Hagopian v. Kechichian, 2026 ONSC 4405

Court File and Parties

CITATION: Hagopian v. Kechichian, 2026 ONSC 4405 COURT FILE NO.: FS-18-0007230-0000 DATE: 2026-07-29

SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: Tania Hagopian, Applicant AND: Kevork Kechichian, Respondent

BEFORE: M. Kraft, J.

COUNSEL: Julie Stanchieri and William Francis, for the Applicant James Edney and Joseph Slavec, for the Respondent

HEARD: July 22, 2026

Endorsement

Nature of the Motion

1The applicant, Tania Hagopian (“Tania”), moves to:

a. Amend her Application to add claims for the tort of Intimate Partner Violence (“IPV”), assault, battery, abuse of process, punitive damages, care costs, and income loss;

b. Question the respondent, Kevork Kechichian (“Kevork”), prior to trial; and

c. Withdraw deemed admissions resulting from her failure to respond to Kevork’s April 9, 2026 Request to Admit (“RTA”).

2Kevork opposes all relief. He submits that the proposed amendments cause non-compensable prejudice because he cannot properly defend new tort claims before the trial, which is scheduled for October 5, 2026. He notes that on June 10, 2026, Nakonechny J. ordered that this 14-day trial cannot be adjourned and the length of the trial cannot exceed the 14 days allotted. Kevork further argues that the deemed admissions should stand because Tania failed to respond within the time prescribed by the Family Law Rules.¹ He characterizes this motion as a delay tactic.

3This is a high-conflict matter with a 9.5-year litigation history. The parties separated on October 15, 2017, following a 19-year marriage. They have two adult children, aged 26 and 23, for whom Tania was the primary caregiver. Between 2007 and 2011, the family relocated to San Diego where Kevork worked. In July 2011, Tania and the children returned to Toronto while Kevork remained in San Diego for employment,

4The 14-day trial is scheduled to commence on October 5, 2026. It will address retroactive and prospective child and spousal support, income imputation, equalization, and post-separation adjustments. By the time the trial begins, this litigation will have been ongoing for 10 years.

Issues to be determined

5The issues I need to determine are as follows:

a. Should Tania be permitted to amend her Amended Application under Rule 11(3) to add various tort claims and to specify that she and Kevork began cohabiting on October 15, 1995?

b. Should the parties be permitted to question the other again prior to trial?

c. Should the deemed admissions arising from the April 9, 2026 Request to Admit (“RTA”) be withdrawn pursuant to Rule 22(5)?

Brief Conclusion

6This long motion was heard on July 22, 2026, and I reserved my decision. For the reasons set out below, Tania is permitted to amend her application to add the tort claims for IPV, assault, and battery only; the parties are ordered to conduct further questioning of each other by no later than September 9, 2026; and Tania’s deemed admissions arising from the April 9, 2026, RTA are withdrawn, with her response dated June 9, 2026, to stand for use at trial.

Background

7The parties were married on September 1, 1996, and separated on October 25, 2015. They have two children, now aged 26 and 23. Between 2007 and 2011, the family relocated to San Diego for Kevork’s work. In July 2011, Tania and the children returned to Toronto while Kevork remained in San Diego. Tania served her initial Application in 2017 in Newmarket, and the matter was subsequently transferred to this court in 2018.

8Pursuant to an interim order of Jarvis J. dated September 26, 2018, Kevork pays Tania monthly spousal support of $32,000, monthly child support of $14,000, and section 7 expenses of $36,000 annually, at a rate of $3,000 per month. Following the completion of questioning, Tania amended her Application in 2023 to include a claim for unequal division of net family property.

9On August 27, 2025, the parties attended a Trial Management Conference before Nakonechny J., where a Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form (“2025 TSEF”) was released setting the matter down for a 14-day trial to commence on October 5, 2026.

10On April 9, 2026, Kevork served an RTA containing 305 requests and over 300 corresponding documents spanning thousands of pages. At the time, Tania was unrepresented and writing her final examinations for an architecture degree. She wrote to Kevork’s counsel on three occasions seeking an extension, allegedly mistakenly believing she had until 30 days before trial to respond rather than the 20 days prescribed by the Family Law Rules.

11On May 29, 2026, Tania's agent, Julie Stanchieri, notified Kevork’s counsel that she had been retained and that Tania would deliver a response to the RTA shortly. Kevork’s counsel replied on May 30, 2026, refusing to consent to a withdrawal of the deemed admissions. Tania subsequently completed her response with the assistance of counsel and served it on June 9, 2026, one day prior to the exit pretrial conference.

