Superior Court of Justice

Collingwood Aviation Partners Ltd. (CAPL) applied for a declaration that it had a common law easement and contractual rights to full access to the adjacent airport lands owned by Winterland Airfield Holdings Ltd. (WAH).

WAH had erected fences restricting CAPL's access, citing safety concerns, and sought to impose user fees and increased insurance requirements.

The court found that CAPL had both contractual and common law easement rights to unimpeded access, as the properties had a symbiotic historical relationship.

The court ordered the removal of the restrictive fencing, declared that WAH could not charge user fees for access, and dismissed WAH's application regarding insurance.

Following a finding that the defendants breached a Solar Development Lease Agreement, a case conference was held to schedule a reference to determine damages and prejudgment interest.

The court established a timetable on consent for the delivery of records, cross-examinations, and factums, with a further case conference scheduled to ensure the parties remain on track.

The applicant brought a motion for interim spousal support following the breakdown of a traditional marriage.

The respondent, a high-income earner operating a mini-tender business through various corporations, argued his income was highly volatile and currently nil.

The court applied a cautious approach to income determination on an interim basis, accepting the respondent's expert's calculation of a three-year average income of $1.8 million, which accounted for necessary corporate retained earnings.

The court ordered the respondent to pay interim spousal support of $65,625 per month based on the mid-range of the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines, commencing February 1, 2021.

The applicant tenant brought an application for a declaration that her commercial lease was valid and binding, and for an injunction restraining the respondent landlord from interfering with her business.

The landlord had engaged in a campaign of harassment, including destroying common areas and removing the air conditioning unit, in an attempt to force the tenant to vacate so he could carry out construction.

The court found the landlord's allegations of breach to be spurious, dismissed his counter-application for fundamental breach, and granted the tenant's application, ordering specific performance of the lease and requiring the landlord to complete outstanding repairs.

The applicant property owner sought a declaration that the respondents breached an agreement of purchase and sale, an eviction order, and damages.

The respondent brought a motion to stay the application, arguing the Landlord and Tenant Board had exclusive jurisdiction under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The court found that a landlord and tenant relationship existed and the parties could not contract out of the Act, meaning the applicant must comply with the Act for eviction.

However, the court declined to stay the entire application, as the claims for breach of contract and damages fell outside the Board's exclusive jurisdiction.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment.

Following a case conference, the parties agreed to the terms of a consent judgment.

The court granted the relief sought and issued an order in accordance with the draft judgment.

The applicant, a federal inmate serving a life sentence, applied for habeas corpus after being involuntarily transferred from a minimum to a medium-security institution.

The transfer was based on allegations of his involvement in institutional subcultures, which he denied.

The court found that the Correctional Service of Canada failed to meet its disclosure obligations under section 27 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act by not providing the applicant with the Security Reclassification Scale (SRS) information.

This failure rendered the transfer decision procedurally unfair and unreasonable.

The application for habeas corpus was granted, and the applicant was ordered to be returned to a minimum-security institution.

The plaintiffs brought a motion under Rule 7.08 for court approval of a proposed $150,000 settlement for a minor who sustained a crush injury to her hand in an elevator.

The court adjourned the motion, finding the current record insufficient to determine if the settlement was in the minor's best interests.

The court required further medical evidence regarding the minor's surgery and prognosis, as well as the contingency fee agreement and time dockets to assess the fairness and reasonableness of the proposed $40,000 legal fee.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her incapacity to consent to a Community Treatment Plan and upholding the issuance of a Community Treatment Order.

The court first determined that although the CTO had expired, the appeal was only partially moot and should be heard on the merits.

Applying the palpable and overriding error standard of review, the court found no error in the Board's dismissal of preliminary motions regarding the procedural requirements of the CTO.

The court also upheld the Board's finding that the appellant lacked capacity to consent to treatment, as she was unable to appreciate the reasonably foreseeable consequences of her treatment decisions.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought an action to rescind a settlement agreement, alleging the defendant fraudulently inflated the company's revenue prior to the plaintiff purchasing the defendant's shares.

The defendants moved to strike the action as an abuse of process based on a full and final release signed during the settlement.

The plaintiffs moved for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendants from enforcing the settlement agreement's default provisions.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding a strong prima facie case of fraud that was not contemplated by the release.

The court granted the interlocutory injunction, finding the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm if the defendant returned to the business.

During a trial, the plaintiffs sought to admit an Industry Canada document into evidence under the public documents exception to the hearsay rule.

