CITATION: Armstrong et al v. Coppin, 2026 ONSC 4400

COURT FILE NO.: CV-23-00711553

DATE: 20260729

ONTARIO

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE

BETWEEN:

JAKUB BENJAMIN ARMSTRONG, MONIKA J. ARMSTRONG and BENJAMIN A. ARMSTRONG

PLAINTIFF

– and –

DANIEL COPPIN also known as DANIEL FERRE COPPIN

Defendant

Steven Sieger, for the Plaintiffs

HEARD: May 4, 2026

Papageorgiou J.

Overview

1Daniel Coppin (“Daniel”) assaulted the plaintiff Jakub Benjamin Armstrong (“Jakub”) when Jakub was 17 years old. At the time, Daniel was 34 years old.

2Daniel was charged criminally and plead guilty.

3Jakub brought this civil claim for negligence and battery. His parents, Monika Armstrong (“Monika”) and Benjamin Armstrong (“Benjamin”), claim damages under the Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3 (the “FLA”.

4There is no issue that Daniel is liable. He plead guilty to criminal charge of assault, and he failed to defend this matter. The only issue is the damages to which the plaintiffs are entitled.

Decision

5For the reasons that follow, I award the plaintiffs damages as follows:

Jakub: general damages in the amount of $75,000

Monika: damages pursuant to the FLA in the amount of $8,400

Benjamin: damages pursuant to the FLA in the amount of $400

OHIP’s subrogated claim in the amount of $7,683.89

Disbursements in the total amount of $540.38

Analysis

The Incident

6On December 31, 2021, Jakub was celebrating New Year’s Eve with his parents at Blue Mountain.

7After dinner, Jakub and his friends walked into the Village at Blue Mountain to watch the fireworks.

8He and his friends encountered Daniel who saw them talking to girls. Daniel accused them of being paedophiles even though they were teenagers like the girls they were talking to.

9After they exchanged some words, Daniel approached Jakub, pushed him up against a fence and slapped him. Jakub tried to squirm out of Daniel’s grasp unsuccessfully. Then Daniel punched him hard against the fence repeatedly. Jakub fell to the ground and his friend pulled up and they left.

Jakub’s Injuries

10Jakub went home and his parents drove him to Collingwood Marine Hospital in Barrie. They were able to stop the bleeding in his nose and did X-rays that showed Jakub’s right mandible was broken in two places and that he needed surgery for this.

11Jakub’s orbital bone was also broken, and his nose was injured as well but they had to heal on their own. His shoulder also hurt and there was also bruising on his body consistent with being kicked while on the ground.

12Collingwood Marine Hospital said he needed a better hospital for his jaw surgery and sent Jakub to Sunnybrook Hospital where he attended the next morning. They did further scans at Sunnybrook that confirmed that his jaw was broken.

Treatment

13Jakub then had jaw surgery at Markham Stouffville Hospital on January 4. They placed a titanium plate in his jaw as well as screws and wired his jaw shut. It was removed two months later.

Impact on Jakub

14After the surgery, Jakub could not eat solid food for two months. Initially, his mother had to use a syringe to put food in his mouth on the side opposite to the break as he could not even sip anything through a straw. He had to be on a very plain liquid diet which included Ensure, Gatorade, and Boullion soup.

15Eventually, he was able to have solid food blended also inserted through syringes and later he was able to use a straw which he could insert between the wires. He lost a significant amount of weight. He was 140 pounds before the incident and lost 15 pounds.

16To prevent infection, he had to use an antibacterial rinse each day.

17He had symptoms of a concussion although he says he was not formally diagnosed with a concussion. In that regard, he suffered from headaches and was dizzy such that he could not stand up comfortably. Light and noise bothered him. He remained in bed for several weeks.

18He could not speak properly and felt embarrassment to be seen in this way, and he had to finish grade 12 in this manner.

19The attack also caused him emotional trauma. He became afraid of going out at night and was concerned he might be assaulted again. He had nightmares and stopped going out at night. He continues to have nightmares and sleep difficulty.

