ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
B E T W E E N:
HIS MAJESTY THE KING
S. Burdo and Sam Weinstock, for the Crown
- and -
CHRISTIANA EDWARDS
H. Hussain, for the Accused
Accused
HEARD: May 25, 2026 and July 3, 2026
REASONS FOR SENTENCE
DENNISON J.
A. Introduction
1On March 17, 2026, the jury convicted Ms. Edwards of importing approximately 4.5 kilograms of cocaine into Canada. The court heard sentencing submissions on May 25, 2026 and additional submissions on July 3, 2026. Having considered the evidence filed and the submissions of counsel, these are my reasons for sentence.
B. Facts of the Offence
2Ms. Edwards travelled from Kingston, Jamaica on a West Jet flight and arrived at Toronto Pearson International Airport. She was scheduled to board a connecting flight to Manchester, United Kingdom.
3She was referred to secondary inspection with her luggage. During a search of Ms. Edwards’ black suitcase, Border Services Officer Yorke discovered an anomaly within the panels of the suitcase and located 3,195 grams of cocaine. The officer located a further 1,481.5 grams of cocaine concealed behind the liner of her grey suitcase.
4The main issue at trial was whether Ms. Edwards knew she was importing a controlled substance into Canada. Ms. Edwards testified that she believed she was transporting travel documents from Jamaica to the UK to assist Jamaican workers. She testified that she was paid $10,000 to do so.
5The jury clearly did not accept her evidence nor did it leave them with a reasonable doubt that she knew she was importing a controlled substance.
C. Circumstances of the Offender
6The court had the benefit of hearing Ms. Edwards testify about her upbringing and now has the pre-sentence report that sets out further background information.
7Ms. Edwards is currently 39 years of age. She is an American citizen. She was born in California. She was raised by her mother and did not meet her father until she was in her late teens. She described her mother as hard working and that she tried to raise them well. They struggled financially and she grew up in a low-income neighbourhood. They relied on local food banks and the church to survive.
8She stated that there was a lot of gang activity in the area she grew up in. She testified that the Bloods controlled her neighbourhood and that she was approached by the gang multiple times to sell drugs and she refused. She explained that if you helped the gang, they would provide financial help or provide drugs.
9Ms. Edwards testified that she had family and friends that joined gangs and would sell drugs and prostitute themselves. She did not use any drugs. Two of her uncles and her best friend became addicted to drugs. Her best friend became abused, and she was found dead. She stated that drugs were not an issue with her mother’s side of the family.
10Ms. Edwards finished high school. Her peers teased her in junior high about the fact that her mother could not afford to buy her the latest fashions. She joined the drill team and colour guard in high school and became more popular.
11Ms. Edwards and her sister Ms. Murphy were abandoned by their mother when Ms. Edwards was 17 years of age and Ms. Murphy was 15 years of age. They moved into her father’s house as her mother moved to another state with her boyfriend. They then moved out on their own. Ms. Edwards took care of her younger sister.
12Ms. Edwards explained that she had three half siblings through her father that she met when she was 18 years old. She stated that she became close, and they lived together. Her half sister, Christa had some health issues and Ms. Edwards assisted her financially. In 2023, Christa had a baby, Ava, and when Christa became ill, Ms. Edwards took care of the baby for about three to four months. She continued to provide financial support to Christa and Ava.
13Ms. Edwards testified that she started working when she was in grade five at a printing store. She worked to make extra money at Christmas and during the holidays. She got her first real job when she was 18 working at Walmart. She has always been gainfully employed. She has worked at Walmart, a department store, Sam’s Club, and a pharmacy.
14In the pre-sentence report, Ms. Edwards stated that she married in October 2022 and that she lived with her husband and extended family in rental accommodation. She stated that her husband is presently in custody in the United States. She has two stepsons who are 17 and 19 years of age that she has a good relationship with. Her sister and her friend confirmed that she is married. Some day she would like to have children of her own.
15In 2024, Ms. Edwards worked at a gas station at night and Walmart during the day. She said that she worked 16 to 18 hours a day. Around April, she started working for Lyft and at a hotel. She also started to sell her plasma so that she could give the money to her sister. She stated that she worked seven days a week. She did not own a house or a car but used what she earned to pay rent and help her family.
16Ms. Edwards does not have any alcohol or substance abuse issues.
