evidence Act violated s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court held that the principle against self-incrimination is a principle of fundamental justice, but that the constitutional structure contemplates a general rule of witness compellability coupled with use immunity, rather than an absolute right to silence for such witnesses.

The Court further held that s. 5 of the Canada Evidence Act is constitutional, while recognizing varying approaches among the judges to residual protection under s. 7, including limited derivative-use immunity or case-specific exceptions grounded in fairness.

The Court also upheld the Court of Appeal's order for a new trial after the Crown's successful appeal from acquittal.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for second degree murder arising from a fatal stabbing after key youth witnesses recanted their videotaped police statements implicating the accused.

The Supreme Court reconsidered the orthodox common law rule limiting prior inconsistent statements to credibility use only and held that, for witnesses other than the accused, such statements may be admitted substantively on a principled hearsay basis where reliability and necessity are established through a voir dire.

The majority required threshold guarantees addressing hearsay dangers, while concurring reasons proposed a more flexible reliability framework.

Because the trial judge had considered himself bound by the orthodox rule and had not assessed substantive admissibility under the new approach, a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario, which had allowed the Crown's appeal from a stay of proceedings ordered by the trial judge due to delay.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, applying the principles from R. v. Morin to conclude that the delay in this case was not unreasonable.

The appellants, Chief and Councillor of the Shawanaga First Nation, were convicted of unlawfully conducting a bingo contrary to the Criminal Code.

They argued that the lottery provisions of the Criminal Code were unconstitutional and that they had a defence of colour of right, mistakenly believing the laws did not apply to their activities on an Indian reserve.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the constitutional questions were resolved in the companion case of R. v. Furtney, and that the defence of colour of right was unavailable because their mistake was one of law, not fact.

The appellants were charged with counselling bingo licensees to violate the terms and conditions of their licences, contrary to the Criminal Code.

They challenged the constitutionality of the Code provisions, arguing they constituted an improper delegation of criminal law power to the provinces and created an invalid discretionary regulatory regime.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provisions were not an improper delegation of legislative power, but rather a valid exercise of the criminal law power that incorporated provincial legislation by reference or limited the reach of the criminal law.

The Court also found that the non-publication of the licence terms and conditions did not violate the Charter.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault based in part on wiretap evidence.

The trial judge admitted the evidence without opening the sealed packet.

The Court of Appeal opened and edited the packet but denied the appellant the right to cross-examine the affiant.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the appellant had established a basis to cross-examine the affiant because the affidavit was misleading regarding the use of a police informant, which bore directly on whether other investigative procedures were unlikely to succeed.