Civil Litigation - Defendant - SCJ

The court dismissed Aqib Rahman's action against Dewart Gleason LLP and Lawyers Professional Indemnity Company as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The claim alleged civil fraud by the defendants in defending lawyers in prior litigation, but the court found that the doctrine of absolute privilege, as confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Rahman v. Elia Associates, provided a complete defence.

The court held that the action was devoid of merit, sought to relitigate settled issues, and should not proceed.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendants' statement of defence due to their persistent failure to comply with multiple court orders, including deadlines for affidavits of documents, attending examinations for discovery, and paying costs.

The defendants repeatedly appealed orders and sought adjournments, which the court found to be an abuse of process.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, finding that further timetable orders would be ineffective given the defendants' history of non-compliance and delaying tactics.

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice, on referral from the registrar's office following a request from the defendants, reviewed the plaintiff's statement of claim under Rule 2.1.01 for being frivolous and vexatious.

The court found the claim appeared to be frivolous and vexatious and ordered that the plaintiff be given notice and an opportunity to make submissions.

Pending the outcome of this review, the plaintiff's action was stayed pursuant to s.106 of the Courts of Justice Act, and further filings were restricted.

Glycobiosciences Inc. (Glyco) sought leave for its non-lawyer president, Kevin Drizen, to represent the corporation in an application before the Ontario Superior Court of Justice.

This application sought the same relief previously denied by the Federal Court, specifically an order requiring L'Oreal to delete confidential information.

The court dismissed the motion, affirming that corporations must generally be represented by lawyers and that the desire to save legal fees does not constitute a barrier to access to justice.

The court also noted Mr. Drizen's history of unsuccessful litigation and abuse of process in previous related matters.

The defendants and third parties brought motions to dismiss three related actions for delay, citing the plaintiffs' prolonged inaction over several years.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion for a status hearing and leave to amend their statement of claim.

The court found that the plaintiffs failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the significant delay and did not rebut the presumption of non-compensable prejudice to the defendants, particularly due to the death of a key witness.

Consequently, the court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss all actions for delay and dismissed the plaintiffs' cross-motion.

The defendant brought a motion to set aside a default judgment in a mortgage enforcement action.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the defendant failed to move promptly, did not adequately explain the circumstances leading to the default, and lacked an arguable defence on the merits.

The court also noted that the mortgage had matured, rendering the proposed defence largely moot.

The Applicants, Roof Tile Management Group Inc. and Roof Tile Management Inc., brought an application seeking declaratory relief and other non-monetary orders, along with a motion to amend their Notice of Application to seek a reference for damages.

The Respondents, Henry Forget and 2149220 Ontario Inc., opposed both the amendment and the application as the proper form of proceeding, arguing that the case involved highly contested facts requiring an action.

The court dismissed the Applicants' motion to amend, finding it would improperly bifurcate the proceeding and cause procedural injustice.

The court also converted the application into an action under Rule 38.10, determining that an application was not the appropriate forum to resolve the significant factual disputes concerning liability and damages.

This endorsement addresses the costs of a successful motion by the Defendant, Andrew Rudensky, to set aside a noting in default and default judgment obtained by the Plaintiffs.

The Plaintiffs argued for no costs or an offset, asserting Mr. Rudensky's fault for the default.

The court found the Plaintiffs solely responsible for failing to properly serve Mr. Rudensky, thus dismissing their arguments regarding his alleged fault or delay.

The court also rejected Mr. Rudensky's claim for substantial indemnity costs under Rule 49.10, finding that his offer to settle was not "beaten" by the costs endorsement itself.

Ultimately, the court fixed Mr. Rudensky's partial indemnity costs at $79,253.40, payable by the Plaintiffs within 30 days.

The defendant High Tide Inc. brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss the action against it by Highland Cannabis Inc., alleging the claims were frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and that the pleaded torts of intrusion upon seclusion and conversion were not available.

The court found that the claims against High Tide Inc. were frivolous and vexatious, and that neither the tort of intrusion upon seclusion nor conversion applied to the facts of a data breach involving business sales data.

The motion was granted, and the action against High Tide Inc. was dismissed.

The parties brought cross-motions concerning discovery issues, including compelling answers to undertakings, under advisements, and refusals, access to accounting software, and setting a timetable for subsequent steps.

The court ordered various questions to be answered and documents produced, emphasizing relevance and proportionality under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Access to the defendant's accounting software was granted to the plaintiff.

The court also set a timetable for further discovery and expert reports, reserving costs to the trial judge due to divided success.

The applicants, Mejo Varghese and Bincy Joseph, brought an application seeking the return of their $60,000 deposit after refusing to close on the purchase of a new home constructed by the respondent, Hogg Construction Ltd. The applicants alleged a material breach of the Agreement of Purchase and Sale (APS) due to a significant reduction in the living room size (approximately 3'6" shorter than planned), which they argued was not a "minor change" permitted by the contract.

The respondent contended the applicants misinterpreted the plans and that any changes were minor.

Applying the principle from Stefanovska v. Kok, the court found the reduction in the living room's length was objectively significant, affecting the property's use and enjoyment, and thus constituted a major change and a repudiation of the APS.

