Superior Court of Justice

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a motion for summary judgment to enforce a defaulted mortgage and obtain an order for possession.

The defendants conceded the default but objected to various default and administrative fees claimed by the plaintiff.

The court granted judgment and possession but disallowed the disputed fees, finding they were prohibited by s. 8 of the Interest Act as they effectively imposed a higher rate on arrears without evidence of actual administrative costs.

Due to the plaintiff advancing these unwarranted charges, the court exercised its discretion to deny the plaintiff's claim for contractual substantial indemnity costs.

The accused, a 39-year-old American citizen with no prior criminal record, was convicted by a jury of importing approximately 4.5 kilograms of cocaine into Canada.

The court considered the aggravating factor of the large quantity of cocaine and mitigating factors including the accused's background of poverty and systemic anti-Black racism, as well as harsh pre-trial custody conditions.

The court rejected the defence argument that the accused's status as a foreign national who would likely face a removal order and be ineligible for day parole warranted a sentence below the established range.

The accused was sentenced to 6 years' imprisonment, less credit for pre-sentence custody.

The plaintiff, a person under disability, sought court approval of a proposed settlement with the remaining defendant tavern.

The Superior Court of Justice approved the settlement and the 33.3 percent contingency fee, finding the resolution to be in the best interests of the plaintiff.

The applicant brought a motion to sever her divorce claim from corollary relief issues, seeking an Ontario divorce before a Russian divorce obtained by the respondent could be recognized.

The court found that severing the divorce could result in a legal disadvantage to the applicant regarding her spousal support claims, given the unsettled law on foreign divorces.

The motion to sever the divorce was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a 17-year-old boy, was viciously assaulted by the 34-year-old defendant, resulting in a broken jaw and other injuries.

The defendant pleaded guilty criminally and failed to defend the civil action.

The court assessed damages, awarding the plaintiff $75,000 in general damages.

The plaintiff's parents were awarded $8,400 and $400 respectively for attendant care under the Family Law Act.

The parents' claims for mental distress were dismissed as they failed to establish proximity or a serious and prolonged mental disturbance.

OHIP's subrogated claim and out-of-pocket expenses were also awarded.

At a case conference, the court considered whether three related actions arising from a construction project should be heard one after another and proceed on a common timetable.

The actions involved claims for construction management services, oppression remedies, and consulting services, with overlapping allegations of delay and cost overruns.

The court ordered the actions to proceed together under Rule 6.01(1), finding they shared common questions of fact and law, and that separate proceedings risked inconsistent findings.

An alternative request to sever counterclaims under Rule 6.1.01 was dismissed.

The plaintiff was struck from behind by an unidentified vehicle in a Starbucks drive-through.

Unaware she had suffered a concussion, she did not obtain the other driver's information before he left.

She reported the accident to her broker the next day but did not notify police within 24 hours or provide written notice to her insurer within 30 days.

In a special case trial, the court held the plaintiff could not have ascertained the driver's identity with reasonable due diligence due to her injuries.

The court found no irreparable prejudice to the insurer from the delayed reporting and granted relief from forfeiture.

The court also found sufficient corroborating evidence of the unidentified vehicle's involvement.

The plaintiff, a former foreperson for the TTC, claimed he was constructively dismissed after the TTC failed to accommodate his request for an exemption from its mandatory COVID-19 mask policy.

The plaintiff alleged that wearing a mask exacerbated his migraine disorder and caused dyspnea and palpitations.

The court dismissed the constructive dismissal claim, finding that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because there was no medical evidence linking his migraine disorder to his inability to wear a mask.

The court held that the plaintiff repudiated his employment contract by refusing to comply with an essential condition of his job.

The plaintiff was awarded $2,792 for one week of unpaid sick leave that the TTC had previously agreed to pay.

The offender was convicted of manslaughter after shooting the deceased 15 times with an illegal firearm.

The jury accepted the partial defence of provocation.

The court considered the offender's lack of criminal record, deep remorse, and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions (Duncan credit), as well as collateral consequences (fear for safety) and Morris factors (social context evidence).

The offender was sentenced to 9 years imprisonment, reduced to 4 years and 6 months after credit for pre-sentence custody.

The 70-year-old offender pleaded guilty to second-degree murder after stabbing a vulnerable victim 42 times in a spontaneous rage triggered by loud noise.

The Crown sought a 14-year period of parole ineligibility, while the defence sought 10 to 12 years.

The court found that the offender's severe and long-standing mental illnesses played a central role in the offence, shifting the paramount sentencing objectives from deterrence to treatment.

Considering the offender's age, medical conditions, and onerous presentence custody, the court imposed a life sentence with a 12-year period of parole ineligibility.

The third party insurer brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss a third-party claim regarding insurance coverage.

The issue of first instance was whether the standard excluded driver endorsement (OPCF 28A) applies to 'other automobiles' not specifically listed on the policy.