20He also stopped playing competitive sports. He used to run cross country, played tennis, did track and field sports, and was an alpine skier. He was ranked first in Canada for Alpine skiing previously.

21He had to give up all of these sports.

22When it was time to apply to university, he could not apply to some that he really wanted to attend because he could not do videos that they required or interviews because he could not speak. For example, one of his top picks was the University of British Columbia and he sought accommodation for the application, but they would not accommodate him and so he could not apply.

23He ultimately attended McMaster University in a Bachelor of Commerce program.

24At first, he tried to do some counselling at McMaster to process the incident and attended four sessions.

25He says that the first two years were rough but afterwards, he became more social.

26His average the first two years was in the C range to B minus but after two years he started doing better and his marks were in the range of B+ to A-.

27He feels that the incident affected his school performance initially at McMaster because he was not in the same place as he was before and had trouble focussing because of the trauma.

28Jakub testified that this incident has had a lasting impact on his life:

• He avoids crowds in general at night.

• He also does not socialize in large settings.

• He continues to not play competitive sports.

• He has to check in with a dentist periodically to ensure that there are no misalignments.

• He will have to have the plate in his jaw forever and he hears a clicking noise when he opens his mouth too wide which is then a constant reminder of the incident.

• He was made aware that he may have trouble with his teeth in the future ad they may have to be extracted.

Jakub’s Damages

29Jakub’s counsel references the case Leighton v. Best (2009), 177 A.C.W.S. (3d) 702 (Ont. S.C.). In that case the plaintiff and defendant were in a fight during a hockey game. The defendant fractured the plaintiff’s jaw. The plaintiff’s stick had come up and struck the defendant in the face. Then the defendant punched the plaintiff and broke his jaw.

30After the court addressed the issue of consent and specific damages for future care, and other items, it considered his claim for general damages.

31The court concluded that his injuries were not catastrophic.

32He had a broken jaw, he had a concussion but with no significant sequelae, was prescribed various pain medications, and had to see a dentist about his teeth pain. The plaintiff had surgery to wire his jaw shut and had to return to the doctor’s office on a weekly basis until the fixation was removed seven weeks later. Like Jakub, during this period he had to have only liquids, lost weight, had difficulty speaking, and was in pain and slept a lot. He also could not play sports for a while. He could not take his children to end of season ceremonies and his relationship with his wife became strained because he could no longer tend to tasks around the house. What is different about this case is that months after the incident, the plaintiff in that case had to have root canals on three of his teeth.

33In terms of ongoing problems, he did not suffer the significant emotional trauma that Jakub testified about. He had no issues with avoiding socializing.

34As well, the court had concerns that the plaintiff’s own action in raising a high stick to the defendant and striking him with it had motivated the retaliation from the defendant. As such, mitigation of damages was appropriate. The court awarded general damages in the amount of $35,000.

35Jakub’s counsel also references Milicic v. Liberty Entertainment Group, 2019 ONSC 379 which also involved an assault that resulted in a broken jaw. The plaintiff similarly had his jaw wired shut and had to eat through a straw. He was unable to work. He was left with ongoing headaches, memory and sleep problems, fatigue, hearing loss, numbness around his lips, and difficulty eating. He worked at a job installing windows and doors and had to take breaks every 3 to 4 hours because of fatigue.

36Wilson J., as she then was, awarded the plaintiff general damages of $125,000.

37There were a number of expert reports in Milicic v. Liberty Entertainment Group and there are none before me. As well, there were important distinctions between that case and this one, as follows:

• A neuropsychologist was of the opinion that the plaintiff in that case was depressed and that he exhibited symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder and post-concussive symptoms including headaches, cognitive and emotional changes.

• A psychologist who assessed the plaintiff concluded that he had an adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and depression.

• A psychiatrist noted that the plaintiff had difficulty with memory and concentration which related to the emotional sequalae as opposed to brain damage from the assault.