12At the exit pretrial conference on June 10, 2026, Nakonechny J. granted Tania leave to bring the present long motion, restricted strictly to two issues: amending her pleadings and withdrawing the deemed admissions. The exit pretrial was largely unproductive as Tania attended unprepared and failed to serve an Offer to Settle, resulting in a $5,000 costs order against her. In her endorsement, Nakonechny J. ordered that the 14-day trial cannot be adjourned or extended.

13On June 24, 2026, three weeks after the Supreme Court of Canada released its decision in Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia,² Tania served a draft Amended Amended Application. This draft sought to specify a cohabitation date of October 15, 1995, and to introduce tort claims for IPV, assault, battery, abuse of process, punitive damages, care costs, and income loss. On July 3, 2026, Kevork served a comprehensive disclosure request, maintaining that production was necessary to defend against these newly proposed tort claims.

Issue one: Should Tania be permitted to amend her Amended Application to include damages for various torts and to specify that she and Kevork began cohabiting before marriage starting on October 15, 1995, pursuant to Rule 11(3)?

14Tania seeks permission to amend her Application to add claims for loss of income and the torts of IPV, assault, battery, and abuse of process. She claims a total of $3.1 million in damages, comprising:

a. $500,000 in general and aggravated damages for IPV, assault, and battery;

b. $100,000 for abuse of process;

c. $500,000 in punitive damages;

d. $2 million for income loss and competitive disadvantage; and

e. unspecified amounts for past, future, and special care costs.

15She also seeks to specify the cohabitation start date as October 15, 1995.

16Kevork opposes the amendments. He submits that because these claims could have been brought earlier - with the exception of the newly recognized tort of IPV- allowing them so close to the October 5, 2026 trial date causes non-compensable prejudice to him. He notes that his counsel is out of the country until late August 2026, leaving insufficient time to conduct necessary questioning, quantify damages, or retain necessary experts to defend against a $3.1 million claim.

The Law

17Rule 11(3) of the Family Law Rules mandatorily requires the court to grant permission to amend a pleading unless the amendment would disadvantage another party in a way for which costs or an adjournment could not compensate. The threshold is high, and the onus rests on the refusing party to demonstrate actual, non-compensable prejudice.³

18In Moghini v Dashti, ⁴ the court held that a motion to amend should be allowed unless:

a. the amendment would cause an unjust process that cannot be fixed by an adjournment or costs,

b. the amendment proposed is untenable (i.e. not properly pleaded and not prima facie meritorious in law), or

c. the amendment is made in bad faith. […].

19There are many family law cases where the court has allowed litigants to amend their pleadings just prior to trial and even at trial.⁵

20There are also many family law cases where the request for an amendment of pleadings has not been allowed due to the timing of when the amendments are sought: In Moghini v Dashti, Myers, J., states: “…..A process that requires a party to go to trial without disclosure and discovery of relevant documents and evidence is allowing trial by ambush and surprise. That is not a just process. Therefore, an assessment is required as to whether an injustice will result if an amendment is allowed in this case and, if so, whether an adjournment of the trial and/or an order of costs can prevent that injustice from occurring.”⁶

Application to the Facts

21Kevork deposes that to properly defend these dynamic tort claims before trial, he must take several extensive steps, including:

a. Retaining civil counsel and filing an Amended Answer;

b. Moving to compel third-party productions and records, including out-of-province police and court records from a family wedding in Texas;

c. Conducting further questioning of Tania and key third-party witnesses;

d. Bringing interlocutory motions for summary judgment, sealing orders, or anonymization;

e. Retaining foreign counsel in California and Paris to address cross-jurisdictional and limitation period defences, given that much of the alleged tortious conduct occurred outside Ontario.

22Tania submits that Kevork’s anticipated procedural steps are overstated. She highlights that Kevork has already consulted civil counsel and that she has agreed to an immediate exchange of affidavits of documents. She argues that because the alleged IPV occurred primarily behind closed doors, there is no extensive documentary record or third-party witness list to explore.

23Tania further contends that Ontario is the appropriate forum with a real and substantial connection to the dispute, as she maintained her primary residence in Markham and Kevork jointly owned that home until 2025. She notes that under the Limitations Act, 2002⁷, there is no limitation period for physical assaults inflicted within an intimate relationship. Finally, Tania confirms she will consent to the release of any out-of-province police records and does not intend to call expert witnesses, as all her evidence must fit within her allotted 7 trial days.