The applicants were not obligated to complete the transaction.

The applicant sought relief from forfeiture for late notice of a claim under a Directors and Officers' Liability Policy, arguing imperfect compliance.

The respondent denied coverage, asserting non-compliance with a condition precedent.

The court found the applicant's delay in notifying the insurer, after the Securities Act amendment permitted disclosure, constituted a substantial breach and caused prejudice to the insurer in a claims-made policy.

Consequently, relief from forfeiture was not available, and the application was dismissed.

The defendant, Valeria Dye, brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action by the plaintiffs, Augustine D’Souza and Cedric D’Souza.

The plaintiffs claimed damages for breach of contract, fiduciary duty, trust, and negligence, alleging that $86,000 was transferred to Dye's trust account and improperly released.

The court found that the facts were hazy and in dispute, raising genuine issues requiring a trial.

The motion was dismissed, with the court emphasizing a cautious approach when dealing with self-represented litigants and noting that informal evidence could be sufficient to defeat summary judgment.

The Applicant brought a motion for judgment, alleging that the Respondent's principal, Paul Halyk, accessed confidential and privileged communications between the Applicant's principal and its legal counsel.

The court found that Halyk accessed privileged material and failed to rebut the presumption of prejudice, as he did not provide specific details about the extent of his review.

While declining to grant judgment on the Application due to insufficient evidentiary record for the underlying merits, the court ordered the Respondent's Notice of Appearance struck, allowing the Application to proceed as undefended.

The defendants moved to dismiss or stay the plaintiff's action under Rule 21.01(3) due to pending related proceedings.

The court rejected arguments of res judicata and issue estoppel, finding no final determinations had been made.

It allowed the action to proceed against one defendant, Vilson Da Silva, as the claims were distinct and could not be brought in the existing lien action due to the Construction Lien Act.

However, claims against Leblon Carpentry were dismissed for lack of factual basis, and claims against Leblon Drywall were dismissed (without prejudice) as they were duplicative of an existing counterclaim in the lien action and contrary to the purpose of the Construction Lien Act.

To ensure judicial economy and avoid multiplicity of actions, the court ordered the transfer of a related Barrie action to Brampton and directed that all three interconnected actions be tried together or sequentially.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's action, which sought damages under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for alleged discrimination and obstruction of justice by court staff due to her whistleblower status.

The court, applying Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, found the Statement of Claim unintelligible, an attempt to relitigate past proceedings, and that court staff are statutorily immune from such claims.

The action was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The defendants brought a motion for security for costs, which they subsequently abandoned.

The plaintiff had made a "with prejudice" settlement offer, including evidence of financial means, which the defendants did not accept.

The parties could not agree on the costs of the abandoned motion.

The court found the plaintiff's claimed costs reasonable, noting the defendants' lack of due diligence in bringing the motion, their improper focus on a summary judgment motion as frivolous, and the unreasonableness of requiring the plaintiff to prepare responding materials after the settlement offer.

The court awarded the plaintiff costs of $14,500.00 on a substantial indemnity basis for work incurred following the settlement offer, payable within 30 days, rejecting the defendants' request to defer payment.

This endorsement addresses the appropriate resolution of costs and clarification of damages following a wrongful dismissal summary judgment motion.

The court determined that for the purpose of comparing a judgment to a Rule 49 offer, damages awards for wrongful dismissal are reduced by statutory termination payments.

Consequently, the plaintiff did not obtain a result more favourable than their Rule 49 offer, nor did the defendant's offer trigger cost consequences under Rule 49.10(2) as the court's award exceeded it when statutory payments were factored in.

The court also ruled that tax consequences are not relevant in a Rule 49 analysis.

The plaintiff was awarded partial indemnity costs, and the net value of the judgment was clarified.

This endorsement concerns the costs of an injunction motion where the plaintiffs' request to prohibit the defendant Dongab Co. Inc. from exercising its power of sale on two mortgages was denied.

Dongab and Network Sewer and Watermain Ltd., the successful defendants, sought costs on a full indemnity basis, or alternatively substantial or partial indemnity.

Despite mortgage documentation calling for full indemnity, the court exercised its discretion under section 131 of the Courts of Justice Act to award costs on a partial indemnity scale, finding the requested amounts extraordinarily high and exceeding the plaintiffs' reasonable expectations.

The plaintiffs were ordered to pay $163,000.00 in all-inclusive costs.

This decision addresses a summary judgment motion by Security National Insurance Company (SN) seeking to dismiss claims for unidentified automobile and family protection coverage.

The central issue was whether the deceased, Lawrence Hamel, and the named insured, Yvonne Moelker, qualified as "spouses" under the Insurance Act and OPCF 44R endorsement, given they maintained separate residences due to Hamel's mental health.

SN argued for a strict co-residence requirement, while the plaintiffs and the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund advocated for a broader interpretation aligned with family law's dependency context.

The court dismissed SN's motion, adopting the expansive, holistic definition of "spouse" from the Family Law Act, which does not mandate shared dwelling, finding that Yvonne and Larry were indeed spouses.