• A specialist in oral medicine found that the plaintiff had significant changes in his temporomandibular joints and had restricted range of motion in his mouth and was left with paresthesia and numbness of his chin and lips.

38Jakub’s counsel acknowledges that Jakub’s damages were more significant than in Leighton v. Best, but not more significant than in Milicic v. Liberty Entertainment Group.

39I agree that his damages lie somewhere between the two, but I find that they are closer to the damages awarded in Leighton v. Best.

40In all the circumstances, in my view, Jakub is entitled to general damages in the amount of $75,000. This was a vicious attack on a young boy which had a significant impact on him physically and emotionally and which continues to plague him. While his injuries were not as significant as in Leighton v. Best, at the same time, he was a child and the impact on him was significant.

Monika’s and Benjamin’s Damages

Family Law Act Claim

41Pursuant to s. 61 of the Family Law Act, dependents may make claims:

Right of dependants to sue in tort

61 (1) If a person is injured or killed by the fault or neglect of another under circumstances where the person is entitled to recover damages, or would have been entitled if not killed, the spouse, as defined in Part III (Support Obligations), children, grandchildren, parents, grandparents, brothers and sisters of the person are entitled to recover their pecuniary loss resulting from the injury or death from the person from whom the person injured or killed is entitled to recover or would have been entitled if not killed, and to maintain an action for the purpose in a court of competent jurisdiction.

Damages in case of injury

(2) The damages recoverable in a claim under subsection (1) may include,

(a) actual expenses reasonably incurred for the benefit of the person injured or killed;

(b) actual funeral expenses reasonably incurred;

(c) a reasonable allowance for travel expenses actually incurred in visiting the person during his or her treatment or recovery;

(d) where, as a result of the injury, the claimant provides nursing, housekeeping or other services for the person, a reasonable allowance for loss of income or the value of the services; and

(e) an amount to compensate for the loss of guidance, care and companionship that the claimant might reasonably have expected to receive from the person if the injury or death had not occurred.

Contributory negligence

(3) In an action under subsection (1), the right to damages is subject to any apportionment of damages due to contributory fault or neglect of the person who was injured or killed.

[emphasis added throughout]

42After the assault, Monika was the one who primarily cared for Jakub. She purchased his food and the supplements required. And she would be the one to blend his food and feed him with a syringe. Each of his daily three meals took an hour each time. This was in addition to other care that he required.

43She initially took a month off work to do so.

44She did everything for him.

45She took him to ten appointments in the two months following the incident.

46She had to drive him to school which took a half an hour each way, twice a day, and which she did during the weekdays only. This amounts to two hours per day.

47He also had numerous appointments. There were ten that she had to attend with him. He got up frequently at night and she had to assist him. His appointments took a minimum of an hour each time because he had to wait. There was also time taken to drive to his appointments.

48He was also put on a special diet of things that they would not normally buy, like spinach and high protein foods.

49Benjamin testified that Monika took the brunt of the caring responsibility, but he helped when needed and filled in the cracks.

50After the second month, the wires were removed and it is unclear what special care he would have required.

51The plaintiff says that the appropriate range of the hourly rate is between $15 and $20 per hour.

52The plaintiff references Bhatt v. Willaim Beasley Enterprises Limited, 2015 ONSC 2168. In that case an injured child’s parents requested the cost of attendant care costs. The court indicated that it could not grant them because there was no evidence that the parents did not provide the exact same care prior to the incident that cause the injuries. While the plaintiff submitted that the hourly rate should have been $20, the court made no decision on the rate.

53The plaintiff also references Campbell v. Roberts, 2014 ONSC 5922, where the court awarded past attendant care costs based upon an estimate of the amount of time the party spent caring for her husband. I note that there are other decisions where courts have accepted that a party should be compensated at the rate that they would have had to pay a personal support worker. In Rolley v. MacDonell, 2018 ONSC 6517 the court accepted an hourly rate of $30. See also Bain (Guardian ad litem of) v. Calgary Board of Education, [1993] A.J. No. 952 (Q.B.) and Wilson v. Byrne, 2004 CanLII 20532 (Ont.S.C.) where courts similarly awarded an hourly rate although not at the rate of $30 per hour.