24Kevork’s July 3, 2026, production requests are unsupported by prevailing jurisprudence. In his request for production, Kevork asks Tania to map each alleged fact to the three elements of the new IPV tort. However, Ahluwalia does not require this type of pleading map. As established by the Supreme Court of Canada at paragraph 184 of that decision, to establish the tort of IPV, (1) a plaintiff must show that the abusive conduct arose in an intimate partnership or its aftermath, (2) the defendant intentionally engaged in that conduct, and (3) the conduct objectively constitutes coercive control. The Court explicitly clarified that the new tort does not require a plaintiff to prove any consequential harm separately, as the harm is necessarily present and liability follows once the three elements are met.

25Kevork further requested that Tania produce specific documentation to substantiate her claim that he concealed assets for the purpose of financial control. This request misinterprets the mental element of the tort. At paragraph 186 of Ahluwalia, the Supreme Court held that a plaintiff must simply establish the defendant’s intention to engage in the impugned conduct. There is no legal requirement to prove that the defendant subjectively intended to exercise coercive control or cause a specific type of financial harm; it is sufficient that the underlying act itself was intentional.

26Finally, Kevork’s demand for a comprehensive incident schedule detailing every historical event, date, and witness is unrealistic. Tania has deposed that she intends to rely primarily on her oral testimony to prove the pattern of IPV. As noted in Zunnurain v. Chowdhury, intimate partner violence is notoriously difficult to prove because it routinely occurs behind closed doors without third-party corroboration or independent documentary evidence.⁸ This reality was explicitly reinforced by the Supreme Court in Ahluwalia at paragraphs 102 and 216, which cautions courts against imposing evidentiary requirements that ignore the isolated environment in which coercive control takes

27The amendments Tania seeks regarding damages for the tort of IPV, assault, and battery are granted. Kevork has known from the outset of this litigation that Tania asserts she suffered abuse during the marriage. In her initial 2017 Application, Tania sought a restraining order under section 46 of the Family Law Act, pleading that Kevork was abusive and physically violent. She detailed specific instances of physical violence in a September 12, 2018, affidavit, and attached photographic evidence of her injuries to a subsequent affidavit sworn on June 24, 2026. Furthermore, Tania’s October 29, 2024, Reply explicitly pled that Kevork intimidated, harassed, and exerted financial control over her.

28During his July 27, 2023 questioning, Kevork refused to answer questions concerning abuse and family violence, asserting that the issue was irrelevant. He was plainly aware of Tania’s family violence allegations. Those allegations were pleaded, addressed during questioning, and cannot reasonably be characterized as a surprise. Nor can the proposed tort claims be described as "trial by ambush."

29Family law pleadings require parties to set out the material facts that support their claims rather than specific legal labels or torts.⁹ Because Tania has consistently pled the underlying material facts of family violence throughout this case, I am persuaded that permitting these specific amendments causes no surprise or actual prejudice to Kevork.

30The proposed amendments for IPV, assault, and battery damages are neither legally untenable nor brought in bad faith. Tania acted swiftly by serving her draft amendments within three weeks of the SCC’s decision in Ahluwalia. The real issue is balancing the timing and scope of this request against any procedural disadvantage to Kevork. While these amendments introduce additional factual considerations, Kevork will not be unfairly disadvantaged. Tania has consented to further questioning on these new claims, which can easily be completed in early September 2026.

31Conversely, Tania's late amendments to add claims for abuse of process (damages of $100,000) and income loss or loss of competitive advantage (damages of $2 million) are denied. These amendments would cause Kevork severe prejudice that cannot be remedied by costs or an adjournment. Both parties want to proceed to trial, and Nakonechny J. has ordered that the scheduled trial is peremptory on both sides. Kevork’s counsel is out of the country until the end of August 2026 - a fact known to Tania - and these financial and process torts were never raised at the Trial Management Conference when the Trial Scheduling Endorsement Form was finalized.

32Tania could have advanced claims for abuse of process, income loss, or loss of competitive advantage at any point over the last 9.5 years of litigation. She failed to do so and has offered no explanation for the delay. In applying Rule 11(3), I must consider the primary objective set out in Rule 2(2) to deal with cases justly, which includes ensuring procedural fairness, reducing expense, and managing court time effectively under Rules 2(3) and 2(4).

