SCJ 2014

A small hydroelectric power producer sought a declaration and damages concerning the interpretation of a long‑term electricity purchase contract.

The plaintiff argued that payments after the tenth year of the agreement were required to escalate annually with inflation, while the defendant maintained that the contract fixed the tenth‑year rate as a floor and permitted annual rate determinations thereafter.

The court held the contract language was clear and contained no entitlement to an automatic inflation escalator.

Claims based on estoppel arising from the treatment of other generators were rejected.

Although the limitation period did not bar claims arising within two years before the action, the plaintiff ultimately failed to establish entitlement under the contract.

The plaintiff contractor sued a corporation and its director for breach of contract arising from unpaid plumbing and drainage services.

The parties had orally settled the debt by reducing the amount owed and arranging repayment through a loan amortization schedule, but no written settlement agreement or personal guarantee was executed.

The plaintiff alleged the director personally guaranteed repayment of the corporate debt.

The court found the evidence did not establish that the director promised a personal guarantee.

In any event, any such oral guarantee would be unenforceable under s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds because it was not in writing and signed.

Charitable beneficiaries of an estate brought a motion seeking a contempt finding against the estate trustee for failing to comply with prior court orders requiring the filing of estate accounts and the taking out of an appointment to pass accounts.

The trustee had been personally served and given an additional extension but failed to comply and did not appear at the contempt hearing.

Applying the test for civil contempt, the court found the prior orders were clear and unequivocal and that the trustee deliberately disobeyed them.

The court held the trustee in contempt, removed her as estate trustee, and ordered the appointment of a succeeding trustee to administer the estate and receive all estate assets.

Substantial indemnity costs were ordered against the trustee personally.

Following a motion to change child support based on an alleged material change in circumstances, the court determined costs after releasing the underlying judgment.

The respondent father had sought termination or suspension of child support and relief from arrears, while the applicant mother sought imputation of income, enforcement mechanisms, and security for child support.

The court found that both parties achieved some success but that the overall result favoured the applicant mother because the father obtained only limited relief and the court granted security for child support through a lien on his property.

The court also considered the parties’ conduct, the absence of meaningful settlement offers, and the importance of enforcing a child’s right to support.

Balancing the Family Law Rules factors and the parties’ financial circumstances, the court awarded partial indemnity costs to the applicant.

The plaintiff appealed a Master's order that set aside an amended statement of claim delivered while the defendants' motion to strike was outstanding.

The plaintiff had aggressively sought default judgments without notice despite knowing the defendants were represented and actively defending.

The court upheld the Master's reliance on the established practice requiring leave or consent to amend a pleading in the face of a motion to strike.

The court also noted that the Rules of Professional Conduct must be read with the Principles of Civility, and adopting technical interpretations of the Rules of Civil Procedure to deny a represented defendant the right to be heard is not condoned.

The appeal was dismissed.

Media organizations sought certiorari to quash a provincial court judge’s order imposing a partial publication ban and denying access to a video exhibit tendered during a guilty plea for obstruction of justice arising from a detention-centre death.

The applicants argued that the provincial court judge lacked jurisdiction and that the order failed the Dagenais/Mentuck test.

The Superior Court held that the judge presiding over the guilty plea had jurisdiction to consider and grant a publication ban related to the proceeding before him.

The court found that the partial ban appropriately balanced open court principles with the fair trial rights of co‑accused facing related charges.

The court concluded that the order was necessary to prevent a real and substantial risk to the proper administration of justice and that no error of law appeared on the face of the record.

The court determined costs following dismissal of a motion seeking removal of plaintiffs’ counsel due to an alleged conflict of interest.

Applying s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court exercised its discretion to award costs to the plaintiffs as the successful parties.

Although the motion raised a potentially significant issue regarding counsel’s role, the court found delay in bringing the motion and concerns suggesting it may have been brought for tactical reasons.

The amount sought by the plaintiffs was considered excessive for the scope and complexity of the motion.

Costs were fixed at a reduced amount payable by the defendant.