54The plaintiffs did not provide any evidence of what they would have had to pay a personal care worker but given that the minimum wage in Ontario is currently $17.60, I find the request for remuneration at the rate of $20 per hour reasonable.

55Understandably, the plaintiffs did not have an actual ledger that showed the time that they spent. They were parents focussing on caring for their child after a vicious assault and they were not focussed on putting together a case for litigation. I am satisfied with their general testimony of the kinds of things that they did and their estimates and I have estimated the overall time that in my view they spent based upon their testimony. Each testified about what they did in general and in general how long the tasks took.

56Based upon Monika’s testimony, I calculate the total time that that Monika spent that first month to be 10 hours per day, 30 days per month at a rate of $20 per hour, for a total of $6,000. Incidentally, this is also the amount of income that she lost that month because of the leave of absence she took.

57Jakub’s needs were less the second month, and Monika had returned to work. However, she still assisted with his food needs, including blending his food and feeding him, and driving him to and from school. I calculate that she spent an average of four hours per day that second month and calculate the time she spent to be four hours per day, for 30 days at $20 per hour, for a total of $2,400.

58Benjamin did not provide a significant amount of attendant care services and only helped out when Monika was not available. He did not provide any specific evidence of the hours that he spent or what he did but I accept based upon both his and Monika’s evidence that he did provide secondary assistance. Therefore, I award him damages for work he did caring for Jakub the first month based upon an estimate of four hours per week for at $20 per hour for a total of $320 (4 weeks per month). I estimate that he would only have cared for him an average of one hour a week the second month for a total of $80.

Emotional Distress

59Monika and Benjamin testified that this incident has had a long-lasting impact on their family. They have never had any violence of this sort in their family. Monika continues to have flashbacks of that night.

60They have a cottage at Blue Mountain and when they go to it, they are reminded of the incident. As such, they do not go there as often.

61Monika used to assist with coaching skiing, and she has stopped this as well because it brings up bad memories.

62Monika continues to worry about Jakub continually every time he goes out and every time he goes to the dentist.

63Benjamin similarly testified that he was emotionally affected. It was very difficult to see his son traumatized and missing out on social life and not being able to apply to his top university.

64The FLA does not specify that emotional distress is a damage that can be awarded to family members pursuant to s. 61. As set out in Forget et al. v. Gibb et al, 2026 ONSC 626 at para 345 and Thomson v. Handler, 2023 ONSC 5042 aff’d 2025 ONCA 868 at para 235, and Mason v. Peters et al, 1982 CanLII 1969 (C.A.) at para 32, leave to appeal dismissed without reasons, [1982] S.C.C.A. No. 51, a court cannot grant FLA damages to provide damages for mental distress. Section 61 of the FLA specifically says that family members can recover “pecuniary loss[es] resulting from the injury” to a family member. Damages for mental distress are a form of general damages and are often referred to as non-pecuniary or non-economic damages.

65I requested further submissions on the basis for Monika and Benjamin’s claim for mental distress damages given that these cannot be claimed under s. 61 of the FLA.

66The plaintiffs referenced general case law in respect of the ability to claim for emotional distress as a type of damage caused by negligence. However, the claim doesn’t allege negligence in respect of Daniel’s conduct towards Jakub.

67While paragraph 17 of the Claim does assert that Monika and Benjamin suffered mental distress as a result of the incident, it does not plead that Daniel owed Monika and Benjamim a duty of care personally as distinct from any duty of care owed by Daniel to Jakub. The pleading, even read generously, alleges that Daniel’s actions were negligent only as against Jakub, and that Monika and Benjamin’s claim is based on the FLA, not a separate duty of care that Daniel owed them personally. Indeed, in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the claim, they specifically plead that they bring their claim pursuant to the FLA.

68Even if Monika and Benjamin had specifically pleaded negligence and a duty of care owed to them, the parents have failed to establish any proximity.