33Introducing complex, unquantified multi-million-dollar economic tort claims at this late stage would completely derail the strict 14-day trial timeline. In denying these specific claims, I adopt the reasoning of Myers J. in Moghini v. Dashti.¹⁰ In a heavily case-managed family law environment, timeliness, proportionality, efficiency, and affordability are essential elements of justice. Last-minute efforts to exploit the mandatory language of Rule 11(3) to introduce entirely new, unquantified claims that were never vetted at previous case conferences or discoveries undermine the integrity of the process. This constitutes a distinct form of prejudice that cannot be cured by costs.

34Tania is prepared to pay costs to Kevork for the preparation of an Amended Answer to address the IPV, assault, and battery claims, and she is fully cooperative regarding questioning taking place in September, and the exchange of Affidavits of Documents.

35Finally, Tania is permitted to amend her application to specify her pre-marriage cohabitation date. Kevork’s own Answer acknowledges that the parties cohabited shortly prior to their marriage, meaning this minor amendment causes no surprise or prejudice.

Issue Two: Should Tania be permitted to question Kevork again prior to trial?

36Rule 20(5) of the Family Law Rules provides that a court may order questioning if it would be unfair to require the requesting party to proceed without it, the information is not easily available through another method, and the questioning will not cause unacceptable delay or undue expense.

37Kevork acknowledges that further questioning is necessary if Tania’s pleading amendments are allowed. The test is fully met here. It would be fundamentally unfair to expect the parties to proceed to trial on new intentional tort allegations without mutual discoveries. Questioning is the most direct method to uncover the necessary evidence, and completing this step now will promote cost efficiency at trial. Ordering a second examination even after a matter has been set down for trial facilitates a much more time-efficient hearing on the merits.¹¹

38Accordingly, both parties are permitted to conduct a second questioning of each other, which must be completed by no later than September 9, 2026.

Issue Three: Should the deemed admissions arising out of the RTA, dated April 9, 2026, be withdrawn pursuant to Rule 22(5)?

39Tania seeks to withdraw any deemed admissions arising from her failure to respond to Kevork’s April 9, 2026 RTA within the 20-day period prescribed by Rule 22(4). She submits primarily that the parties' 2025 TSEF governed the timeline and dictated that responses to requests to admit were not due until 30 days before trial, thereby superseding the default timelines in the Family Law Rules. Alternatively, Tania seeks permission to withdraw the admissions under Rule 22(5), arguing that Kevork’s RTA was an abusive, improper document that did not strictly require a response, and that she otherwise satisfies the legal test for judicial withdrawal.

40Rule 22(5) provides that a deemed admission may be withdrawn only with the permission of the court. In exercising its discretion, the court must interpret Rule 22 in a manner consistent with the primary objective of the Family Law Rules, which demands procedural fairness for both parties.

41A deemed admission may be withdrawn where the interests of justice warrant it. The scope of the court’s discretion varies based on the circumstances surrounding the default and whether the deemed admissions involve pure facts, questions of law, or issues of mixed fact and law. Where a failure to respond is supported by satisfactory evidence of inadvertence, a genuine mistake, or a reasonable explanation for the party's position, withdrawal may be permitted.¹²

42While requests to admit are a highly valuable tool to dispense with formal proof, narrow issues, and minimize litigation costs, deemed admissions that encompass questions of law or mixed fact and law are generally of little to no evidentiary weight.¹³

43As articulated in Sharifi v. Kandhola, the established test for withdrawing an admission involves a three-step inquiry: (1) whether the proposed withdrawal raises a triable issue; (2) whether the admission was inadvertent or resulted from mistaken instructions; and (3) whether the withdrawal will result in non-compensable prejudice to the opposing party.¹⁴

44Kevork opposes the withdrawal. He points out that Tania previously responded to an RTA within the prescribed statutory timelines earlier in this proceeding. He argues that she was well aware of her procedural obligations and cannot now exploit her temporary self-represented status to excuse her non-compliance. Kevork further submits that Tania did not fail to respond due to exam stress but rather chose to ignore the RTA in favour of a scheduled graduation vacation she had planned to go to Europe.

45Tania denies Kevork's characterization of her delay. She states that while she did successfully respond to an RTA in November 2025, that initial document contained only seven simple statements and she had the benefit of legal counsel at the time. By contrast, when Kevork served this second RTA, she was self-represented and writing her final examinations for her architecture degree. Tania notes that she did not ignore the document; rather, she actively contacted Kevork’s counsel on three separate occasions to request an extension, mistakenly believing she had until 30 days before trial to respond.

