Superior Court of Justice

The defendants and their alter ego, Nest Services Limited, brought a motion for directions on whether they could serve the plaintiffs with an application for an anti-anti-suit injunction in Hong Kong.

The court had previously declared the arbitration agreement void and issued an anti-suit injunction barring the defendants from pursuing arbitration in Hong Kong.

The court held that pursuing the anti-anti-suit injunction was effectively pursuing the enjoined arbitrations, and directed that the defendants may not take any steps to advance the arbitrations.

The offender was convicted by a jury of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death after running a red light at 80 km/h and striking another vehicle, killing a 75-year-old passenger.

The Crown sought three years' imprisonment, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the offender's prolonged inattention, aggressive driving, and prior speeding record, balanced against her prosocial background, remorse, and lack of criminal record.

The court imposed a sentence of two years' imprisonment, a 15-year driving prohibition, and a non-communication order.

The accused, a doctor, was charged with two counts of sexual assault and two counts of uttering threats against a former patient and friend.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the complainant's evidence.

The defence argued the complainant had a motive to fabricate the allegations, pointing to evidence that she extorted the accused for money and threatened to report him if he stopped paying.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony regarding the alleged assaults, threats, and cash payments.

Concluding that the complainant's evidence lacked credibility and reliability, the court was left with a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused of all charges.

The plaintiffs brought a summary judgment motion for specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a new home.

The vendor had attempted to terminate the agreement due to increased construction costs, but did so after the contractual cancellation date.

The court found the vendor in breach and ordered specific performance, requiring the transfer of the land with an abatement of the purchase price equal to the estimated cost of construction.

The court also dismissed the vendor's third-party claim against the municipality, finding that building officials do not owe a duty of care to protect a developer's profit margins from delays in processing building permits.

The applicant's motion for contempt of court against the respondent was dismissed.

The respondent sought full recovery costs of $61,700, arguing the applicant acted in bad faith by using the contempt motion to intimidate her into changing a final order regarding medical decisions.

The court found the applicant's behaviour unreasonable and motivated by a desire to inflict financial and emotional harm, constituting bad faith under rule 24(10) of the Family Law Rules.

The court fixed costs payable to the respondent on a full recovery basis in the sum of $55,000.

Following a five-day trial, the court determined parenting time and child support for two children.

The mother sought alternating weekends for the father, while the father sought three consecutive weekends.

The court ordered two consecutive weekends with the father during the school year and equal parenting time during the summer, finding this in the children's best interests under s. 24 of the Children's Law Reform Act.

On child support, the court imputed various unsupported business expenses back into the self-employed father's income under s. 19 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, fixing arrears at $34,093.82 and ongoing support at $1,426.34 per month.

Costs of $7,000 were awarded to the mother due to the father's late financial disclosure.

Sentencing followed a jury conviction for historical sexual exploitation and sexual assault committed against a 15-year-old child living in the offender's home under his care.

Applying the Supreme Court's guidance in Friesen and Sheppard, the court treated denunciation and deterrence as paramount, emphasized the profound harm of sexual violence against children, and placed substantial weight on the repeated abuse, the domestic setting, and the offender's high position of trust.

Mitigating factors included the offender's age, lack of prior record, difficult childhood, and the custodial impact on his elderly spouse, but these did not justify the defence position.

A penitentiary sentence of four years was imposed, the sexual assault count was stayed under Kienapple, and ancillary orders were granted, with the s. 161 orders later vacated as unavailable at the time of the offences.

The plaintiff, a 52-year-old Managing Director in investment banking with 18 years of service, was terminated without cause.

The court determined the reasonable notice period to be 21 months, considering his age, length of service, and specialized role.

The court used a comparator approach to calculate the plaintiff's lost bonuses during the notice period, rejecting the employer's averaging approach due to the highly cyclical nature of the mining market and the employer's record profits during the notice period.

After deducting mitigation earnings and severance already paid, the court awarded the plaintiff $2,540,073.95 in damages.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion challenging the constitutionality of the Rules of Civil Procedure that require a litigation guardian to be represented by a lawyer.

The plaintiff sought to act as litigation guardian for her 16-year-old daughter but was unable to retain counsel.

The court held that to avoid infringing section 15 of the Charter, the Rules must be interpreted to allow a mature minor the opportunity to establish their capacity to self-represent.

The court ordered the plaintiff to file evidence of her daughter's capacity and intentions, failing which she must seek representation from the Office of the Children's Lawyer or the Public Guardian and Trustee.

During a judge-alone trial for sexual assault and related offences, the accused brought a mid-trial application under s. 276 of the Criminal Code to cross-examine the complainant about her potential sexual activity with another individual during the two weeks prior to the alleged assault.