17Ms. Edwards has done well in custody and has completed several educational and training courses including hairdressing, self care, anger management, changing habits, supportive relationships, looking for work, problem solving and workbooks on motivation and from challenge to change. She has worked in various roles while in custody as a laundry worker, cleaner, server and in the library.
18Ms. Edwards is described as someone that can sustain warm and caring relationships and who despite a difficult childhood, is someone who remains positive. Her friends and family describe her as loyal, caring, and resilient. They remain supportive of her.
D. Position of the Parties
19The Crown seeks a sentence of 7 years, less 6 months for Duncan credit as well as the appropriate deduction for Summers credit. The Crown accepts that given that Ms. Edwards is a foreign national, her time in custody will be more difficult given that her family is far away and cannot visit her. The Crown argues that denunciation and deterrence are the primary sentencing goals. The Crown submits that there is nothing about Ms. Edwards personal circumstances that warrants imposing a sentence below the range for this type of offence. The Crown also seeks ancillary orders including DNA, a weapons prohibition order and forfeiture order.
20The defence submits that a sentence of 3.5 years is appropriate. Counsel submits that ranges are not binding. Ms. Edwards has relevant Morris factors and is a first-time offender. Ms. Edwards is an American citizen and therefore, she will not get day parole after serving a third of her sentence as many first-time offenders would and therefore serving her sentence is significantly harsher. These collateral circumstances justify the lower sentence.
E. Legal Principles
21Section 10(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act states that:
Without restricting the generality of the Criminal Code, the fundamental purpose of a sentence for an offence is to contribute to “respect for the law and maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society while encouraging rehabilitation, and treatment in appropriate circumstances of offenders and acknowledging the harm done to victims and to the community.”
22Section 718 of the Criminal Code sets out the purposes and objectives of sentencing which includes: to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; to separate offenders from society, where necessary; to foster rehabilitation; to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.
23Section 718.2 instructs the court to consider the aggravating and mitigating factors relating to the offence and offender and to impose a sentence that is similar to sentences imposed for similar offences and offenders, and to consider the principle of restraint.
24When considering all these factors the fundamental principle that must be applied is proportionality. See s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code. In R. v. Bissonnette, 2022 SCC 23, [2022] 1 S.C.R. 597, at para. 50, the Supreme Court of Canada explained that the sentence “must be severe enough to denounce the offence but must not exceed ‘what is just and appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender and the gravity of the offence’”. See also R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, [2021] 3 S.C.R. 366, at para. 10: R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at para. 30.
F. Sentencing Range and Jurisprudence
25The sentencing range for importing large amounts of cocaine is well established. Back in 1996, the Court of Appeal in R. v. Cunningham (1996), 1996 CanLII 1311 (ON CA), 27 O.R. (3d) 786 (C.A.) held that barring exceptional circumstances, the appropriate range for first time couriers who smuggle large amounts of cocaine into Canada should be six to eight years. In that case, the Court of Appeal imposed a 5-year sentence in addition to the 8 months the offender spent in pretrial custody. The offender was a 21-year-old first offender, who lived on social assistance and pled guilty to importing over 5 kilograms of cocaine into Canada. In finding the appropriate range for importing multiple kilograms of cocaine, the Court of Appeal held that:
In establishing such a range, we readily acknowledge that sentencing is not an exact science and that trial judges must retain the necessary degree of flexibility to do justice in individual cases. We recognize as well that the suggested range will often require the imposition of a severe penalty for first offenders. We are not insensitive to this concern, mindful as we must be that in many instances, couriers tend to be weak and vulnerable, thereby becoming easy prey to those who engage in drug trafficking on a commercial basis.
26This range of sentence has been repeatedly reaffirmed: R. v. H(C.N.), (2002), 2002 CanLII 7751 (ON CA), 62 O.R. (3d) 564 (C.A.); R. v. Aujla, 2015 ONCA 350, 395 D.L.R. (4th) 244 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 87-88.
27The Crown filed several cases which I have considered. For example, in R. v. L.C., 2022 ONCA 863, 421 C.C.C. (3d) 227 (Ont. C.A.), the Court of Appeal upheld a sentence of 6 years and 3 months for an offender who imported 3.2 kilograms of cocaine strapped to her body. She admitted guilt after the Charter application was dismissed. The offender was a single mother to three children who had been apprehended by the CAS. The trial judge considered the collateral consequences to the offender and her children and considered the offender’s upbringing and how anti-Black racism impacted her moral blameworthiness.