Application to Facts

46The chronological reality of how this RTA unfolded is critical to the assessment of Tania's mistake. On April 9, 2026, Kevork served an RTA comprising 305 statements and approximately 300 underlying documents. Two days later, on April 11, 2026, Tania notified Kevork’s counsel that she was in the middle of final architecture examinations and requested a two-week extension as a self-represented litigant. Kevork’s counsel did not reply, taking the position that a request for two weeks fell within the default 20-day response window prescribed by the Family Law Rules.

47On April 18, 2026, Tania contacted Kevork’s counsel a second time to request an additional two weeks to review the massive volume of records. Again, no response was received. On April 24, 2026, Tania attempted to open the digital link containing the 300 documents but found she couldn’t open it. She notified Kevork's counsel, who delivered a new link on April 27, 2026—just two days before the default statutory response deadline of April 29, 2026.

48On May 8, 2026, Tania requested a formal extension of time. Kevork characterizes this as her first valid extension request, maintaining that her prior emails merely signaled an intent to respond late. Kevork also asserts that Tania lied about lacking her former counsel's file, relying on correspondence from her previous lawyer confirming the file had been delivered to Tania on March 5, 2026.

49On May 11, 2026, Kevork’s counsel formally notified Tania that they intended to rely strictly on the deemed admissions because she had failed to serve a response within 20 days. Tania ultimately served a comprehensive, counsel-assisted response late in the evening on June 9, 2026. The next day, at the June 10, 2026 exit pretrial, Nakonechny J. granted Tania leave to bring this motion.

50In explaining her non-compliance, Tania points to the 2025 TSEF executed by the court. Paragraph 8 of that form explicitly states that Tania could serve an RTA 60 days before trial and respond to an RTA 30 days before trial. On this basis, Tania deposes that she genuinely believed her response to Kevork’s RTA was not due until September 5, 2026, operating under the mistaken impression that a court-ordered TSEF completely supersedes the default timelines in the Family Law Rules.

51Tania reasons that if Kevork had served his RTA 61 days before trial, the TSEF would allow her until 30 days before trial to respond, rendering the 20-day limit in Rule 22 inapplicable. Alternatively, she argues that the sheer breadth of the 305 statements constitutes an abuse of process. She asserts that Kevork suffers no actual prejudice and has offered to pay up to $4,000 in costs to remedy any inconvenience.

52Applying the three-branch test for the withdrawal of admissions, I am satisfied that Tania has met her onus. First, the 305 statements directly relate to central, triable issues in this litigation, including income imputation, support, work history, and property division.

53Second, I am satisfied that the failure to respond on time was the product of an honest mistake. While Tania's early emails show she knew she had a pressing obligation to respond, she clearly did not comprehend that missing the 20-day window would result in automated, terminal admissions that could extinguish her claims.

54Furthermore, it was entirely reasonable for a self-represented litigant to conclude that the deadlines set out in the 2025 TSEF governed her case. Timelines in a TSEF frequently diverge from the default Family Law Rules and are intended to prevail. Because a TSEF is an order signed by a judge, its terms must be followed from the date of issuance until the trial takes place. Accordingly, the second branch of the test is met: the admissions were a mistake born of a reasonable belief that the TSEF overrode Rule 22.

55Third, Kevork will not suffer non-compensable prejudice if the admissions are withdrawn. While Kevork has relied on these admissions, he was put on notice no later than May 29, 2026—when Tania’s agent contacted his counsel—that the timelines were actively disputed. Any prejudice Kevork experienced between the April 29 default and the June 9 delivery of Tania's actual response can be fully remedied by an award of costs.

56The single example of specific prejudice raised by Kevork is that he refrained from retaining a cross-border US tax expert, missing the July 7, 2026 expert report deadline mandated by the TSEF. He claims he deemed the report unnecessary because the underlying facts were temporarily admitted. However, because Tania communicated her intention to bring this motion back in May, Kevork has known for months that these admissions were unstable. He remains fully capable of securing and serving an expert report as soon as practicable.