The accused sought to challenge the Crown's reliance on documented injuries as corroboration of the assault.

The Crown opposed the application, arguing the accused lacked an evidentiary foundation to establish that other sexual activity occurred.

The court held that s. 276 does not always require particularization of identifiable instances of sexual activity where the accused seeks to challenge the cause of physical injuries.

The court granted the application, permitting a cascading line of cross-examination to balance the accused's right to make full answer and defence with the complainant's privacy and dignity.

The defendants moved to strike the plaintiff's Statement of Claim under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff, who claimed an interest in a property destroyed by arson, sued the lender and the lender's lawyer for breach of contract, negligence, and breach of fiduciary duty regarding a construction mortgage.

The court struck the breach of contract claims because the plaintiff was not a party to the mortgage agreement.

The negligence and fiduciary duty claims against the lawyer were also struck because the lawyer owed no duty to the non-client plaintiff.

The motions were granted without leave to amend.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's long-term disability claim, arguing the plaintiff was not totally disabled prior to his termination.

The plaintiff brought a cross-motion for summary judgment.

The court dismissed both motions, finding that the conflicting medical evidence and questions regarding the plaintiff's credibility and the exact onset date of his disability created genuine issues requiring a trial.

The accused was tried on charges of assault causing bodily harm, impaired operation of a conveyance, and operating a conveyance with a blood alcohol concentration over the legal limit.

The charges arose after the accused crashed his ATV near the complainant's property and subsequently engaged in a physical altercation with the complainant over riding ATVs on the farmland.

The court rejected the accused's claim of self-defence, finding him to be the primary aggressor who struck the complainant unprovoked.

The court also rejected the accused's defence of post-driving alcohol consumption, finding his evidence of drinking after the incident implausible and contradicted by expert evidence.

The accused was found guilty on all three counts.

The plaintiff, a 59-year-old executive with 18.5 years of service, was terminated without cause by the defendant employer.

The court awarded a 24-month reasonable notice period, finding that the plaintiff's age, tenure, and executive position warranted the maximum standard notice.

The court also awarded damages for a discretionary bonus that was unfairly denied in the year prior to termination, and damages for restricted stock units and stock options that would have vested during the notice period, calculated based on the plaintiff's historical holding patterns.

Claims for a bonus during the notice period and for aggravated and punitive damages were dismissed.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's estate application, the successful respondent sought full indemnity costs of $79,439.23.

The applicant argued no costs should be payable or they should be paid by the Estate.

The court awarded the respondent costs on a substantial indemnity scale due to the applicant's unfounded allegations of fraud, formal offers to settle, and an improper late motion to admit expert evidence.

Costs were fixed at $60,000 payable by the applicant personally to the Estate.

The defendants brought a motion to set aside a default judgment.

The court dismissed the motion regarding the corporate defendant, finding no plausible excuse for the default and no arguable defence to the unpaid invoices.

However, the court granted the motion regarding the individual defendant, finding an arguable defence as to whether he provided an enforceable personal guarantee under the Statute of Frauds.

The offender pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after police found over 1.1 kilograms of cocaine and $65,000 in his garage.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of 26 months, while the defence sought a conditional sentence of two years less a day.

The court noted the offender was a youthful, first-time offender who had made exceptional efforts toward rehabilitation, including completing a business program and securing employment.

Finding that a conditional sentence would meet the objectives of denunciation and deterrence while recognizing the offender's rehabilitation, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by three years of probation.

At a case conference for a contempt of court proceeding, the respondent appeared with newly retained counsel.

On consent, the matter was adjourned to allow counsel to prepare.

The court discharged the previously appointed amicus curiae, as the respondent was no longer self-represented.

The court also amended the title of proceeding to reflect the criminal nature of the contempt proceeding, while noting it would remain a sub-bundle in the civil file.

The applicant brought an application seeking a declaration of sole ownership of a property purchased jointly with the respondent, his former common-law partner, arguing a resulting trust.

The respondent opposed, claiming unjust enrichment and a joint family venture, and requested the matter be transferred to Family Court.

The Superior Court of Justice declined to make findings of fact and transferred the proceeding to Family Court, noting that under section 21.8(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, claims for unjust enrichment between persons who have cohabited fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Family Court.

The respondent brought a motion for interim child and spousal support.

The parties were separated but continued to reside in the matrimonial home with their children.

The applicant was paying all carrying costs for the home, joint debts, and children's expenses.

The court dismissed the motion as premature, finding that interim support is generally not payable when the payor spouse covers all carrying costs while the parties reside together under the same roof.

The respondent was granted liberty to renew the motion once the matrimonial home is sold.