SCC 2023

The appellant corporation, which held approximately $90 million in non-capital losses and other tax attributes it could not itself utilize, entered into a complex arrangement with a venture capital company to monetize those tax attributes.

Through a series of transactions, the appellant's assets and liabilities were stripped into a parent company, and the venture capital company obtained contractual control over the appellant's board composition and activities via an investment agreement, while never formally acquiring de jure control of its shares.

The appellant then carried on a new investment business using the tax attributes to shelter income.

The Supreme Court held, 7-1, that the transactions constituted abusive tax avoidance under the general anti-avoidance rule (GAAR) in s. 245 of the Income Tax Act.

The object, spirit and purpose of s. 111(5) is to prevent corporations from being acquired by unrelated parties in order to deduct unused losses against income from another business for the benefit of new shareholders; the transactions achieved the functional equivalent of an acquisition of control and frustrated that rationale.

The appellant appealed a unanimous decision of the Alberta Court of Appeal that set aside a trial acquittal on one count of sexual assault and substituted a conviction pursuant to s. 686(4)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had erred in law both by admitting evidence of the complainant's prior sexual activity and by finding an air of reality to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the defence had no air of reality and the prior sexual activity evidence was inadmissible, such that the Court of Appeal properly substituted a conviction.

A school board trustee sued a teachers' union president for defamation arising from public statements characterizing the trustee's online posts opposing a provincial sexual orientation and gender identity educational initiative as bigoted, transphobic, and hateful.

The defendant applied to dismiss the action under British Columbia's anti-SLAPP statute, the Protection of Public Participation Act.

The chambers judge dismissed the defamation action, finding a valid fair comment defence and that the public interest in protecting the defendant's counter-speech outweighed the limited harm to the plaintiff.

The Court of Appeal reinstated the action.

The Supreme Court of Canada majority restored the chambers judge's dismissal order, holding that the plaintiff failed to adduce sufficient evidence of serious harm causally linked to the defendant's statements, and that the defendant's expression as counter-speech on a matter of public interest relating to a marginalized group was deserving of significant protection under the public interest weighing exercise in s. 4(2)(b) of the PPPA.

Côté J. dissented, concluding the plaintiff was entitled to a day in court and that the chambers judge erred in failing to consider aggravating factors to harm and the quality of the expression at issue.

The appellant sought division of family property pursuant to Saskatchewan's Family Property Act after the parties executed a separation agreement without independent legal advice or financial disclosure.

The trial judge found the agreement not binding and equalized the family property, ordering the respondent to pay approximately $90,000.

The Court of Appeal applied the Miglin framework and found the agreement entitled to great weight, ordering the appellant to pay approximately $5,000.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the Miglin framework should not be transposed wholesale into provincial family property legislation, which requires a statute-specific analytical approach.

The Court found the agreement binding and procedurally sound, with no demonstrated prejudice from the absence of legal advice or disclosure.

The appeal was allowed and the family home and household goods were divided as of the date of trial, resulting in a payment of $43,382.63 owed by the respondent to the appellant.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision restoring stay applications for abuse of process that a trial judge had summarily dismissed following a Vukelich hearing.

The accused had alleged systemic police misconduct and inhumane conditions of confinement prejudicing their right to a fair trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal and held that the correct threshold for summary dismissal of applications in the criminal law context is whether the application is manifestly frivolous — a rigorous standard requiring that the frivolous nature of the application be obvious on the face of the record.

The trial judge erred by failing to assume the truth of the alleged facts and inferences and by applying an insufficiently rigorous threshold that slid towards the merits of the underlying applications.

The appellant challenged provisions of Quebec's Cannabis Regulation Act that completely prohibit the possession and cultivation of cannabis plants in a dwelling-house, arguing they fell under federal criminal law power or were inoperative due to federal paramountcy.

The Supreme Court held that the impugned provisions are a valid exercise of provincial jurisdiction under ss. 92(13) and (16) of the Constitution Act, 1867, finding their pith and substance is to ensure the effectiveness of the state monopoly on cannabis sales to protect public health and security.

The Court further held that the provisions do not frustrate the purpose of the federal Cannabis Act, because Parliament's exemption of up to four home-grown plants does not confer positive rights to cultivate, and the provincial objectives are compatible with the federal scheme's goals of combating illicit cannabis activity.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered by the Quebec Court of Appeal arising from the respondent's refusal to provide a roadside breath sample under s. 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code when the demanding officer did not have an approved screening device (ASD) in his possession.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the word 'forthwith' in s. 254(2)(b) must be interpreted in accordance with its ordinary meaning — immediately or without delay — and that the absence of an ASD at the scene at the time a demand is made is not an unusual circumstance justifying a flexible interpretation of that requirement.

A demand made when no ASD is present is therefore invalid, and a driver cannot be criminally liable for refusing to comply with a demand that it was physically impossible to comply with.

The Crown bears the burden of establishing unusual circumstances to justify any departure from the immediacy requirement.