The court held that 'other automobiles' are incorporated by reference into the OPCF 28A form, consistent with sections 225 and 240 of the Insurance Act.

Because the driver was an excluded driver at the time of the accident, there was no liability coverage while she operated another person's vehicle.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the third-party claim was dismissed.

In a high-conflict family law proceeding, the applicant moved to amend her pleadings to add tort claims for intimate partner violence, assault, battery, abuse of process, and income loss shortly before trial.

She also sought to withdraw deemed admissions resulting from her failure to respond to a Request to Admit while self-represented.

The court allowed the amendments for IPV, assault, and battery, finding no non-compensable prejudice to the respondent, but denied the late economic tort claims as they would derail the peremptory trial.

The court also permitted the withdrawal of the deemed admissions, finding the default was an honest mistake based on a misunderstanding of a Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form, and ordered further questioning.

The plaintiff brought a motion for default judgment against his former accountants for breach of contract, fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty arising from two unpaid loans.

The defendants failed to defend the action and were noted in default.

The court found that the deemed admissions and the plaintiff's affidavit established liability.

The court awarded compensatory damages for the outstanding loan balances and $75,000 in punitive damages, finding that the defendants' conduct in taking advantage of a longstanding client relationship was reprehensible and breached their fiduciary duties.

The applicants brought an application under the Arbitration Act, 1991 to declare that an arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to hear claims brought by the respondent in a family business dispute.

The dispute centered on whether the respondent, who was a shareholder of a corporate partner but not a 'partner' or 'principal' under the partnership agreement, was a 'party' entitled to invoke the arbitration clause.

Applying the principles of contractual interpretation from Sattva, the court found that the plain wording of the agreement, including the recitals and enurement clause, contemplated that shareholders of the partners were parties.

The court concluded that the arbitrator had jurisdiction over the respondent's claims for dissolution and increased compensation, as well as the applicants' claims regarding management compensation.

The self-represented plaintiff brought a motion under Rule 15.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking leave to represent her closely held co-plaintiff corporation in a copyright infringement action.

The defendants opposed, arguing she lacked the ability to navigate the litigation and adhere to professional standards.

The court applied the Extend-a-Call criteria and found the plaintiff demonstrated sufficient competence and understanding of the issues.

The court granted leave, noting the corporation's closely held nature and the plaintiff's inability to retain counsel, but imposed a condition allowing the defendants to seek review if her conduct becomes obstructionist.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter after threatening the victim, who then fell from a balcony while attempting to flee.

The Crown alleged as an aggravating fact that the accused wielded a knife, but the court found this was not proven beyond a reasonable doubt on the circumstantial evidence.

The court sentenced the accused to 3 years and 4 months, taking into account his guilty plea, youthful age, and the harsh conditions of his presentence custody, which resulted in a sentence of time served.

The offender pleaded guilty to trafficking 1.4 kilograms of methamphetamine and 22.36 grams of fentanyl to an undercover police officer over several transactions.

The Crown sought a 4-year penitentiary sentence, while the defence sought a conditional sentence.

The court considered the offender's extremely difficult background as a refugee, her history of trauma, and her struggles with addiction and mental health.

However, given the large quantity of dangerous drugs involved and her extensive criminal record for breaching court orders, the court found a conditional sentence inappropriate.

The offender was sentenced to 3 years in the penitentiary.

The appellant was involved in a single-vehicle accident and walked to a nearby restaurant to use a phone.

A police officer arrested him in the restaurant washroom for failing to remain at the scene under the Highway Traffic Act.

This arrest led to impaired driving and refuse breath sample charges.

At trial, the judge upheld the arrest as lawful.

On appeal, the Superior Court found the trial judge erred by failing to assess whether the officer's subjective belief that an offence occurred was objectively justifiable in the circumstances.

The conviction appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The plaintiff estate trustee brought a motion under Rule 37.14 to set aside a registrar's order dismissing the action for delay.

The underlying action involved alleged historical loans made by the deceased to the defendant.

The court found that the plaintiff's explanation for the delay was reasonable, as it was primarily caused by the defendant's capacity issues and the need to appoint the Public Guardian and Trustee as her litigation guardian.

Although the delay was not due to inadvertence, the motion was brought promptly and the defendant suffered no actual prejudice.

The court set aside the dismissal order and restored the action.

Claridge applied for a vesting order for vacant land held by Desloges, arguing it was the beneficial owner under an express or resulting trust.

Desloges opposed and brought a cross-application for reimbursement of property taxes, insurance, and maintenance costs incurred since 1991.

The Superior Court of Justice found that while the express trust failed because a condition precedent requiring Planning Act approval was not met, a resulting trust arose in favour of Claridge.

The court granted the vesting order, finding the claim was not statute-barred or barred by laches.

Desloges's cross-application was partially granted, awarding $46,304 for maintenance costs, but claims for insurance and taxes were dismissed as unproven.