The defendant appealed a master's order dismissing a motion to remove the plaintiff's counsel for an alleged conflict of interest.

The issue was whether conflict rules applicable to law firm partnerships also apply where lawyers practise in a cost‑sharing association but hold themselves out publicly as a single firm.

The court held that where lawyers present themselves to the public as a firm, the same conflict principles apply, including the presumption that confidential information may be shared absent adequate screening mechanisms.

Because the lawyers shared branding, contact information, and facilities without evidence of protective measures or a shared conflicts system, a reasonable observer would perceive an appearance of conflict.

The master erred in relying on conclusory assurances rather than objective safeguards.

The appeal was allowed and the plaintiff’s counsel was removed from the record.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking to transfer a Small Claims Court action to the Superior Court of Justice in order to pursue substantially higher damages.

The action originally sought damages within the Small Claims Court monetary jurisdiction, but the plaintiff later asserted losses exceeding $400,000 arising from the repossession of a leased truck and resulting business losses and health consequences.

The court considered the principles governing transfers from Small Claims Court, including the court’s inherent jurisdiction to permit a transfer where appropriate.

Relying on authorities addressing when a plaintiff may pursue the claim in its “real dimensions,” the court held that the circumstances justified a transfer despite the plaintiff’s earlier choice of forum.

The motion was granted, but costs were awarded to the defendant because the need for the motion arose from the plaintiff’s own procedural error.

The applicant sought to quash a common law peace bond imposed after acquittal on criminal harassment charges.

The trial judge had ordered the peace bond to prevent further misconduct toward the complainants, finding a reasonable apprehension of a future breach of the peace.

The applicant argued the order was imposed without proper notice or representation, that his hearing impairment prevented him from following proceedings, and that the peace bond was unnecessary.

The court rejected these arguments, finding that the applicant received fair notice and representation, accommodations for his hearing disability were provided, and the evidentiary record supported the trial judge’s conclusion that a peace bond was justified.

The court further held that the proper mechanism to challenge the order was a statutory appeal rather than an application for certiorari.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference arising from an encounter with a 13‑year‑old complainant whom he met through an online dating website.

The accused denied that sexual activity occurred and asserted the parties only briefly met in a park.

Applying the credibility framework in R. v. W.(D.), the court rejected the accused’s evidence and found it did not raise a reasonable doubt.

Despite inconsistencies on peripheral matters, the court found the complainant credible and reliable, noting her lack of motive to fabricate and corroboration from a friend regarding subsequent events.

The court concluded that sexual intercourse occurred when the complainant was 13 and the accused was 25, proving both offences beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendants brought motions seeking dismissal of the claim against an individual defendant and security for costs.

The plaintiff sought leave to amend the statement of claim to add allegations that the individual defendant improperly directed the corporate defendant not to pay a promissory note.

The court held the proposed amendments were insufficient to establish personal liability for a corporate officer because they did not plead conduct separate from the officer’s role as the directing mind of the corporation.

Leave to amend those portions of the pleading was refused, and the claim against the individual defendant was dismissed for failing to disclose a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The court also ordered the corporate plaintiff to post $25,000 as security for costs due to concerns about its ability to satisfy a potential costs award.

In CCAA proceedings involving a debtor company whose assets had already been sold and where no plan of arrangement was contemplated, the representative plaintiff in a proposed securities class action moved to lift the stay of proceedings and to amend the claims procedure order after failing to file a proof of claim by the claims bar date.

The directors argued that the claims procedure barred the class action against them and extinguished related claims, including access to insurance proceeds.

The court held that both the stay and the claims bar order are discretionary tools intended to facilitate restructuring or liquidation objectives under the CCAA.

Because the restructuring process had effectively concluded and no plan was forthcoming, using the claims bar order to extinguish the class action would serve no functional purpose under the CCAA.

The court exercised its discretion to lift the stay and modify the claims procedure order to permit the plaintiff to proceed with the class action.

Following a jury conviction for second degree murder arising from the prolonged abuse and death of a child, the court determined the appropriate periods of parole ineligibility under ss. 235 and 745.4 of the Criminal Code.