The appeal was dismissed and the acquittal upheld.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired driving and driving with excessive blood alcohol after police conducted a random sobriety stop on private property.

The officers had formed the intention to stop the respondent while he was on the highway under s. 48(1) of the Highway Traffic Act, but only effected the stop after he had pulled onto a private driveway.

The Supreme Court held that s. 48(1) did not authorize random sobriety stops on private property, as the respondent was no longer a 'driver' within the HTA's definition when stopped, and the police breached his s. 9 Charter rights.

However, applying the Grant framework, the Court declined to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2), finding that the legal uncertainty at the time rendered the breach not egregious, and the reliable and crucial nature of the evidence combined with the serious public interest in combatting impaired driving outweighed the first two lines of inquiry.

The accused voluntarily made admissions during a treatment process concerning acts of a sexual nature committed against a child.

Those admissions were sent to the director of youth protection and then to police with the accused's consent.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and filed a motion to exclude the admissions, which the trial judge dismissed.

The Court of Appeal entered an acquittal on the basis that the admissions were inadmissible.

The Supreme Court, in a majority decision, allowed the Crown's appeal on the sole issue of the accused's consent to disclosure of his admissions, restoring the conviction.

The dissenting judge would have dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the Court of Appeal majority.

The Crown appealed the Court of Appeal for British Columbia's decision setting aside voyeurism convictions and ordering a new trial.

The accused, a hockey coach, had surreptitiously photographed two adolescent boys aged 12 to 14 in their underwear in hockey arena dressing rooms.

The central issue was whether s. 162(1)(a) of the Criminal Code contains an implicit temporal component requiring the Crown to prove that nudity was reasonably expected at the specific time the photos were taken.

The Supreme Court held, through a textual, contextual, and purposive analysis, that s. 162(1)(a) has no implicit temporal component; dressing rooms qualify as protected 'safe places' regardless of whether nudity is expected at the precise moment of observation or recording.

The Court restored the convictions, and declined to address the respondent's constitutional overbreadth argument raised for the first time on appeal.

A member of the Canadian Armed Forces posted abroad was convicted of voyeurism, possession of a device for surreptitious interception of private communications, sexual assault, and disgraceful conduct, following a search of his residence and electronic devices by Canadian military investigators and local police operating under a Virginia warrant.

The appellant challenged the search as violating s. 8 of the Charter, arguing the search was unauthorized and unreasonably expanded to cover unanticipated offences.

The majority held that the search was authorized by law under the Virginia warrant, which expressly covered electronic devices; that the warrant met the Vu standard for specific prior authorization of digital searches; and that evidence of sexual assault discovered inadvertently during triage of electronic devices was admissible under the plain view doctrine.

The Court declined to reconsider the extraterritorial application of the Charter as established in R. v. Hape.

The appeal was dismissed and convictions affirmed.

The Crown appealed declarations of unconstitutionality of mandatory minimum sentences for robbery with a restricted or prohibited firearm (five years under s. 344(1)(a)(i)) and robbery with an ordinary firearm (four years under the former s. 344(1)(a.1)) of the Criminal Code.

The majority held that neither mandatory minimum constituted cruel and unusual punishment under s. 12 of the Charter, finding the offences narrowly defined, high in gravity and moral culpability, and the minimums not grossly disproportionate even in reasonably foreseeable cases.

The Court affirmed the two-stage framework from the companion case R. v. Hills, 2023 SCC 2, and addressed the role of Indigeneity in the s. 12 analysis.

Karakatsanis and Jamal JJ. dissented, concluding both provisions were unconstitutional and should be struck down.

The appellant pleaded guilty to intentionally discharging a firearm into or at a place knowing or being reckless as to whether another person was present, contrary to s. 244.2(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentence of four years' imprisonment under s. 244.2(3)(b) on the basis of a reasonable hypothetical involving a young person firing an air-powered pistol or rifle at a residence incapable of perforating its walls.

The majority held that the mandatory minimum is grossly disproportionate under s. 12 of the Charter because the offence captures a wide spectrum of conduct ranging from acts that present little danger to the public to those that pose a grave risk, and the fit sentence for the hypothetical youthful offender would be a suspended sentence of up to 12 months' probation — rendering a four-year custodial term totally out of sync with sentencing norms and incompatible with human dignity.

The declaration of invalidity was applied retroactively and the three-and-a-half-year sentence imposed by the sentencing judge was reinstated.

Côté J. dissented, finding that the hypothetical was not a reasonably foreseeable application of the offence and that the mandatory minimum did not meet the high threshold for cruel and unusual punishment.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision that set aside the accused's conviction for sexual offences against a young child and entered an acquittal.

The trial judge had admitted the child's unsworn videotaped police statement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule after a psychologist concluded the child could not testify without undue trauma.

The Court of Appeal majority found the trial judge erred in the threshold reliability analysis by failing to address the role of cross-examination and making a positive finding of no motive to fabricate.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, substantially adopting the reasons of the Court of Appeal dissent, and restored the conviction.