28In R. v. Clarke, 2019 ONSC 5868, after a jury trial, Justice LeMay imposed a seven-year sentence for an offender who imported 4.3 kilograms of cocaine into Canada. The offender was traveling with her two children aged 7 and 10 at the time. When she was arrested the children were turned over to CAS until she was released on bail. While she was racialized, there was no evidence that demonstrated that there was a connection between anti-Black racism and her commission of the offence.
29In R. v. Abad-Roberston, 2015 ONSC 6300, the offender was convicted of importing 4.1 kilograms of cocaine into Canada. The offender was 25 years of age. She had no criminal record. She had a two-year-old son for whom she was the primary care giver, and she had gone back to school and was gainfully employed. Justice Andre held that there were no exceptional circumstances that warranted departing from the Cunningham range and sentenced her to six and a half years imprisonment.
30In R. v. Carrera-Vega, 2015 ONSC 4958, the offender was convicted of importing 3.8 kilograms of cocaine. The offender was 22 years of age at the time of the offence. He had no criminal record and had a daughter who was four years old at the time of sentencing. He was a permanent resident and therefore at risk of being deported because of the sentence. Justice Fairburn held that there was nothing exceptional that warranted a sentence outside of the Cunningham range and she sentenced the offender to six and a half years in custody.
31The defence relies heavily on Harris J.’s decision in R. v. Gordon, 2025 ONSC 2597. In that case, Harris J. reviewed the sentencing range set out in Cunningham and discussed the cautious approach that must be taken when considering general deterrence. He held that exceptional circumstances are not required for there to be a departure from the range. In that case, the offender was convicted after a jury trial of importing 3.5 kilograms of cocaine. Two kilograms were strapped to her body, and one and a half kilograms was taped to her twelve-year-old son. The offender was racially marginalized. She suffered various forms of hardship including sexual abuse, single parenting, poor mental health and poverty. She was a single mother of two young sons that she was going to be separated from. She also had significant mental health issues including general anxiety, depression, borderline personality disorder and a history of engaging in self harm. She had been admitted to the hospital on numerous occasions and had attempted to take her life on two occasions. Harris J. sentenced the offender to 3.5 years imprisonment. The Crown has appealed this sentence.
32I need not consider whether I agree with everything in Harris J.’s decision in determining the appropriate sentence in this case.. I do agree with Harris J. that sentencing ranges are not straightjackets and that sentencing judges must impose sentences that are proportional to the gravity of the offence and degree of responsibility of the offender.
33The defence also relied on the decision of R. v. Aghabeigi, 2004 BCCA 263. In that case, the British Columbia Court of Appeal denied leave for the offender to appeal a three-year sentence she received for importing almost 10 kilograms of opium and denied the Crown’s sentence appeal. The offender was 41 years of age and a mother of two. She had no criminal record and had been on welfare for several years after she divorced from her husband. She suffered from depression, fibromyalgia, arrhythmia and type 2 diabetes. The Court of Appeal agreed that the sentence was lenient given that some cases suggested sentences of 6 to 7 years but found that the trial judge did not err in principle. The Court noted that the offender had stayed out of trouble while on bail and that while on bail, her health deteriorated and for those reasons they would not interfere with the decision of the sentencing judge. This case demonstrates that sentencing is an individualized process.
34At the end of the day, sentencing ranges are “guidelines, rather than hard and fast rules”: Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, [2020] 1 S.C.R. 424, at para. 37. They help a sentencing judge exercise their discretion because they reflect the application of the objectives and principles of sentencing to a particular offence and encourage greater consistency between sentencing decisions in accordance with the principle of parity. However, a sentencing judge may impose a sentence below or above the range provided that the sentence is in accordance with the principles and objectives of sentencing because sentencing is a highly individualized exercise. R. v. Nasogluak, 2010 SCC 6, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 206, at para. 44; R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 1089, at para. 57.
35Applying the above principles, I will consider what is the appropriate sentence in this case.
G. What is the Appropriate Sentence?
Aggravating and Mitigating Factors
36In determining the appropriate sentence, the sentencing judge must consider any aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender: Criminal Code, s. 718.2(a). I will begin by considering the aggravating factors in this case.