The defendants objected, arguing the document did not fit the statutory or common law categories of public documents.

The court dismissed the objection and admitted the document, finding it satisfied the four-part test for the public documents exception as it was prepared by a public official discharging a public duty, intended as a permanent record, and available for public inspection.

The plaintiff builder brought a motion for default judgment against the defendant purchaser who failed to close a real estate transaction.

The court required the plaintiff to serve the motion materials on the defendant in accordance with Toronto best practice.

The court found the plaintiff met its onus to prove damages and mitigation efforts, awarding the difference between the contract price and resale price.

However, the court refused to enforce a 20% contractual interest rate, applying the Courts of Justice Act rate instead, and limited the recovery of carrying costs due to an unexplained 5-month delay in closing the resale.

The applicant mother brought a motion for temporary child support.

The respondent father had been unemployed since 2017 and owned a vacant, mortgage-free rental property.

The court found the father had not made reasonable efforts to gain employment or utilize his property to generate income promptly upon separation.

The court imputed an income of $58,000 to the father for 2020 and ordered him to pay $13,776 in child support for that year, with ongoing support based on his new $100,000 salary.

The applicant mortgagor defaulted on a mortgage and the respondent mortgagees commenced power of sale proceedings.

The mortgagor requested a discharge statement under s. 22 of the Mortgages Act, which the mortgagees refused to provide, claiming the mortgagor was stalling.

The mortgagees then sold the property to a third party.

The court held that the mortgagees had no reasonable excuse to refuse the discharge statement, meaning their enforcement rights were suspended under s. 22(3).

Consequently, the sale to the third party was invalid.

The court rejected the argument that ss. 35 and 36 of the Mortgages Act or s. 99(1.1) of the Land Titles Act protected the third party purchaser's title from a breach of s. 22.

The respondent father brought a motion to change a 2018 consent order, seeking to reduce his child and spousal support obligations based on a claimed reduction in his self-employment income.

The court found that the respondent had reorganized his corporation shortly after the consent order and was splitting income with his new spouse and son.

The court imputed income to the respondent by adding back the non-arm's length salaries and dividends, setting his income at $195,488 rather than his claimed $144,121.

Support was adjusted accordingly, retroactive only to January 1, 2021, as a previous motion for 2020 had already been dismissed.

The payor brought a motion to change seeking to terminate child support for three adult children and spousal support due to his impending retirement for medical reasons.

The recipient opposed the termination of spousal support and sought retroactive arrears.

The court found that the payor's retirement at age 56 with an unreduced pension was reasonable given his documented health issues and the stressful nature of his employment.

The court terminated child support on consent, declined to order retroactive arrears, and ordered step-down spousal support for a transitional period, followed by nominal support of $1 per month.

The plaintiffs, commercial tenants of a sports bar, sought leave to amend their statement of claim against the defendant landlord to add claims under the Occupiers' Liability Act and for punitive damages related to toxic mold on the premises.

The defendant opposed, arguing the amendments constituted new causes of action that were statute-barred.

The court granted the motion, finding that the original claim contained sufficient material facts regarding the defendant's control of the premises and alleged bad faith conduct, such that the amendments merely particularized existing claims and did not constitute new causes of action.

The plaintiff set the action down for trial.

The defendant subsequently brought a motion to compel answers to undertakings and refusals from discovery.

The plaintiff raised a preliminary objection that the defendant required leave under Rule 48.04(1) because defense counsel had completed a Certification Form, allegedly consenting to the action being placed on the trial list.

The Master dismissed the preliminary objection, finding that completing the Certification Form did not constitute consent under Rule 48.06(1), and therefore the defendant did not require leave to bring the motion.

The Children's Aid Society brought a child protection application regarding a 7-year-old child.

The court found the mother lacked credibility regarding her severe substance abuse issues, domestic violence instigation, and failure to comply with court orders, including driving while prohibited.

The court found the child to be in need of protection due to the risk of physical and emotional harm from the mother.

The child was ordered to remain in the care of the father for six months under CAS supervision, with the mother granted specified supervised access.

The appellant appealed a property standards order requiring him to remove hoarded items, waste, and debris from his front porch.

The appellant, who lives on his porch year-round, argued the City was harassing him and that his collected items were not garbage.

The Superior Court of Justice found the items violated the municipal by-law and created an unsafe and unsanitary hazard.

The court upheld the order but modified it to specify that only one small welcome mat, one chair, and one side table fabricated for outdoor use could remain on the porch.