69In Saadati v. Moorhead, 2017 SCC 28, [2017] 1 S.C.R. 543 the Supreme Court stated:

10In claims for negligently caused mental injury, it is generally sufficient that the pleadings allege some form of such injury (Odhavi Estate v. Woodhouse, 2003 SCC 69, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 263 at para 74). […]

23I add this. As to that first necessary element for recovery (establishing that the defendant owed the claimant a duty of care), it is implicit in the Court’s decision in Mustapha that Canadian negligence law recognizes a duty exists at common law to take reasonable care to avoid causing foreseeable mental injury, and that this cause of action protects a right to be free from negligent interference with one’s mental health. […]

24It is also implicit in Mustapha that the ordinary duty of care analysis is to be applied to claims for negligently caused mental injury. With great respect to courts that have expressed contrary views, it is in my view unnecessary and indeed futile to re-structure that analysis so as to mandate formal, separate consideration of certain dimensions of proximity, as was done in McLoughlin v. O’Brian. Certainly, “temporal”, “geographic” and “relational” considerations might well inform the proximity analysis to be performed in some cases. But the proximity analysis as formulated by this Court is, and is intended to be, sufficiently flexible to capture all relevant circumstances that might in any given case go to seeking out the “close and direct” relationship which is the hallmark of the common law duty of care (Cooper v. Hobart, 2001 SCC 79, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 537 at para 32 citing Donoghue v. Stevenson, 1932 CanLII 536 (FOREP), [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) at pp. 580-81). As the Court has said, that analysis focuses on factors arising from the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant.

[emphasis added]

70The plaintiffs cite Snowball v. Ornge, 2017 ONSC 4601 where the court dismissed a rule 21 motion to strike a claim brought by immediate family members of a man killed in a helicopter crash for emotional distress. The fact that there is a case where this kind of claim was not struck out does not assist Monika and Benjamin in proving proximity at trial.

71The plaintiffs also cite Moore v. 7595611 Canada Corp, 2021 ONCA 459 where a jury award of mental distress damages in favour of parents were upheld. In that case a child was trapped in a fire with no way to escape when an apartment was engulfed in flames and smoke. She clung to life for a few days with her parents at her bedside. The decision indicates that they witnessed the terrible reality of seeing their child with third degree burns on over half of her body and other parts of her body disintegrating. There was no appeal of the proximity issue, only the quantum of damages and so it is unclear from this decision what the proximity was and what factors the court focused on to establish it.

72The plaintiffs did not do any proximity analysis. They did not explain what relationship Monika and Benjamin had with Daniel that would justify the imposition of a duty of care in circumstances where they were not present and did not witness what occurred. Again, as noted above, in Saadati v. Moorhead, the Supreme Court specifically directed that the proximity analysis focuses on factors arising from the relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant and there were none before me.

73I conclude that Monika and Benjamin have not established the necessary proximity between them and Daniel. Therefore, also for this reason, they have no entitlement to claim damages for mental distress as an incident of negligence.

74Further, they did not prove they suffered a mental injury that would entitle them to damages.

75In Saadati v. Moorhead, the Supreme Court noted that while a recognizable psychiatric illness may not be required to award from establish mental distress damages, claims for mental injury is not proven by the existence of mere psychological upset.

37None of this is to suggest that mental injury is always as readily demonstrable as physical injury. While allegations of injury to muscular tissue may sometimes pose challenges to triers of fact, many physical conditions such as lacerations and broken bones are objectively verifiable. Mental injury, however, will often not be as readily apparent. Further, and as Mustapha makes clear, mental injury is not proven by the existence of mere psychological upset. While, therefore, tort law protects persons from negligent interference with their mental health, there is no legally cognizable right to happiness. Claimants must, therefore, show much more — that the disturbance suffered by the claimant is “serious and prolonged and rise[s] above the ordinary annoyances, anxieties and fears” that come with living in civil society (Mustapha, at para. 9). To be clear, this does not denote distinct legal treatment of mental injury relative to physical injury; rather, it goes to the prior legal question of what constitutes “mental injury”. Ultimately, the claimant’s task in establishing a mental injury is to show the requisite degree of disturbance (although not, as the respondents say, to show its classification as a recognized psychiatric illness).