37First, the nature of the drug involved: cocaine. The dangers of trafficking cocaine have long been recognized in the jurisprudence. The harms of trafficking cocaine lead to addiction, and debilitating health effects and even overdose. It also leads to indirect harms including the increase in crime committed by those who seek to finance their addiction and organized crime. It impacts families and causes intergenerational trauma, as well as health care costs and law enforcement expenses; Parranto, at paras. 87-91. It is not mitigating that the cocaine was intended for the UK as opposed to Canada. The harms from cocaine do not change even if it was not intended to be trafficked in Canada. The offence of importation of cocaine is very serious.
38Second, there was a significant amount of cocaine totalling 4,676.5 grams. The cocaine was valued between $82,800 to $561,181 CAD depending on how it was sold.
39There are several mitigating factors in this case.
40First, it is not an aggravating factor that Ms. Edwards had a trial or did not acknowledge remorse. The trial in this matter was extremely streamlined and the actus reus of the offence was admitted. The only issue at trial was Ms. Edwards’ knowledge. The conduct of the trial saved the court considerable judicial resources which warrants mitigation.
41Second, Ms. Edwards comes before the court with no criminal record. She is not however a youthful first offender which would have resulted in her receiving more mitigation: R. v. Habib, 2024 ONCA 830, 99 C.R. (7th) 110 (Ont. C.A).
42Third, there is Ms. Edwards’ personal circumstances. Ms. Edwards does not provide any insight into why she committed the offence as she takes the position that she is innocent, as is her right. However, the court can still review her personal background and draw an inference as to her motivation for committing the offence.
43While the court did not have the benefit of an enhanced pre-sentence report, the court had the evidence of Ms. Edwards and the pre-sentence report.
44I have no issue finding that Ms. Edwards suffered from anti-Black racism living in an impoverished area in the United States where there was a significant gang presence and drug trafficking and drug use. She was raised by a single mother and commenced working while in grade school to help earn money for her and her family. She was abandoned by her mother and moved in with her father and sister and then they moved out and she supported herself and her sister at a very young age. She has held a variety of jobs just to get by economically. She has been heavily burdened by growing up in poverty her whole life. Her educational and economic disadvantages are factors that have arisen because of anti-Black racism.
45From this evidence I am satisfied that there is a sufficient connection between Ms. Edwards’ experiences as a Black woman and the systemic anti-Black racism she faced and her commission of the offence for financial profit. This in turn diminishes her moral culpability and assists in considering the various objectives of sentencing to ensure her sentence is proportionate: R. v. Morris, 2021 ONCA 680, 159 O.R. (3d) 641 (C.A.), at paras. 13, 39, 42, 91, 97 103, 124.
46Fourth, the court may also give mitigation to the unduly harsh pre-trial incarceration conditions that an offender faces above the enhanced credit provided for in s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code. R. v. Duncan, 2016 ONCA 754. Duncan credit is not a deduction from an otherwise appropriate sentence. Rather it is a mitigating factor that can be considered along with other mitigating and aggravating factors to determine a fit sentence. It does not require a numerical calculation; however, such an approach may skew the calculation of the ultimate sentence and take on unwarranted significance in fixing the ultimate sentence: R. v. Marshall, 2021 ONCA 344, at paras. 52-53.
47There are two aspects of Duncan credit to consider with respect to the time that Ms. Edwards has spent in custody to date. First is the time that Ms. Edwards has spent in lockdown and being triple bunked. Ms. Edwards was in Vanier from August 18, 2024 to the first date of sentencing submissions on May 25, 2026. During that period, she was in partial or full lockdown for 771.5 hours (approximately 32 days). Some of the lockdowns were for several days in a row. For example, she was on lockdown for 8 full days and a further four full days when there was a respiratory outbreak in March 2026. She was on full lockdown for six days in October 2025 due to staffing issues. She was triple bunked for five days. Ms. Edwards also slept on the floor on four occasions. The harsher conditions she faced while in custody warrants mitigation on sentence.
48Ms. Edwards is a foreign national. As such her time in custody thus far has been harsher than other individuals as Ms. Edwards’ friends and family have not been able to visit her given that they reside in California. This also warrants mitigation. See for example R. v. Critton, 2002 CanLII 3240 (Ont. S.C.).