The sentencing judge assessed the character of each offender, the nature and circumstances of the offence, and the jury’s recommendations.

The evidence established prolonged physical abuse, malnutrition, and deprivation of medical care, culminating in a fatal assault.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that one accused committed the final assault causing death, while the other was complicit through failure to protect and participation in the ongoing abuse.

The primary perpetrator received life imprisonment with 18 years’ parole ineligibility, while the secondary participant received life imprisonment with 13 years’ parole ineligibility.

Following the dismissal of motions to set aside service ex juris and to stay or dismiss an action for lack of jurisdiction, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The successful party sought substantial partial indemnity costs.

The court reduced the claimed costs to reflect time spent on unsuccessful jurisdictional arguments, unnecessary steps, and work unrelated to the motions.

Costs were ultimately fixed at a reduced amount and apportioned severally among the moving defendants, reflecting their differing roles in the litigation, including the raising of a forum non conveniens argument.

Following dismissal of a complex multi‑party action on summary judgment, the successful defendants sought costs of the entire action in addition to agreed costs of the summary judgment motion.

The plaintiff argued that costs submissions should be limited to the motion and that delay in bringing the motion inflated the defendants’ legal fees.

The court held that where summary judgment disposes of the entire action, the court may fix costs of the entire proceeding, treating the motion similarly to a trial judgment.

Applying the discretion under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court reduced the defendants’ claimed partial‑indemnity costs by 25% to align with what would have been the plaintiff’s reasonable expectations in a large and technically complex case.

In a health care cost recovery action brought by the Crown against tobacco companies under the Tobacco Damages and Health Care Costs Recovery Act, 2009, a defendant moved to strike portions of the statement of claim referencing alleged misrepresentations made by tobacco companies before parliamentary committees.

The court considered whether statements made to House of Commons and legislative committees could be relied upon in a civil action.

It held that parliamentary privilege, specifically freedom of speech, protects statements made during parliamentary proceedings and committee appearances, including by non‑members who participate as witnesses.

Because the privilege is absolute and prevents courts from questioning such statements, the impugned pleadings referencing those presentations could not stand.

The motion to strike those paragraphs was therefore granted.

A paving contractor sought payment for unpaid invoices relating to asphalt work performed at two Canada Post facilities.

The defendant alleged the work was deficient and counterclaimed for remedial costs, asserting the plaintiff failed to perform the contract as originally agreed.

The court held that the parties had orally varied their written contract at a pre‑construction meeting, changing the scope of work from removal and replacement of asphalt to grinding and repair while maintaining the same price structure.

The court rejected the defendant’s credibility on key issues and found no evidence of complaints from the project owner or of required remedial work.

Judgment was granted for the unpaid balance and the counterclaim was dismissed.

The plaintiff brought a motion seeking a ruling that her action should proceed to trial and not be dismissed on a forthcoming summary judgment motion.

The defendant argued that the claim was barred by res judicata, issue estoppel, abuse of process, and the Limitations Act because the same issues had already been adjudicated in a prior action concerning the construction of a residential property.

The court found that the plaintiff was attempting to relitigate factual and legal issues previously determined and that the new action was also commenced outside the applicable two-year limitation period.

Applying principles of proportionality and the culture shift endorsed in Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court determined that further motion proceedings would serve no useful purpose.

The action was dismissed immediately as an abuse of process.

The applicant brought a motion to sever a joint tenancy in a matrimonial home following separation and settlement of family law proceedings, and sought discharge of a creditor’s writ of execution registered against the property.

The court considered whether the parties’ conduct during matrimonial litigation constituted a course of dealing sufficient to sever the joint tenancy under the principles set out in Hansen Estate.

The court held that the parties’ actions demonstrated a mutual intention to treat their interests as tenants in common, thereby severing the joint tenancy.

Exercising equitable jurisdiction, the court further ordered that the creditor’s writ be discharged upon payment of $37,000 into court pending determination of entitlement among potential creditors.

The court found insufficient evidence that the creditor would be prejudiced by such an order.