57Because I am ordering that Tania's June 9, 2026, response be accepted and the deemed admissions withdrawn, I need not determine whether the statements in Kevork’s RTA are legally improper. I note, however, that during oral argument, Kevork’s counsel conceded that several of the 305 statements contained improper questions of pure law or mixed fact and law.¹⁵ Had these admissions stood, the trial judge would have been forced to evaluate their validity.¹⁶

58Unfortunately, neither party walked the court through the 305 statements item by item, and Tania's agent did not have a clear list of the specific statements Kevork conceded were improper mixed law and fact questions prior to making submissions. Given my primary finding that the statutory test for withdrawal is met due to an honest mistake and a lack of non-compensable prejudice, a line-by-line assessment of the RTA is unnecessary. Tania’s June 9, 2026 response shall stand for use at trial.

ORDER

59This court makes the following order:

a. The applicant’s draft Amended Amended Application dated June 24, 2026 may be served and filed with paragraphs 35(b) and 35(e) under the Claim being removed, and paragraphs 51, 53 and 54 under the Important Facts Supporting Her Other Claims being removed,

b. The respondent’s claim for costs relating to the answering the applicant’s Amended Amended Application shall be determined by the trial judge.

c. The parties may each question the other for no more than 4 hours for each party. The Questioning shall take place by September 9, 2026. The parties shall provide their available dates to one another within 3 days of this Order. If the parties cannot agree on the date and time for questioning or any other related arrangement for this questioning within 7 days, the court shall determine same.

d. Pursuant to Rule 22(5) of the Family Law Rules, the Applicant’s deemed admissions arising from the Applicant's failure to respond to the Respondent's Request to Admit dated April 9, 2026 within 20 days are withdrawn. The Applicant's Response to Request to Admit dated June 9, 2026, shall be deemed as the Applicant's Response to the Respondent’s Request to Admit.

e. The Respondent’s claim for costs relating to the deemed admissions shall be determined by the trial judge.

f. The parties are encouraged to agree on costs of this motion on the basis that there was divided success. If they are unable to do so, the applicant shall serve and file written costs submissions of no more than 3 pages, not included a Bill of Costs or Offers to Settle within 10 days of the release of this Endorsement. The respondent shall serve and file written costs submissions of no more than 3 pages, not including a Bill of Costs or Offers to Settle within 7 days of being served with the applicant’s costs submissions.

M. Kraft, J.

Footnotes

1. 1Family Law Rules, O. Reg. 114/99.
2. 2Ahluwalia v. Ahluwalia, 2026 SCC 16.
3. 3Davidson v. Davidson, 2021 ONSC 7459 at para. 22.
4. 4Moghini v. Dashti, 2016 ONSC 2116.
5. 5Cuthbert v. Nolis, 2024 ONCA 21, at para. 17, Studley v. Studley, 2022 ONCA 810, at para. 15; Davidson v. Davidson, 2021 ONSC 7459, at para. 22.
6. 6Supra Note 4, at paragraphs 16 and 17.
7. 7Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Sched. B., s. 16(1)(h.2).
8. 8Zunnurain v. Chowdhury, 2024 ONSC 5552, at paragraphs 219–233, and Barendregt v. Grebliunas, 2022 SCC 22, [2022] 1 SCR 517, at para.144.
9. 9Sethi v. Sethi, 2025 ONSC 5079 at paras. 46–49; Frick v. Frick, at para. 11-12 and Ahluwalia at para. 90
10. 10Supra, Note 4, at paragraph 35.
11. 11J.A.L. Developments v. Residences of Springhill Inc., 2020 ONSC 2222 at paragraph 70.
12. 12Smith v. Noel, 2023 ONSC 6682 at para. 8.
13. 13Ibid, at paras. 7–8.
14. 14Sharifi v. Kandhola, 2022 ONSC 478 at paragraph 22, (Antipas v. Coroneos, 1988 CanLII 10348 (ON SC); Serra v. Serra, 2006 CanLII 43100 (ON SC); Ramoutar v. Ramoutar, 2019 ONSC 2448, para. 6; and Forget v. Forget 2001 O.J. No. 3691, at para. 7.).
15. 15Mr. Edney acknowledged in submissions that the following statements in Kevork’s RTA contained mixed law and fact: #93, #94, #95, #120, $121, #122, #124, #125, #127, #129, #141, #145, #155-164, #183-185, #187-189, #265-266, #271, #277, #280, #281, #292, #293, #296. It was also acknowledged that the following statements contained pure law: #151, #152, #153, #286, #287, #288 and #289.
16. 16Woofenden v. Woofenden, 2018 ONSC 4583 at paragraphs 32–33.