Collateral Consequences
49The court must also consider the collateral consequences that arise from the commission of the offence, the conviction for the offence or the sentence imposed for the offender. The weight to be given to the collateral consequences varies from case to case. The question is not whether the collateral consequences diminish the offender’s moral responsibility or the seriousness of the offence but whether the effect of the consequences means that a particular sentence would have a more significant impact on the offender because of their circumstances. However, the weight to be given to collateral consequences should be determined having regard to the type and seriousness of the offence. Collateral consequences cannot be used to impose a disproportionate sentence. R. v. L.C., 2022 ONCA 863, 421 C.C.C. (3d) 227 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 21; R. v. Pham, 2013 SCC 15, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 739, at paras. 14-18; R. v. Suter, 2018 SCC 34, [2018] 2 S.C.R. 496, at paras. 47-48.
50One collateral consequence that Ms. Edwards will face while serving her sentence is separation from her family. She is an American citizen who was travelling through Canada when she committed the offence. She has no friends or family here. Neither her family nor friends have been able to come to visit her since her arrest and will be unlikely to visit while she serves her sentence. She has not seen her family including her young niece that she cared for or her two stepchildren. The Crown agrees that this is a collateral consequence for the court to consider in determining the appropriate sentence. See Critton.
51Counsel for Ms. Edwards submits that an exceptional collateral consequence is Ms. Edwards’ inability to obtain day parole or an unescorted temporary absence (UTA). Counsel for Ms. Edwards submits that it is a certainty that Ms. Edwards will be subject to a removal order as she has no status in Canada. He submits that under s. 36(2) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, S.C. 2001, c. 27 (IRPA) she is inadmissible as a foreign national having been convicted of an offence in Canada. The next step is for the Minister to consider issuing a removal order pursuant to s. 44 of IRPA. Once the removal order is issued, she will not receive day parole or UTA. Section 128(4) of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act, S.C. 1992, c. 20 (CCRA). Government of Canada, Parole Board of Canada Policy 8.4. If she was a Canadian citizen, she would likely receive day parole after serving 1/3 of her sentence. Therefore, counsel submits that her sentence is harsher than it otherwise would be.
52Counsel submits that even if her parole ineligibility is uncertain, it is still relevant. Courts routinely consider forward looking factors in determining the appropriate sentence including, future employment, health deterioration in custody and family reintegration.
53The Crown submits that Ms. Edwards’ parole eligibility is not a relevant consideration on sentencing as they are two separate regimes.
54The Crown also disagrees that Ms. Edwards will automatically serve two-thirds of her sentence and be deported at her statutory release date. The Crown submits that it is uncertain that Ms. Edwards will not receive day parole or UTAs. At this time Ms. Edwards is not subject to a removal order and therefore is eligible for UTAs and day parole as set out in 8.3 of the Parole Board of Canada’s policy. The Crown also points out that a foreign national can apply for a voluntary departure at any time as set out in the Parole Board policy at 8.4, paras. 14-15. In addition, the Crown notes that parole can be granted on compassionate grounds for Ms. Edwards at any time. Compassionate grounds includes where the offender is terminally ill, suffers from physical or mental health issues that will cause serious damage if the offender continues to be held in custody, where it would constitute excessive hardship that was not reasonably foreseeable at the time the offender was sentenced. Finally, the Crown submits that as a foreign national, Ms. Edwards can also apply to have her sentence transferred pursuant to the International Transfer of Offenders Act, S.C. 2004, c. 21.
55I agree with the defence that it is extremely likely that Ms. Edwards will be subject to a removal order at some point. However, when that will likely occur is not known and until that time, she would be eligible for UTAs and day parole. I also agree that based on the facts known at present, she would not likely be eligible for parole on compassionate grounds.
56I am of the view that the fact that Ms. Edwards is a foreign national and will almost certainly be subject to a removal order which would make her ineligible for UTAs or day parole at some point is not a collateral consequence that warrants a reduction in sentence as suggested by counsel for Ms. Edwards.
57This case is not like Pham. In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada held that in determining an appropriate sentence, it was appropriate for the sentencing judge to consider the collateral consequence that an offender would be denied the right to appeal the deportation order depending on the length of sentence imposed.