76In Moore v. 7595611 Canada Corp. there was clear expert evidence supporting the claims for mental distress and the mental impacts were particularized and far more significant than psychological upset. The expert report noted that the mother suffered deterioration in mood and functionality and that she experienced suicidal ideation. The father suffered PTSD and persecutory anxiety.

77Here there is no similar evidence.

78While understandably upset, Benjamin and Monika suffered psychological upset but they did not establish a serious and prolonged mental disturbance. Their evidence in this regard was brief, unparticularized, and did not explain what the mental disturbance was apart from being upset about the fact that their son was assaulted and the fact that they don’t like to go to their cottage anymore and worry about him.

79Therefore, I award no damages for mental distress.

Out of Pocket Expenses

80Monika and Benjamin claimed for out-of-pocket expenses as follows:

• $250 for Ensure that the doctors told Jakub to drink for nutritional reasons. He would not have drunk this otherwise. I award this amount.

• Pharmaceutical products for pain the amount of $239.38. I award this amount.

• Parking in the amount of $51 when they brought him to appointments. I award this amount.

• $1,521 for groceries. He would have had to eat in any event and they would have had to purchase food. They claim this amount on the basis that his physicians directed them to make certain foods for him that they would not have otherwise purchased. I have reviewed these receipts are they are filled with regular food like pasta, broccoli, onions, celery, beef, chicken, garlic, ice cream, avocado, banana, shrimp, beats, seafood containers, sport drinks, potatoes. These appear to me to be mostly regular food and to the extent they had to purchase food that he could eat, they would not have had to spend money for the food that he was eating in the ordinary course before the incident. They provided no evidence of what their grocery expenses were prior to the incident compared to afterwards to show that they ended up spending more money on groceries because of additional items they felt they had to buy. Since they provided no specific evidence that explained why the additional shopping they had to do resulted in a net expense for them after deducting what they would have spent to feed him in any event, I do not award them anything for their expenditure on groceries.

OHIP Subrogated Claim

81OHIP’s subrogated claim is for $7,683.89. I award this amount.

Conclusion

82I award the following:

Jakub: general damages in the amount of $75,000

Monika: damages pursuant to the FLA in the amount of $8,400

Benjamin: damages pursuant to the FLA in the amount of $400

OHIP’s subrogated claim in the amount of $7,683.89

Disbursements in the total amount of $540.38

Costs

83Pursuant to s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, costs are in the discretion of the court. Rule 57 of the Rules sets out the factors which courts should have regard to when awarding costs. The overall objective is “to fix an amount that is fair and reasonable for the unsuccessful party to pay in the particular proceeding, rather than an amount fixed by the actual costs incurred by the successful litigant”: Zesta Engineering Ltd. v. Cloutier (2002), 2002 CanLII 25577 (ON CA), 21 C.C.E.L. (3d) 161 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 4; Boucher v. Public Accountants Council for the Province of Ontario (2004), 2004 CanLII 14579 (ON CA), 71 O.R. (3d) 291 (C.A.), at para. 26; Clarington (Municipality) v. Blue Circle Canada Inc., 2009 ONCA 722, 100 O.R. (3d) 66, at para. 52; and G.C. v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2014 ONSC 1191, at para. 5.

84The plaintiffs request costs on a partial indemnity basis in the amount of $25,643.12 which is inclusive of HST, and disbursements in the amount of $4,264.

85I have reviewed the Bill of Costs which is well particularized and shows the significant time spent by counsel on this matter. The rates are also reasonable.

86Therefore, I award the costs as claimed.

87The plaintiffs may send a revised Judgment to my assistant to be signed.

Papageorgiou J.

Released: July 29, 2026

CITATION: Armstrong et al v. Coppin, 2026 ONSC 4400