58The issue of parole is different. Parliament created a separate regime for parole. Parliament determined that foreign nationals subject to a removal order are not eligible for UTAs or day parole until they are eligible for full parole. Ms. Edwards does not challenge the constitutionality of those provisions.
59Ms. Edwards asks the court to lessen her sentence because it is certain that a removal order will be issued which will preclude her from applying for day parole or UTAs. Applying that logic the court should also consider that most first time offenders will be granted parole at an earlier time and that this may impact the sentence that the trial judge feels is appropriate.
60The jurisprudence both before and after Pham has repeatedly held that a trial judge should not increase or decrease a sentence outside of the sentencing range based when parole may likely be granted.
61In R. v. Bernier, 2003 BCCA 134, 177 C.C.C. (3d) 137 (B.C. C.A.), the British Columbia Court of Appeal held that the parole regime and sentencing are separate and distinct. In the context of imposing a lengthier sentence because an offender would likely receive early parole, the Court of Appeal held at para. 45:
To put this another way, judges in determining a fit sentence are to put the powers conferred by the Corrections and Conditional Release Act on the National Parole Board out of their minds. Parliament has given certain powers to the judiciary and others to the Board and it is not for the one to trespass into the field of the other.
62If probable parole cannot be used to increase a sentence, it also should not be used to reduce a sentence. In R. v. Uy, 2016 BCSC 823, at paras. 18-22, the sentencing judge dismissed the very argument raised by Ms. Edwards finding that parole ineligibility raises different considerations than the loss of a right to appeal a deportation order as discussed in Pham. The court held that it was Parliament’s choice to determine that foreign nationals who are subject to a removal order should not be eligible for day parole of UTAs until they are eligible for full parole.
63In Carrera-Vega, at paras. 66-67, the offender submitted that he should receive a sentence below the range because he was facing an unpredictable situation arising from his status as a permanent resident. If he was subject to a removal order he could not receive day parole or an UTA until he served full parole., Fairburn J., as she then was, dismissed this argument.
64Fairburn J recognized that in Pham collateral consequences can be given some consideration in appropriate circumstances. She found that in the circumstances it would be contrary to the principles set out in Pham to impose a sentence below the range based on speculation as to what will happen once the offender was incarcerated. She noted a removal order was not a foregone conclusion. In addition whether the offender would receive day parole or UTAs with or without a removal order is unknown. She also noted that if the offender was deported after receiving full parole the “strictures of their sentence evaporate more quickly than would be the case if they were not subject to the removal order. Their sentence would be over”, in contrast to the offender who remains in Canada. See also Whaling v. Canada (Attorney General), 2012 BCCA 435, 292 C.C.C. (3d) 502 (B.C. C.A.), at para. 52; R. v. Razmara, 2012 ONCA 13, at para. 2.
65The Court of Appeal in R. v. Passera, 2019 ONCA 527, 146 O.R. (3d) 449 (Ont. C.A.), leave to appeal denied, [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 327 held that sentencing judges are not to consider when or how an offender might be released in determining the appropriate sentence. As explained by Doherty J.A. at paras 26-27:
Subject to specific statutory exceptions (e.g. ss. 743.6 and 745.5), sentencing judges are not asked to determine parole eligibility when fixing an appropriate sentence. Questions relating to if, when, or how an offender might be released on some form of conditional release prior to the completion of the sentence are not for the sentencing judge to determine: see Zinck, at paras. 18-20; Canada (Attorney General) v. Whaling, 2014 SCC 20, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 392, at para. 61. A sentencing judge cannot increase a sentence with a view to increasing the period of parole ineligibility or the period during which an offender would be subject to parole: Zinck, at para. 18; R. v. Wilmott, 1966 CanLII 222 (ON CA), [1966] 2 O.R. 654 (C.A.); R. v. Holden, 1962 CanLII 576 (BC CA), [1963] 2 C.C.C. 394 (B.C.C.A.).
27It would be equally wrong for a sentencing judge to impose a sentence that was less than the appropriate sentence for the offence and the offender because, in the sentencing judge’s view, the offender would be best served by being eligible for conditional release at some specific point in time. For example, some crimes, and cocaine importation is one, require a sentence that emphasizes denunciation and general deterrence. It would be an error in principle for a sentencing judge to ignore or undervalue those considerations and impose a sentence predicated entirely on the sentencing judge’s assessment that the offender’s rehabilitation would be best served if that offender were eligible for parole at a certain date.
66This reasoning is also consistent with the comments of Lamer C.J. in R. v. M.C.A, 1996 CanLII 230 (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500. In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada considered the applicability of the parole provisions for fixed sentences where parole eligibility commenced at the time of sentence, as opposed to life imprisonment other than as a minimum punishment, where parole eligibility commenced the date of arrest. In discussing the interaction between sentencing and parole, Lamer C.J. held that the granting of parole represents a change in the conditions under which an imposed sentence must be served rather than a reduction of the judicial sentence itself and that the sentencing judge should not alter the sentencing based on the particularities of the Corrections Act. As he stated at para. 70:
In my view, it would seriously pervert both the very purpose and function of the statute to suggest that the peculiarities of the parole eligibility rules contained within the Corrections Act ought to dictate and control the structure of sentences under the Code. The Corrections Act was intended to facilitate the sentencing discretion of trial judges rather than frustrate it. As such, I simply cannot accept that we should modify the basic architecture of our criminal justice system to avoid a potential anomaly arising from the comparative rules governing the commencement of parole eligibility under ss. 120(1) and (2) of the Corrections Act.
67I adopt the reasoning outlined in the above jurisprudence. I am of the view that it would not be appropriate for the court to consider that a removal order will almost certainly be issued and at that time Ms. Edwards would not be able to obtain day parole or UTA in determining the appropriate sentence. The two regimes are separate and there are too many unknowns. The court does not know when the removal order will be issued. Until that time, Ms. Edwards is eligible for day parole and UTAs. It is not known with or without the removal order if she would be granted day parole or UTAs. Finally, it is not known if she will immediately be deported when she is eligible for full parole which would effectively end her sentence as compared to other offenders who would still have to serve their sentence in Canada.
68Counsel for Ms. Edwards also submits that another factor to consider is that imposing a lesser sentence on Ms. Edwards will spare Canadians the expense of her incarceration as was considered by Justice Hill in Critton, at para. 24. This cuts both ways. While a shorter sentence may spare the Canadian public’s purse, imposing a lessor sentence on the basis that a person is a foreign national creates a two-tier system for sentencing: one for foreign nationals and a different one for national and permanent residents. Moreover, it would signal that foreign nationals can commit offences in Canada with comparatively lighter repercussions, creating a dangerous incentive that puts Canadians at significant risk. Such an approach would fail to protect Canada and would be contrary to our international treaty obligations to combat drug offences.
69The defence also submits that another collateral factor is that Ms. Edwards is 39 years of age, and she wishes to have children. The longer a sentence that is imposed, the less likely that she will be able to have a child. While I have considered this factor in determining the appropriate sentence, I do not give it significant weight. It is far from certain that if the court imposed a lesser sentence that she would become pregnant.
70Each case turns on its facts. I do not find that a sentence of 3.5 years is appropriate in this case as was given in Gordon by Harris. J. whether the circumstances of the offender in that case are described as exceptional or not. The offender like Ms. Edwards was older and had significant Morris factors present. However, Ms. Gordon had other significant mitigating factors including serious mental health issues and two young children she was solely responsible for, both of whom have special needs.
71In arriving at a fit sentence, I have considered the circumstances of the offence and Ms. Edwards’ circumstances, including the aggravating and mitigating factors as well as the collateral consequences. I have also considered the purpose, objectives and principles of sentencing. Denunciation and general deterrence are important sentencing objectives given that Ms. Edwards has been convicted of importing a large amount of cocaine. I do not consider specific deterrence to be a relevant sentencing objective in this case given the time that Ms. Edwards has already spent in custody and her personal circumstances. I also have considered the principles of restraint, parity and find that Ms. Edwards has excellent prospects for rehabilitation.
72I am of the view that the appropriate sentence in this case is one of six years less presentence custody less 1068 days of Summers credit. The remaining sentence to serve is 1,122 days which 3 years and 27 days.
73In addition the court makes the following ancillary orders.
DNA order pursuant to s. 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code;
S. 109 order. There is a weapons prohibition order for 10 years pursuant to s. 109(2)(a) and a weapons prohibition for life pursuant to s. 109(2)(b);
Forfeiture order as provided.
Dennison J.
Released: July 30, 2026